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SUMMARY 
The subject of this thesis is the influence of encounter on the religious 
understanding of a group of primary age children in inner city Leicester. The 
research focuses on a minority of non-Muslim children in a predominanýly 
Muslim area,, and is informed by small discussion groups in which the children 
were free to explore and share their own ideas. The study begins by presenting a 
view of children as active in the construction of their own lives. 
The young participants' contributions to the discussions are related to other 
theoretical positions on children's religion and a cognitive and language-based 
approach is advocated. A progressive, developmental model of children's 
religious thinking is rejected in favour of a model that allows multi-directional 
movement to and fro between different faith styles in response to a number of 
contextual factors. 
Detailed textual analysis of the transcribed conversations reveals the inffuences of 
social encounter on the children's understanding. It also recognises the creativity 
of the children's religious thinking when their perspectives are brought into 
dialogical relationship with the viewpoints of others. As they assimilate words and 
discourses from their wider environment, the children adapt them and emplpy 
them for their own ends. Their social context of religious plurality supplies a bank 
of understandings and associations. From this they select and negotiate meanings 
to suit the requirements of the immediate communicative context of the 
discussions. The outcome of the process is the children's ongoing theoloýical 
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This thesis focuses on the religious understanding of a group of children as they 
meet together in an inner city junior school. Within the ethnically and religiously 
diverse city of Leicester, the context of the research participants' lives and 
schooling is a predominantly Muslim area where the children themselves,. as non 
Muslims, are a minority. Their inter faith encounter with neighbours and schopl 
friends of the Islamic faith thus involves the dynamic of minority-majority power 
relations. The other point of encounter is the meeting of the participants in the 
discussion groups that generated the project's data. To these meetings the children 
brought the shared experiences of their common neighbourhood and school 
context, and the different loyalties, beliefs, outlooks of the Christian, Hindu and 
Rastafarian traditions with which they identified- 
The 'religious understanding' of the thesis title is both the content in terms of 
what the children understand about religion and about God, and the process by 
which they come to their understanding within the context of encounter. The 
research discussions are viewed as part of this creative process and the children 
taking part are seen to be engaged in active meaning-making. The project's close 
textual analysis of the recorded outcomes of these research encounters takes into 
account both the content and the form of the children's understanding and the 
relationship between the two. To provide the necessary detail for this analysis and 
to supply the situational context for the children's words,, extensive extracts from 
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nine of their dialogues are included as appendices. References to these are 
signalled in the main body of the text with the letter representing each dialogue 
and the line number of the phrase. 
Structure 
The thesis has been organised into five main sections- Method, Mind, Word, 
Dialogue and Meaning. Each of these sections is further divided into two chapters. 
Method 
This first section deals with the methodology of the project and relates it to other 
research literature. Chapter 1.1 sets out the understandings of chIldhood that have 
influenced my approach to this research with children. It covers reflections on the 
relationship of research and researcher to those being researched, and on the 
relationship of the research event to the wider contexts of the children's lives. At 
this early stage in the thesis, attention is drawn to the centrality of dialogue in the 
overall scheme. 
Chapter 1.2 moves from the gathering of data in the field to the recording, analysis 
and reporting of the same. During these processes the data is brought into contact 
with new contexts and ideas. It addresses the questions of objectiVity and 
general 1 sabil ity in data analysis and interpretation, by describing the pursuit of the 
former in terms of research discipline, and by suggesting a wider relevance for the 
outcomes of this small scale project in areas of knowledge, theory and practice. 
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Mind 
The next two chapters revolve around the theme of children's 'God talk' and 
recognise the strength of the combination of cognitive activity and religious 
language in the continuous formation of children's understanding. Chapter 2.1 
brings instances of children's dialogue to the debate between experience-based 
and cognitive approaches to children's religion, and concludes in favour of 
children's active engagement with theology. 
Chapter 2.2 picks up the cognitive approach to children's religion by positioning 
research findings in relation to Fowler's developmental model of Faith Stages. 
Examination of the children's contributions to the research discussions indicates 
that the movement of understanding is less a progressive movement up through a 
series of faith stages than a multi -directional movement between faith styles, 
adopted by speakers in response to the context of their speech. 
Word 
The third section draws on the work of Mikhail Bakhtin and of Lev Vygotsky to 
trace the influence of contexts of encounter and of the requirements of 
communication, on the children's words and understanding. The two chapters of 
this section follow the movement of word meanings through two interconnected 
social domains. Chapter 3.1 explores the wider domain of the children's social 
setting, noting their varied employment of discourses and words they have 
assimilated from others and made their own. 
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Chapter 3.2 looks in more detail at the actual exchanges of the research 
discussions. The children are seen in their role as speakers and listeners as they 
share their ideas on religious outlooks, practices and beliefs. Their words are 
analysed to show how they select and organise their meanings to effect 
communication with the researcher and their peers. 
Dialogue 
At the centre of the project is a concept of dialogue. Chapter 4.1 uses instances of 
the children's verbal interchanges to explore different understandings of dialogue. 
A threefold model is proposed which incorporates the necessary dialogue between 
differences that is the children's experience, dialogue as an open response to 
difference, and dialogue as the kind of verbal exchange in which the children are 
engaged. 
The second in this pair of chapters on dialogue considers religious dialogue in 
particular. It addresses concerns about safeguarding the integrity of a faith 
tradition or of an individual's religious viewpoint, during dialogical exchange. 
Examples are given of the children's orientation among the diverse religious 
languages they encounter. 
Alleaning 
The final two chapters provide particular examples of children's meaning-making 
dealing with the content of their understanding on issues prominent in their 
conversation. Religious identity is the first of these as the children consider the 
origins, significance and loyalties of their own and others' religious identities. 
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Chapter 5.2 continues with an exploration of the children's understandings of 
religion and of God. As it does so, it draws the children's contributions into a 
wider debate between religious studies and theology. The thesis ends with 
illustrations of the children's creative theology, and recognition of how that 
theology has evolved through their engagement with the context of religious 
plurality in which they live. 
5 
METHOD 
1.1 RELATING TO THE FIELD 
1.1.1 Frameworks 
In the following two chapters I reflect on the underlying understandings that 
guided my choice of methodologies, the data gathering, analysis and theory. They 
respond to the notion developed by Thomas Kuhn: 
Inquirers always work within a paradigm -a framework that detern-fines the 
concepts that are used and that also contains exemplars, or model inquiries,, 
which direct attention toward some problems as being key and away from 
other problems regarded (from that perspective) as somewhat trivial. 
(Philips 1993,67) 
In its initial conception and design this project was based on my own preliminary 
understandings of the children with whom I was going to work, and had its origins 
in the interpretive ethnographic studies of young people's religion by the Warwick 
Religions and Education Research Unit (Jackson and Nesbitt 1993; Jackson 1997, 
Nesbitt 2000). My research practice and interpretation did not remain within 
particular frameworks, however. As the project progressed its foundations were re- 
examined. The focus on children's religious understanding required the positioning 
of my research in relation to differing paradigms of childhood used by other 
schools of thought to explore children's religion, notably David Hay's work on 
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children's spirituality (Chapter 2.1) and James Fowler's on faith development 
(Chapter 2.2). The latter in particular involved some reconsideration of my initial 
presuppositions as I traced the children's movement between different faith styles. 
An increasing interest in the children's use of language during research group 
interviews led me to consider other frameworks of discourse and dialogue, 
recognising Lev Vygotsky"s linking of language and understanding (Chapter 2.2),. 
and drawing on Mikhail Bakhtin's dialogism to support my interpretation of the 
children's context,. words and meanings (Chapters 2.1,2.2). In common with the 
children with whom I was researching, I found that my thinking developed through 
the bringing together of ideas from a variety of theoretical positions and 
discourses. 
1.1.2 Collecting the Data 
The research data which form the basis for this thesis were gathered during the 
years 1997 to 1999 at the junior school where I had been teaching for several 
years, in a predominantly Muslim area of inner city Leicester. The participants of 
the project were thirty five boys and girls drawn from three year groups within the 
school. In a school population of around four hundred, these children constituted 
the non-Muslim minority; twenty of them identified as Hindu and (like the majority 
of their Muslim peers) of Gujarati origin, the rest identified as Christian (one of 
them as 'Rastafarian-Christian'). Of these latter, three were white, five were of 
Affican Caribbean descent and the rest dual heritage Affican Caribbean and white. 
The data collected during the course of the project showed the importance of both 
religious and racial identity in the children's self-understanding. The children were 
7 
aged between eight and eleven years old drawn from the school years 4,5 and 6. 
Because of the small number of children in the school who were not from Muslim 
families all from these year groups were included in the research activities. 
The data were collected as tape recordings at a series of interviews held at the 
school during the festivals of 'Id al-Fitr and 'Id al-Adha. During 'Id the Muslim 
children have time off school to celebrate with their families- The few (non- 
Muslim) children left at school are put together in year groups and take part in 
activities outside the regular curriculum. This timing meant that the sessions could 
take place with minimum disruption to the children's schooling and to my timetable 
as a full time teacher. It also meant that the participants naturally fell into non- 
Muslim groups and did not have to be selected explicitly on these grounds from 
their classes, a process that might have appeared divisive. However, the fact that 
they were being interviewed at a time when Muslims were absent from school 
engaged in different activities from the rest of the school population, did mean thRt 
the difference between being a Muslim and not being a Muslim was particularly 
evident. The influence that this might have had on the children's understanding of 
religious and community differences during the course of the interviews has been 
taken into account in the analysis. 
The children were interviewed in groups which varied in number from three to 
seven. The members of these groups were drawn from the same school year, often 
from the same class, and so knew each other well. Each group contained both 
Hindus and Christians so that there was an element of commonality (being a 
religious minority in a largely Muslim school) and religious difference in each; they 
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were both together discussing their relationship to an 'other' outside the interview 
group, and relating to each other's 'otherness' within the group. Most of the 
children were interviewed twice. 
The interviews were intended to last for about an hour,, though the enthusiasm of 
the children meant that they often ran over that time. They were flexible with little 
direct input from myself as researcher, and with the children able to take their 
thoughts in different directions and explore avenues not explicitly required by the 
activity or question. The first interviews were organised around the focus of a 
series of word cards. A pile of cards was placed face down on the table around 
which the children sat, and they took it in turns to pick up a card and to read the 
word written upon it. The members of the group were asked to discuss what they 
understood by the word they had just heard. The words I had chosen for this 
activity were terms of religious belief and practice, some of a general nature 
(religious, God, spirit), some specifically related to the particular traditions with 
which they identify (Krishna, Jah, Jesus), and several which they might have heard 
used by their Muslim peers (haram, Ramadan, Allah, guna). 
After the first round of group interviews I selected three Year 6 pupils: a practising 
'I? n imastafarian-Christian% Affican Caribbean boy-, a dual heritage (white/Aftican 
Caribbean) girl who identified as Christian but had little active involvement in 
formal religion, and a Gujarati fEndu girl. They were asked to put together a series 
of questions to be used in further interviews. The three were given no guidance 
about the questions other than that the target audience was the same group of 
children still at school while their peers were away celebrating 'Id. The questions 
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that emerged expressed a range of concerns covering pressures of minority status 
within the school, religious beliefs in a context of plurality, religious, cultural and 
racial difference,, interreligious and racial tension and relations within the school. 
The process of formulating questions involved the children in wide-ranging 
discussion of these issues, which constituted further valuable data for the project. 
Subsequent interviews were conducted around the twenty six questions that 
emerged. 
Above is the basic outline of the research methods used during the fieldwork stage 
of this project. The rest of this chapter explores a number of underlying issues 
which guided the choice of methods and possibly influenced the outcomes- ft 
child status of the participants in the project, the purposes of the research, the 
relationship of myself as researcher to the child participants, the relationship of my 
work to other paradigms of research. 
1.1.3 Un derstan ding Ch ildh ood 
Perspectives on Children 
One of the underlying issues affecting the methods and outcome of my research 
was my position as an adult seeking to engage with the perspectives of children. 
The understanding of the child participants with which I began this research was 
bom out of the ten years experience as teacher at their school. Working with 
children gave me certain insights into their lives and views. With these particular 
children my involvement had been extensive before the project began. A minority 
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of them had been members of my own class with all the intellectual, pastoral and 
disciplinary interaction that implies. All the white and black children in the school 
and many of the Hindus had worked together with me on school dramatic 
productions. Several of them I had supported in lunchtime dance groups to which 
they brought their own music and dance styles, the most successful being the self- 
styled 'Black Inspiration' with its interpretations of Jamaican pop. The school 
Carrom Club (practising a board game popular in the Indian subcontinent) that I 
ran for several years was attended by a large proportion of the black, white and 
Hindu children. As well as fulfilling my more formal teacher role, then, I had seen 
them exercising responsibility and been a witness to their team work and creativity. 
At the outset of the research project I had the advantage of an already established 
relationship with the children participants which obviated the need for a lengthy 
period of getting to know the field. However, my knowledge of them was derived 
from my particular professional role and status within the school and could be 
distorted by 'practitioner concerns' (Hammersley 1993, p219) if not checked 
against a wider picture provided by theories developed by others working in siolar 
fields. 
Others exploring children's religious understanding have worked from particular 
concepts of childhood among them the Piagetian cognitive development model 
which was applied by Ronald Goldman to children's religion in the 1960s 
(Goldman 1964 and 1965) and provides a basis for Fowler's 'Stages of Faith' 
(Fowler 198 1). The socialisation model of childhood has also been influential. It, is 
implicit in the term 'nurture' as employed by H. Bushnell in 'Christian Nurture' 
(1967) and latterly has been prominent in Andrew Wright's 'critical religious 
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education' which emphasises the sociality of the child. According to Wright the 
children's developing religious world view is 'adopted from the significant adults 
and peers in each child's life' (Wright 2000). A contrasting position which is the 
foundation for the 'experiential' school of RE, accords the child a 'natural 
knowing' and spirituality. This, it is argued, has been overlaid or even repressed by 
socially constructed processes as they move into adulthood (Hay with Nye 199$). 
Beneath these differing theories of children's religion are questions about the 
relation between childhood and adulthood, between the child and society, between 
natural growth and acculturation. 
Variety of Childhoods 
Alison James and Alan Prout set up a 'new paradigm of childhood sociology' in 
opposition to the developmental model (the 'dominant framework') of children and 
childhood studies. Key features of this new paradigm are the deconstruction of the 
concept of childhood (as distinct from biological maturity) as a natural, single and 
universal phenomenon, and its replacement with a variety of socially, culturafly 
constructed childhoods. Children are understood to be 'active in the construction 
and determination of their own social lives,, the lives of those around them and the 
societies in which they live. ' (8) The concept of a variety of childhoods emerged 
from a number of studies of childhood in other times and cultures and in different 
social classes including an historical survey by Philippe Ariýs (1962), Margaret 
Mead's studies of Samoan society (1928,69), S. Hall & T. Jefferson's study of 
working class youth subculture (1976). On the basis of these examinations of the 
differing roles within the family and the economy, and their relation to adult 
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authority, it was argued that instead of one model of childhood there is a wide 
diversity of childhoods each with its own cultural and historical basis. Alongside 
this process of the deconstruction of a natural universal childhood is the 
recognition of an opposing trend both nationally and globally towards the 
imposition of an artificially constructed universal childhood. One of the forces 
behind this homogenisation of childhood in Britain, it is argued, is universal 
education (Hendrick 1997), and on a worldwide scale international children's 
fights legislation and the influence of North American and European child 
psychology mean that the images of childhood favoured by the industrial North 
have been exported to the South (Boyden 1997). James and Prout cite Foucault's 
'regimes of truth' to extend the influence of these constructions of childhood from 
institutionalised practices to the self-understanding of the children and other 
participants- 
Ways of thinking about childhood fuse with institutionalized practices to 
produce self-conscious subjects (teachers, parents, children) who think (and 
feel) about themselves through the terms of those ways of thinking. (J; tmes 
and Prout 1990,, 23) 
Interest in the influences of social context, of the tension between diversity aqd 
homogenisation on the children's thought is a feature of my research and has direct 
bearing on my methodology. The diversity in the children's lives and upbringing is 
the starting point in this study of cross-cultural encounter. The shared context of 
an English inner city and membership of a particular junior school is what uniles 
them. There are differences in religious nurture, in ethnicity, colour, gender, fanffly 
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structures and circumstance,. all of which affect the children's experience of 
childhood. At the same time the very nature of the school institution requires a 
high degree of conformity to set routines and behaviour patterns. Through school 
another model of being a child, is presented to the children, sometimes - as with 
the contrasting 'rote learning' and 'independent thought' pedagogies of mosque 
and school - in direct conflict with those of home and community. Contrary social 
pressures towards diversification and homogenisation are built into the structures 
of the project. Variety within the wider community provides content for much of 
the research discourse but its immediate context is the school with its pressures 
towards commonality. The composition of the interview groups combines 
sameness and difference, with the children's shared minority status in a 
predominantly Muslim community and their differentiated religious identity as 
Hindu or Christian. 
Consciousness of the determining role of culture and history on the way childhood 
is conceived is only one element of the 'new paradigm'. It does not counter the 
conventional view of socialisation as a moulding process carried out by adults, 
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though the kind of adults that emerge at the end of the socialisation process will 
differ. Nor does it remove the child from the margins of society, an 'individi4al 
subject which exists separately from and prefigures society' (James and Prout 
19907 24). The debate is contained- within adult understandings of childhood, the 
children themselves remain passive and unheard. 
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Children as Agents 
Studies of peer group interaction among children present a contrasting picture of 
children at the centre of a social world,, active in the construction of their own lives 
and meanings. in a small scale study of discourse patterns and power relations 
among primary age children in "Sharing Time",, Jane Danielewicz, Dwight Rogers 
and George Noblit contrast the pressures towards socialisation into school cultuTe 
in teacher-led sessions with the ability shown by children to develop their own 
ritual linguistic elements and use language to establish and maintain social relations 
once the sessions became child-led (Danielewicz, Rogers and Noblit 1996). On a 
larger scale the celebrated work of the Opies on children's games and playground 
culture put together a picture of a culturally autonomous childhood with its own 
lore and language (Opie 1977,84). Their work was part of a reaction to the silenýe 
of children's voices in research and a counterbalance to the idea of children as 
passive in the socialisation process. In fact, the idea of a separate child culture 
undermines models of socialisation. Socialisation becomes cultural assimilation, 
Any adult-child interaction becomes cross-cultural exchange. This concept of a 
separate child's world is evident in the work of such researchers as Corsaro and 
Mandell (cited in Alldred 1998, p 15 1) who aim to become 'participant in children's 
culture'. to 'interact with their perspective', to enter 'the child's world'. 
An objective of such peer group studies is to deconstruct the developmental idea of 
the child as a 'human becoming' rather than a human being (Alldred 1998,150), 
irrational, asocial and in need of adult guidance. It is, however, difficult to 
reconcile the 'child's world' with the cultural constructivist perspective and the 
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Cnew paradigm's' deconstruction of universal childhood. is it possible for children 
to create their own globally understood meanings ftee from cultural/historical 
influences or are there in fact a large number of autonomous 'children's worlds' 
corresponding to the cultural diversity of adult's worlds7 These problems diminish 
when we recognise that to be 'active in the construction and determination of their 
social lives' (James and Prout 1990,8) children do not need their own separate 
world. They act within the same worlds the adults occupy. Though my research is 
a study of children's peer group interaction, I did not have to enter a separate 
'child's world' or to learn a completely new language to communicate with them. 
Like most young people, the project's child participants live out their lives within 
societies, structures and institutions established and regulated by adults. Adults 
have their meanings and purposes and the children respond to these. Other studies 
have examined children's behavioural responses to adult demands and the practical 
strategies they develop to deal with structures imposed upon them (Fuller 19ý0,, 
Sewell 1997, Kitzinger 1990). The activity that constitutes the focus of this study 
is children's language use and meaning making in the context of group discussions. 
To their discussions the research participants brought the words of parents, 
teachers, and religious leaders, and discourses from an adult dominated society (for 
example those of the media, local politics, intemational affairs), yet they 
demonstrated that they were not just 'receptacles of adult teaching' (James and 
Prout 1990). In their talk they showed an ability to reflect critically on the 
meanings of adults, a freedom to adopt or reject them and an ability to adapt them 
to their own requirements (Chapter 3.1). 
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The children did not reflect upon the adults' stated meanings alone but also on 
their underlying purposes and motivations, and they showed an ability to relate to 
the adult world with understanding. Particularly telling are instances of children 
commenting on parents7 approaches to child-rearing. Working among girls in a 
Muslim school Marie Parker-Jenkins reported their keen awareness of the 
motivations and fears of their parents as a 'disempowered' community in a strange 
country closing ranks and concerned to 'protect their children' (Parker Jenkins 
1996). A group of eleven year olds participating in my research showed the saipe 
readiness to comment on parents' approaches to child-rearing when they discussed 
reasons for parents" attempts to limit their children's activities and their fiiendships 
to their own faith community. Arguing that the parents 'can just make it up, like 
they don't really know that you can't do that and you can't do that', they decidpd 
that their motivation was to protect the children from other religions that might 
change them (cf my Appendix: F142 -I shall use a capital letter in this way to refer 
to the recorded dialogue fragment, followed by a numeral indicating the line). 
The members of both groups are not 'ideological dupes' (Skegg 1994), but 
understand well how parenting practices can be motivated by cultural pressures 
and uncertainties rather than conviction. Far from having their world defined for 
them by adults, the children are critical of adults' definitions and of their handling 
of the pressures of the society that they all share. JK criticises the laziness of the 
Hindu and Christian adults who let the Muslims take over prime sites in their area 
(F501-2), and CS declares that it is their role as children to teach the older 
generation how to live in harmony (G279-282). The conditions within which the 
children formulate their views of the world may not be of their own choosing but 
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they are not completely disabled or disempowered. In collaboration with their 
peers they have the resources to steer their course through different cultural 
expectations and meanings and forge new understandings. Confidence in this ability 
led me to adopt methods that gave scope to the children's activity through a 
flexible interview structure within which the participants have the opportunity to 
take the discussion in new and unexpected directions, and the involvement of some 
of the young people in the formulation of the research questions so they could 
highlight the issues that were of particular interest to them. 
The key features of the 'new paradigm of childhood sociology' set out above, the 
dynamic between social construction and children's activity, conform with the 
tentative understanding of the children with which I embarked on the project and 
w. c was subsequently reinforced by the data collected. They can be encapsulatod 
in the words 'agency and structure' which Anthony Giddens placed at the centre of 
his synthesis of competing soctologies of systems and individual actors. Though 
individuals are subject to processes of acculturation and socialization, they are not 
totally bound by them. According to Giddens' principle of action, individuals are in 
a position to choose their responses, to intervene in or resist those processes, to 
influence their direction and outcome: 
It is a necessary feature of action that, at any point in time, the agent 'could 
have acted otherwise': either positively in terms of attempted intervention 
in the process of 'events in the world',, or negatively in term$ of 
forbearance. (Giddens 1979,56) 
18 
This research project picks up agency and structure by looking at the way the 
children actively select from a diversity of meanings and create new understandings 
in response to their particular social setting and the variety of influences acting on 
them. 
I. 1.4 Empowerment Research 
Partisan Research in an Unequal World 
In the previous section I have set out elements of my understanding of the child 
participants of my research. My involvement of these individuals in my project 
necessitates a degree of reflexivity about the effects of my work upon their lives. In 
what follows I consider both the purposes and responsibilities of my research in 
relation to the children,, and will draw upon debates around the concept of research 
as 6 empowerment' of those being researched. 
In line with a large corpus of ethnographic research this study focuses on a groLlp 
of individuals who,, in common understanding, are of subordinate or marginalised 
status - doubly so, as children in an adult-dominated world and as religious and 
racial minorities in a predominantly Muslim community. The disadvantages they 
experience are a frequent subject for reflection in their discussions and they make 
complaints about unfair treatment they feel they have received (F429f, G366f, 
H181f, H325-6,1186-7). Whatever the realities of the complex situation are, I do 
not doubt that my research takes place in the context of an 'unequal world'. There 
is debate whether and to what extent recognition of that inequality should influence 
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the way researchers conduct their inquiries. On one side stand advocates of 
partisan research such as Barry Troyna, for whom 'the imperative guiding the 
development, execution and dissemination of their research is that, because they 
are operating in an 'unequal world', they must not only document what is going on 
but intervene and challenge any injustices which their inquiries had uncovered' 
(Troyna 1995,400-401). On the other are those termed 'Methodological Purists' 
by Troyna, among them Hammersley for whom 'the point of research is to produce 
knowledge, not to transform the world, or to achieve any other practical result 1) 
(Hammersley 1994,340). 
One model of intervention on behalf of research subjects is what Cameron calls the 
(. advocacy position' whereby the researcher speaks on their behalf and uses her 
skills to 'defend subjects' interests, getting involved in their campaigns for 
healthcare or education,. cultural autonomy or political and land rights, and 
speaking on their behalf (Cameron et al. 1994,20). This understanding of the 
researcher's role was expressed by a former Hindu pupil of mine who, on learning 
of the focus group of my research, remarked, 'At last someone's sticking up for 
us! ' Embarking on a research project with the express intention of representing the 
interests of the participants implies an alignment with their cause; it is a partisan 
approach to the task. Another model of intervention is one that rather than 
'speaking on behalf of the researched, encourages them to 'speak for themselves, 7. 
Beverley Skeggs begins her research among white working class girls at a further 
education college with the aim of empowering her subjects through 
conscientisation. She brought with her a 'conscious partiality towards the 
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oppressed, engagement in their struggles for change and the creation of a form of 
research that fosters conscientization' (Nfies 1983 cited by Skeggs 1994,79). 
The objection of the 'Methodological Purists' to practitioners of partisan research 
is that their conclusions owe more to the values and ideological convictions of the 
researchers than to empirical evidence- 
They have serious methodological flaws and fail to provide firm evidence jo 
support the conclusions made by their authors. (Foster 1990,346 cited in 
Troyna 1995,402) 
Troyna's partisan research on racism in schools is criticised by Gomm for 'patchy 7 
data which has been 'massaged into place' (95). Troyna dismisses such criticisms 
by rejecting their underlying positivism with its perspectives of detachment, 
impartiality and objectivity (95). All research is partisan, he claims, it needs to be 
made explicitly so. Objectivity as a criterion for my research will be considered in 
the next chapter (Chapter 1.2). 
Had my project been approached in a spirit of partisan research with a view to 
challenging the discrimination under which my respondents laboured, it could be 
seen as presenting a partial (in both senses of the word), one sided picture of 
relations between Muslims and non Muslims for example. Only the point of view of 
the non Muslim minority was expressed in the interviews, and that view may have 
been subject to the exaggeration of a 'behind-their-backs' discourse. In the group 
discussions judgements were made about the motivations of Muslim peers without 
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the possibility of checking these conclusions with the Muslim children themselves. 
This imbalance,, however,. does not affect the validity of my data where there is 
honesty about the knowledge base of my conclusions and where the aim is to 
record and analyse the perceptions of the participants at the time of the interview 
rather than to make general sociological statements about tensions between 
different religious and cultural groups for transformation into social action. 
Location and Exercise ofPower 
There may be a degree of partisanship in my choice of this particular group to 
participate in the research project and to receive that focused attention, but my aim 
was not the empowerment of that group within wider society; my research does 
not fit within a partisan research framework. Indeed, the very concept of research 
carried out with the intention of effecting social transformation poses difficult 
questions. One of these is the difficulty locating where power lies. The concept of 
empowerment requires the identification of a group or individual in need of 
empowerment, and a sense of where the power is that needs redistributing, 
However, the relationships within and between groups are highly complex and 
entail a range of configurations of power so that it is not the exclusive property of 
the 'dominant' group. Both the mother and her small child have a degree of control 
over each others' actions,, for example, and power in some 'challenging' classroom 
situations oscillates between teacher and pupils. The 'agency and structure' view of 
children outlined earlier in the chapter recognises that children may not be 
disempowered subordinates in an adult world, instead it allows for the possibility 
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that they can exercise power and influence over their context despite their child and 
nunonty status. 
Another issue is the actual power exercised by the researcher when he or she sets 
out to 'empower' the researched. There is a degree of condescension (an 
expression of power inequality) in the adoption by advocate researchers of the 
position of 'expert' representing the needs and interests of the researched. The role 
of advocate gives the researcher scope to colour their portrayal of their subjeqs' 
needs with their own values and interests. Skeggs found that as a young, idealistic 
feminist with conscientisation as her aim,, she was reading her own assumptions 
into her subjects' situation when what they really needed was access to money, 
power and authority 
Why should we assume that the women whom we research desire or are in 
need of conscientization? This may stop us listening to them. (Skeggs 1994, 
79). 
She acknowledged that her participants' greater knowledge of their own context 
gave them the power to take her ideas, know where they are coming from and 
assess accordingly 
The information given is weighed up by the researched against their history 
and cultural background (after all this is how hegemony works). (82) 
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With my research I did not presume to cast myself in the role of empowering agent 
speaking for (or to) my participants about their position in society and how it could 
be improved; instead my prime purpose was to gain knowledge of the children's 
understanding and to pass that knowledge on- 
Researcher's Contribution to Inequality 
Partisan researchers not only argue for a style of research that combats injustice 
but express concern about the potential of traditional 'researcher/researched" 
relationships to reinforce, or even to exacerbate, existing inequalities (Troyna 
1995). The African-American sociologist J. A. Ladner described this relationship in 
strong terms when she argued that it resembled that of oppressor and oppressed 
'because it is the oppressor who defines the problem, the nature of the research 
and, to some extent,. the quality of interaction between him and his subjects" 
(Ladner 1973,419 cited by Troyna 1995,397). Though I do not view my methods 
as a form of oppression I did have a decisive influence on the research agenda and 
activities. Added to the power given me by my researcher and adult status was that 
inherent in my role as teacher at the children's school. I had easy access to my 
subjects and was able to make demands that they did not question upon their time 
and attention. I gathered them together in particular groupings and introduced the 
activities to them. To some extent these followed school patterns - the seating 
around a classroom table, the use of word cards and questions which parallel 
learning tasks used in curriculum delivery. They were reproductions of the 
frameworks within which the children operate in their day-to-day lives. The way 
children are influenced by and deal with these inequalities in their discourse can 
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throw light on the relationship between them and their context. Rather than 
rei orcing the status quo and imposing constraints upon their activity, I judgipd 
these research events to be structures within and upon which the children could 
exercise their agency: 
Every act which contributes to the reproduction of a structure is also an act 
of production, and as such may initiate change by altering the structure at 
the same time as it reproduces it. (Giddens 1979,69) 
The results of my research bore out the validity of this theory as the children select 
and adapt the meanings with which they are presented (Chapter 3.2). 
Value of the Research Event 
This project did not take on responsibility for the participants' position in widiýr 
society but recognised responsibilities towards them within the compass of the 
research activities. My duty cut two ways; towards the children with whom I am 
working and towards the research community which provides the other context of 
my study. To the latter my obligation was to supply information about, and 
I igious understanding. 
To do this I was interpretation of the children's reli i 
dependent on the children who opened up their experiences and understandings to 
me. The ethics of the situation required a degree of reciprocity. I have not assumed 
an advocacy position in my research (see above) and the final product of the 
project, a written record directed at a different audience and in a form the 
participants themselves were unlikely to understand, is insufficient return for their 
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participation. The research event itself needed to be something from which they 
too could benefit. In reflections on her research methodology Kim Knott stresses 
the need for the research process to be rewarding and fulfilling for both parties. 
Often we think of the end result as the purpose of the research process, the 
monograph, the bringing to the public eye through academic enterprise of a 
particular community, a particular viewpoint [ ... 
] But, very often, the 
participant community or individuals cannot recognize themselves in a final 
product in which the authorial voice, however self-consciously reticent or 
fair,, has control. It is important then for the research process itself to have 
value. (Knott 1995,207) 
To make the research process valuable and also enjoyable I provided the flexibility 
for participants to speak about what they were interested in and what they viewed 
as important, to have some control over the topics of conversation, particularly in 
the formulation of questions to be used,. and to take the discussion into new areas. 
In this way they were given a degree of power over the research activity. At the 
same time they seiZed the opportunity to exercise a form of power over their wider 
social setting, They brought to the research dialogues their experiences, sometimes 
painful ones, from their social context and reinterpreted them in the new and 
sympathetic envirom-nent of the interview groups. The hurts received in instances 
of religious and racial teasing, for example, could be reduced by sharing them with 
a friendly audience, and reflecting on the motivations of those who caused the 
upset (H25 If). In the review of such cases and in reflections on the ills of society in 
general, on instances of discord between religious communities (G8 If) and on the 
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hypocrisy of faith practitioners (Ell-13, E129f), the children often took to 
themselves a moral authority. CS's comment on the children's duty to teach adults 
(G282) is an example of this transformation of hierarchies. The research activity 
was empowering then , in the 




This project's methodology has its foundations in the ethnographic tradition of the 
Warwick Religions and Education Unit. Emphasis on fieldwork is a strength of 
ethnography as it gives some account of context and the ongoing roles the subjects 
play within it. Another strength is the scope ethnography gives for the subjects' 
influence on the research processes and outcomes. It is, according to James and 
Prout, a methodology which 'allows children a more direct voice in the production 
of sociological data than is normally possible through experimental or survey styles 
of research' (James and Prout 1997,8). In these ways, then, an ethnographic 
approach would appear to meet the needs of a study interested in the relationship 
between children as agents and the structures upon which they act. Within 
ethnography there is a variety of schools of thought, interpretive ethnography 
being the approach currently favoured by the Warwick school (Jackson 1997). This 
approach, heavily influenced by anthropologist Clifford Geertz's theories of 
cultural interpretation, is one which 4 seeks to establish a coherent and inclusive 
account of a culture from the point of view of those being researched' (Bryman 
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and Burgess 1994,6). Rooted as it is in anthropology, interpretive ethnography 
maintains a concept of different 'ways of life' and 'life-worlds', however complex 
those worlds may be, as subjects for study (Jackson 1997,30). It makes the 
distinction between the 'insiders' who inhabit these life-worlds,. and 'outsiders' 
who do not. Key issues are firstly the degree to which it is possible for the 
researcher as 'outsider' to know what Geertz boldly terms 'the native's point of 
view'. and secondly the relationship between the research sub ects' accounts and j 
their wider cultural context,. the 'parts' and the 'whole" (33). 
7he Native's Point of View' 
Ethnographic work was founded on distinctions between self and other (Gitlin 
19937 193) but the confidence of ethnographers in their ability to know the 'other' 
has been shaken by developments in the sister discipline of anthropology leadingto 
new understandings of the grounding of their knowledge. Geertz links the 
publication of Bronislaw Malinowski's diaries (with their revelations of the 
anthropologist's negative feelings towards the subjects of his study) to the 
explosion of the myth of anthropological knowledge as 'an almost preternaýural 
capacity' to think, feel and perceive like a 'native' and opens up the question: 
if we are going to cling - as, in my opinion,, we must - to the injunction to 
see things from the native's point of view, where are we when we can no 
longer claim some unique form of psychological closeness, a sort of 
transcultural identification, with our subjects? (Geertz 1983,56) 
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Consideration of the researcher's position in relation to the thoughts, feelings and 
perceptions of the researched influenced my choice of methods and my ongoing 
evaluation of their effectiveness. My concerns were how the children could 
communicate their point of view to an 'other, and how an outsider such as mys0f 
could understand what it was like to be on the inside. Experience of interaction 
with my research participants, however, brought me to question the validity of the 
' self/other', 'insider/outsider' distinction in my study. 
Elements of my research were designed to maximise the chances of the 'insider' 
voices being heard, the flexible interview structure, the use of 'insider' questions, 
formulated by the children themselves, the informality of the group discussions in 
which children were conversing with each other not just with the adult 
teacher/researcher. The children rewarded me with enthusiasm and openness. 
Nevertheless my presence at these sessions undoubtedly influenced what was said 
and therefore the data that were collected. Not being able to know how the 
conversation would have proceeded had I not been there, it is difficult to gauge the 
extent of that influence. Whether the children were addressing me directly or 
engaged in interchange among themselves, their awareness of my presence may 
have made them more guarded in their criticisms of others or their use of language, 
and more expansive in their descriptions and explanations so that I too could 
understand. The experience of being observed generates a degree of self- 
consciousness. As they described their experiences and expressed their thoughts, 
the children were not only aware of themselves but aware also of how they might 
appear to the observer. Their view of the research event involved both 'insider' and 
'outsider' perspectives. 
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To remove my influence ftom the scene altogether and observe how the children 
would behave and what they would say if I were not there, would be an 
impossibility unless they were unaware of my presence, if I adopted a role or 
position that enabled me to blend unnoticed into the background. Such covert 
observation is a form of eavesdropping or spying. Even if this were practically 
feasible or ethically acceptable it would not necessarily give me as 'outsider' a 
clearer understanding of participants' views, feelings and perceptions. 
Interpretation of their meanings and purposes would depend on guesswork guided 
only by my existing assumptions about human behaviour, and without the ben(ýfit 
of an I insider' translating their thoughts to my understanding. With participants 
unaware of the need to make themselves understood by the researcher there are 
likely to be difficulties 'bridging the conceptual gap' (Chapter 3.2), some 
translation is needed. 
In order to translate their thoughts to me as researcher, the children needed some 
knowledge of the person for whom they are performing this service. Their selection 
of appropriate information, vocabulary and meanings depended on thoir 
understandings of my purposes and of my position with regard to the subjects 
being discussed. One issue was my status as teacher and how open they could be 'in 
describing feelings and actions that did not fit within an official school line of 
mutual respect and harmony. With most of the discussions there was a preliminary 
gwarming up' period before the children tackled more controversial issues. Al, for 
example, started with rather guarded statements about how interesting it would be 
to visit a mosque (132). It was only later, when he began to realise how much 
freedom he and his peers were being given, that he was more frank in his answers- 
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'I will be honest ... 
' (1139). Another factor for the children to consider was my 
particular interest in the topics under discussion. SN made it clear that he 
understood the religious aspect to be important to me* 
I think you're religious because you wear a cross, and your husband is a 
priest, and you tell us stories in assembly and you support Leicester City 
(C84-5). 
The knowledge that I was a Christian may have encouraged the research 
participants in some of their criticisms of Muslim children's exercise of majority 
power. Reflection on these influences on the children's contributions has led me to 
the conclusion that the direction of research activity is not one way, with the 
ethnographer seeking to 'know' the subject, rather the act of communication 
engages researcher and researched in a process of mutual understanding. 
The children's responsiveness towards me as their audience is an instance of the 
general 'orientation towards the listener' (Bakhtin 1981,282) that features 
prominently in my analysis of the group discussions (page 172). Later in this theýis 
I aim to demonstrate that the act of communication involves change not only in the 
way the children present their experiences and beliefs, but also in the meanings they 
ascribe to them (Chapter 3.2). In the case of my fieldwork, talking in the presence 
of someone associated with school ideals of tolerance and respect, whom they 
might expect to sympathise with the pressures they experience as religious 
minorities,. and for whom religion is important, may influence their own views on 
religious identity and plurality. The need to explain their ideas and describe their 
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experiences before a researcher may encourage them to organise their thoughts 
within their own minds. 
By being there at the discussions I had an inevitable influence on their course; as a 
researcher interested in the influences of factors other than my presence on the 
children's understanding, it was incumbent on me to limit my influence. What had 
to be avoided was a monologue in which my voice was predominant and the 
children's views were brought into confornifty with mine. For this reason I did not 
put forward my own ideas on the words and questions being discussed, lest my 
authority as teacher and adult gave them undue weight in the discussion. The 
freedom with which I allowed the children to explore the issues made way for 
surprises that challenged my own preconceptions so that both the children's and 
my understandings were open to change. 
Pam Alldred's concern with the imbalance between adult-researcher and child- 
subject leads her to write- 
It is difficult to see to what extent children could., as ethnographic subjects,, 
present 'their own' account of their worlds. (Alldred 1998,154) 
In fact,, no communication can be exclusively that subject's 'own' account in the 
sense that he is sole author, but it may be his 'own' in the sense that it is genuinely 
how he perceives his world at the time of speaking. The subject's perception ('the 
native's point of view') can be known, therefore, but that perception will be the 
product of a negotiation process between the subject's understanding and the 
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researcher's presence. In this process the clear distinction between 'self and 
r other,, 'insider' and 'outsider' break down. In their place is a more dialogical and 
constructive paradigm of research. James Clifford's main focus has been on 
ethnographic writing, but his description of ethnography as negotiation is as 
relevant to the fieldwork stages of research: 
It becomes necessary to conceive ethnography, not as the experience and 
interpretation of a circumscribed "other" reality, but rather as a 
constructive negotiation involving at least two, and usually more, 
conscious, politically significant subjects. Paradigms of experience and 
interpretation are yielding to paradigms of discourse, of dialogue and 
polyphony. (Clifford 1983,133) 
Parts'and 'Wholes' 
In their discussions the participants described various experiences and outlined a 
number of concepts, beliefs and points of view. The relationship between these and 
the wider setting in which they originated is central to the analysis and 
interpretation of my research. In Geertzs interpretive ethnography the former are 
the 'parts' or 'symbols' to be related by the researcher to the 'whole', the 'culture" 
from which they emanate by the application of a version of Dilthey's hermeneutic 
circle- 
Hopping back and forth between the whole conceived through the parts 
that actualize it and the parts conceived through the whole that motivate 
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them, we seek to turn them, by a sort of intellectual perpetual motion, into 
explications of one another. (Geertz 198-3,69) 
The different 'parts' of the cultural scene revealed during the research e-vents and 
recorded in fieldnotes and ftmnscriptions form A= Geertz sees as an 'ensemble of 
texts', transfonned fi7om indi-vidual passing events into a body of reference for the 
interpretation of a way of life (Geertz 1973)- Geertz's approach draws on Paul 
Ricoeur's theory of ýýtextualisation' to which I shall return later m the nexi chapter 
(page rel)- He borrows ftom CAlbert Ryle the concept of lhick description' as one 
which naegrates meaning with -%Nider context and reveals different le-vets of 
interpretation, 'consiTuctions of other people-s constructions' (Geertz 19B. 9)- He 
describes his own work in lava, Bali and Morocco as foUoA s- 
Searching out and analy2ing the s--. Tnbohc forms - words, images, 
institutions, behaviours - in terms of whicb, in each place, people actua1hr 
represented themseh-es to themselves and to one anotheir. (Geertz 1983- 
58) 
Though Geertz acknowiedges the complexities and imenial diversities of the 
worlds he researches and represents the idea of 'a culture" variously in his works 
(Jackson 1997,801)- his model of parts and wholes impli an understanding of 
cultures as coherent -realities. Clifford is critical of such a, %ie-v. rejecting the idea of 
cufture as 'a unified corpus of symbols and . or (Clifford 1986,19)- He 
%Tites- 
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Cultures are not scientific "objects" (assuming such things exist, even in the 
natural sciences). Culture and our views of "it" are produced historically, 
and are actively contested. There is no whole picture to be "filled in", since 
the perception and filling of a gap lead to the awareness of other gaps (18). 
An essentialist view of cultures underestimates their fluidity-, 'cultures do not hold 
still for their portraits' (10). It is a view that becomes less and less tenable, 
according to Clifford's thesis, with the increasing globalisation of the modern 
world; researched and researcher are all implicated in a dynamic interaction 
between a multiplicity of ways of life. With echoes of Bakhtin he argues- 
There is no longer any place of overview (mountaintop) from which to map 
human ways of life ... 
Mountains are in constant motion. So are islands: for 
one cannot occupy, unambiguously, a bounded world ftom which to 
journey out and analyze other cultures. Human ways of life increasingly 
influence, don-finate, parody, translate, and subvert one another. (22) 
This project, focusing on the influence of encounter on religious thought, relies on 
an understanding of context closer to Clifford than to Geertz. The diversity and 
complexity of the worlds within and between which the children live their lives is 
evident in their contributions to the research discussions. It is not just the religious 
plurality of their environment that influences their religious thinking but a plurality 
of meanings drawn from a variety of sources and discourses personal, local and 
general; experiences of ffiendship (E33, F56f, F301, A269), of tension with peers 
(B384f, F51 If, G205f), of illness and death in the family (E90-1, E95f), discouTses 
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of race and colour (F56f, H-263, A98-100,125), of political processes (F496f, 
GI 15f), stories from books (F175, G149), scenes from films (B413f, B479, B51K, 
D3 09), news of international events (E II ýý 
E 129). The meanings are so various and 
fluid that however 'thick' the description it would be impossible to incorporate 
them all into a coherent whole. I too was implicated in some of the discourses 
(those relating to school, to local politics, to the experience of being a non Muslim 
in a predominantly Muslim environment, for example) and could use my 
knowledge of these to identify some of the children's references. However, I was 
also dependent on the children telling me who said, or where they had heard the 
ideas and words that they repeated. The role of this dialogical interplay between 
many worlds in the children's understanding is explored in later chapters (Chapter 
3.11,3.2). In this chapter on research methodology the issue is the influence of this 
'dialogism' on the relationship between the research activities and the wider 
context of the children's lives. 
D exco Re gnition of the multiplicity of influences on the children's contributions to the 
interviews has led my research away from a correlation of data with 'parts' (or 
4 symbols') and cultural context with 'whole'. Rather than the research events being 
occasions on which the children represented their wider context to me, I 
understood them as opportunities for the children to select and collate disparate 
elements of their experience, organising them into coherent arguments and 
meanings. The interview was a point of assembly of experiences and views bindiOg 
them in greater unity than they had in the context in which they originated. Specific 
examples of this syncretism are the bringing together of their knowledge of ghosts, 
the Mexican festival of the dead, Halloween and karate classes around the word 
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4 spirit' (A154f), and the incorporation of understandings of prophets, angels,, 
gods, Sita, Muhammad, Mary, parents and children, children and toys into a 
definition of Krishna (D I 89f). The nature of the research was such that during the 
course of the interviews a wealth of meanings from various discourses convergpd 
around key concepts of God, religion and plurality. The research discussions were 
understood to be constructive more than representative. The religious 
understanding that was the focus of the project was not so much being uncovered 
-r- for me by the interviews as being actively created during the event. The following 
quote from Deborah Marks' description of her interviews with young people about 
exclusion from school echoes my own experience of data collection: 
I cannot say how participants really experienced the exclusion. However, 
asking about the experience of exclusion brings forth a number of 
productive ways of seeing the event' (Marks 1996, cited in Alldred 1998, 
156) 
To relate the children's discussions with the wider context, I drew on Deriýk 
Layder's theory of social domains (Layder 1997). By this model the discussions 
('situated activity') were brought into a temporal relationship with their conteNt 
('social setting'); experiences of previous encounters (with their peers and adults of 
the community, with information and images from lessons, books and the media) 
were brought to the research event to be reworked there, the new meanings 
created providing resources for subsequent encounters in a chaining relationship. 
Acknowledgement of the temporality of the children's thinking and the uniqueness 
of each research event had a significant influence on my choice of methods. 
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Validation of my findings did not depend on stability or consistency in the 
children's representations of their world, and so I chose not to cross-check the 
information gained with different qualitative methods (such as children's diaries, 
documentary evidence, photographs, individual rather than group interviews). The 
pnmary sources for my study are records of group interviews; the discursive 
approach and emphasis on participant interaction matched the dialogue focus. The 
actual discussions, rather than a represented world, became the proper interest of 
the study. 
The historicality of the children's meanings meant that these discussions were more 
than separate instances of discourse, however. They drew on accumulated 
understandings of experiences from wider contexts. Because of the overlap and 
similarities in the histories of the individual children, the perspectives they brought 
to play in the dialogues often resembled each other. The constants of the research 
events (the words and questions, the group nature of the interviews, the rt-ýixed 
composition of the groups in terms of religious and racial identity, my presence, týe 
schoolroom setting) meant that in selecting from the meanings and perspectives 
available to them material that they deemed appropriate for the discussion activity, 
the different groups frequently explored common themes and pursued related trains 
of thought. It followed that when it came to analysis of the data, patterns emeTged 
in both the dialogical processes and the meaning content. 
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1.2 BEYOND THE FIELD 
1.2.1 Converting to Text 
The previous chapter explored the relationship between my project and the field 
which provided its data, in this chapter I consider how the project's findings are 
communicated beyond the field and related to the readership of the researýh 
community. This process is dependent on the written word, The written word has 
been the focus of a shift of interest in ethnographic theory (Clifford and Marcps 
1986; Geertz 1988) from the fieldwork encounter to the text produced by the 
ethnographer; the point of communication between object of study and readýr. 
Emphasis is on interpretation- the ethnographer interprets through his or her text. 
In this ethnographic text is inscribed my interpretation of a series of researph 
discussions. This interpretation depends on my choice of analytical method, the 
subject of this section of this chapter. I wish to begin, however, further back in týe 
process of communication between field and readership, with the initial conversion 
of the children's speech into a text capable of being analysed, interpreted apd 
conveyed to an audience outside the immediate context of the initial exchange. 
What follows is a reflection on the significance of the transformation from spokpn 
word to research text within my study. The influence of Ricoeur's theories of 
textualisation on interpretive ethnography has already been noted (page 34). In this 
section elements of his thinking as set out in his 1970 essay, 'Qu'est-ce qu'un 
texteT (Ricoeur 1986,137-159), are related to the theme of dialogue that Tuns 
through my work. 
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In the detailed recording of the interviews my primary concern was that the 
memory of those words should not be lost but should be readily to hand for 
analysis and interpretation. Ricoeur portrays the effect of inscription as much more 
than a conservation of discourse, it is an event of enormous significance: 
Un veritable bouleversement aussi bien des rapports entre le langage et le 
monde que du rapport entre le langage et les diverses subjectivites 
concerndes, celle de l'auteur et celle du lecteur (40) 
'Les rapports entre le langage et le monde' are of key interest to this prqj(ýct 
founded on a dialogical understanding of the relationship between the participants' 
words and the world in wl-kh they live. Dialogue is the central theme and also the 
method; the data have been gathered from actual dialogues carried out in group 
interviews. As far back as Plato's expressed preference for the spoken word (Fp. 
VII 341c. Bury 1929,530) it has been said that dialogue fits uneasily with text. 
Ricocur finds them incompatible. He claims that dialogue is interrupted by tqxt 
(Ricoeur 1986,141), the author and reader are not in a dialogical relationship, for 
whatever questions the reader may have, the writer cannot answer back. It is as 
though the text is posthumous, the author already dead (139). Though his view of 
dialogue as exchange of questions and answers is narrower than the one that 
informs my understanding (Chapter 4.1), there is a sense in which textualisation of 
the children's words is an interruption. In the text the children's explorations of 
God's unity and plurality, of religious identity and intercommunal relations, - are 
frozen at a particular moment in history, cut off from continuation of that dialogue. 
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Ricoeur writes of the effect of inscription as a 'fixation' (138). With taped 
interviews that fixation takes place first of all in the actual recording. As a fixrd 
record of what had just been said, available for consultation and a preliminary to 
transcription, the tape itself has the status of text. The interruption by the tqxt 
noted above became evident to me when at the end of each research session I gave 
the participants the opportunity to review what they had just said by listening to 
extracts of the recorded dialogue. Though eager to hear the recording, none of the 
groups was interested at that point of time in picking up any of the questions that 
had been the meat of their discussion. Their focus had changed to the question of 
who was speaking at any particular time and their comments (That"s you, no it's 
me'% 'Do I really sound like thatT, 'Who said thaff) indicated a distancing of 
themselves from the text. No longer its authors, they had become the text"s'first 
readers,, making efforts to read themselves back into the discussion. 
The fact that the initial dialogue had been interrupted by its recorded form does ilot 
mean that its progress has been halted outside the text, or that the chain of 
meaning, of which each interview is but one link, has been broken. The experience 
of the encounter of the research event, and the meanings negotiated together on 
those occasions,. add to the corpus of ideas which the children can draw on and 
rework at future encounters. Rather as life goes on after a passing moment is 
frozen in a photographic image, so there is a distinction between the dynamism of 
the research event as part of a continuing dialogue, and the historic fixity of its 
record, snapshot of a particular point in time. The transcriptions of the children's 
exchanges included in this study have the status of historical texts* a record of what 
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those individuals once thought but not of what they are thinking now. The ongoing 
dialogue has passed beyond my research; it is with the journey of the record that 
this chapter as a whole is interested. 
The inscribed discourse is not only separated from the dialogical flow of which it 
was,. in its spoken form, initially a part, but it is also removed from its immediate 
situated context,, the points of reference that make it a real event. Ricoeur contrasts 
spoken discourse anchored in 'la realite circonstancielle7' (140) with the 
decontextualised state of the text which is 'en quelque sorte "en air",, hors monoe 
ou sans monde' (141). In spite of this break with the historical links of ongoing 
dialogue and situational links of spoken discourse, Ricoeur is careful not to make 
of the text a self-sufficient unit, closed in upon itself He sees it as waiting upon the 
reader to supply its references: to link it into a context: 
,. en tant qu' 'criture, attend et appelle une 
lecture-, si la lecture est Le texte e 
possible, c i, est parce que le texte n'est pas ferme sur lui-meme, mais ouvýrt 
sur autre chose, lire c'est, en toute hypothese, encha'lner un discours 
nouveau au discours du texte. (152) 
The breaking of the bonds with the situational context of speech is seen as a 
liberation ,' 
I'afETanchisement du texte a 1'6gard de loralit6' (140). The text is nqw 
open to the interpreting activity of the reader who brings it into contact and 
interaction with other discourses. 
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Readership and interpretation are closely linked in Ricoeur's model. The researcher 
is both reader and interpreter when engaged in the analysis of texts recorded during 
fieldwork. The discourses with which the separated text is linked by interpretation 
are not all new,, for it is the researcher's role to read back into the inscription týe 
context from which it emerged. It has been one of my tasks to trace the origins of 
the children's words in the diverse discourses of their social setting and to read 
their histories back into the account. 
Reconstruction is not the only role of interpretation. New aligm-nents are made 
between the text and other texts. Once this project's discussions had been removed 
ftom their original settings through recording and transcription, the separqte 
dialogues could be placed alongside each other, their processes and meanings 
compared. They were also recontextualised within academic discourses apd 
brought into a dialogical relationship with theories from the fields of ethnography, 
child sociology, educational development, discourse analysis and dialogue theory. 
This recontextualisation enabled a change of focus from an understanding of 
questions of religion (God, identity, plurality) in the original dialogues, to p 
understanding of the children's understanding in the new. In the researcher's (or 
reader's) mind, the focal point of a new dialogue where selected meanings frqm 
research texts and academic discourses meet,, new questions are asked and new 
understandings negotiated. To record these evolving understandings in ým 
ethnographic text was to engage again in the process of inscription whereby 
thoughts were removed from the dialogical flow, historicised and crystallised in a 
text to await the attention of future readership. 
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2.2 Analysis 
Under this heading I consider my readershiP of the transcribed discourse, the 
framework within which I interpreted the data before me. In the previous chapter I 
explained how the situated activity of the actual discussions rather than a 
represented world became the focus of this project. Within these research events 
the prime action is speech; the children's language use as recorded by tape and 
transcription therefore became the subject of my analytical attention. With this 
interest I am following a general trend referred to as the 'linguistic turn I in the 
social sciences (Jaworski 1999,4) and evident in the growth of interest in 
discourse analysis , in 
detailed exploration of linguistic structures, sequences and 
transactions within selected examples of situated talk. This trend is partly a result 
of an increasing recognition of the power of language not only to reflect but to 
shape social order and to shape the individual's interaction with society (3). Such a 
view bears resemblance to my understanding of the agency of this project's child 
participants, language being a tool with which they act upon the social and cultural 
structures around them. The 'linguistic turn' is also due to recognition of the 
context-dependent nature of our meaning-making (Chapters 3.1,3.2) by which 
each speech event becomes unique and cannot be replicated. Again there are 
parallels with this project"P s acknowledgement of the temporality of the research 
event. 
In common with discourse analysts I considered the children's contributions within 
the situational context of individual exchanges. The interactive nature of the 
44 
children's speech, and the manner in which their utterances both responded to 
those that preceded them and initiated those that followed, was important to my 
analysis (Chapter 3.2). One of the traditions of discourse analysis that has had 
some impact upon my methods is that of conversation analysis which is defined as 
'the study of recorded, naturally occurring talk-in-interaction' (19) and which 
places emphasis on the structures of talk which produce and reproduce patterns of 
social action. I make use of the work of conversation analysts Jennifer Coates and 
Jane Falks in a later chapter, for example, when I apply their theories of turn-takipg 
and duetting to the children's use of language to establish relations with each other 
and with the researcher in the discussion events (Chapter 4.1.1). However, in tpy 
project this relationship between group members is of subsidiary interest to the 
participants' relationship with the content of the conversation. It is of interest inso 
far as it affected the participants' selection, assimilation and adaptation of that 
content. In this,, the direction of my analysis diverges from that of conversatipn 
analysts, and from discourse analysis in general. I wish to illustrate this difference 
by comparing briefly my approach with an example of conversation analysis. 
In the article 'Children's discourse patterns and power relations in teacher-led and 
child-led sharing time' Danielewicz and colleagues described an investigation into 
children's language use and verbal interactions during sharing time in a first grade 
classroom in the North Carolina. The data from these sharing time activities were 
investigated using 'established methods of discourse analysis' (Danielewicz 1996, 
3 16), the study's interest in patterns of social interaction relate it to the 
conversation analysis school. I have chosen this study as a comparison because,, 
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like my project, it is strongly influenced by readings of Mikhail Bakhtin (312). 
Behind the children's speech Danielewicz identifies Bakhtinian principles of 
4 addressivity' or 'orientation towards the listener' (327), and of the dependency of 
every utterance on the voices of others (3 16). These themes are important in TY 
own analysis. There are also similarities in the activities being researched in both 
projects. s with my research, Danielewicz and her colleagues were focusing on 'a 
social and cultural event in which meanings are being produced and reproduced" 
(315), the subjects were children in a school setting, the medium of exchange was 
c casual spoken language' (3 12), and the leadership of the events was given 
increasingly to the children as a group so that their talk became 'a collaborative 
dialogue' (319). Also both projects employed a card game to initiate exchanges. 
Significantly for the different research purposes, Danielewicz's cards maTked 
changes of speaker while mine marked new topics of discussion. 
In Danielewiczs study the researchers recognised the creativity of the children's 
speech observing how they used linguistic routines as 'a means of social control, as 
an agent for group bonding, and as expressions of care and concern' (3 11). The 
research emphasis was on relationships within the group rather than the meaning of 
what they were discussing - an emphasis revealed in the following statement aýout 
an exchange around the topic of nests: 
Some of their talk works to exchange information about bird's nests, but 
much of their language establishes and maintains social relationships (319) 
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. information about and 
The children's talk, we are told, divided into two categories- 
experiences with bird's nests, and language used to create and maintain personal 
relations (320). The prime interest of the study was clearly on the latter- 
Our purpose in this study is to understand what happens to language and 
interaction patterns when these students participate in a repeated speech 
event over time (317). 
In my project, by contrast, prime interest was on the participants' understandings 
of the topics under discussion. Put differently, if I used my methods to analyse 
Danielewicz's data, I would focus less on the children's social relations and mQre 
on their perspectives on the bird's nest: where the children's knowledge about the 
nest originated, how that information was understood in the discussion and how 
their understanding of the nest's significance (in the life of the bird, in their own 
experience) was changed during the communication event. 
Contrasting uses of Bakhtin's theories highlight the difference of analytical 
approaches in the two studies. Danielewicz quotes at length from Bakhtip's 
'Speech Genre' where he explains how all our speech is 'filled with others' words" 
and she describes how the children 'were able to "assirrulate, rework, and fe- 
accentuate" (Bakhtin 1986) each other's words to create new meaning' (326). The 
assimilation and reworking that she identifies is the 'linguistic recycling' of 
different speech routines (such as 'I've got one like that') signaling affiliation and 
support, The meanings that are created are essentially social meanings. My study, 
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too, is interested in assimilation, reworking and re-accentuation of the words of 
others, but the emergent meanings with which I am concerned are not so much 
social as intellectual, evolving theories of God, religion, identity, plurality. 
This interest in the developing meanings of the words the children use takes my 
analysis outside the bounds of the immediate discussion (situated activity) to trace 
the words' origins in a variety of discourses from the wider context of the 
participants' social setting. My approach recognises not only the dialogues of the 
individual research event but the dialogicality of the dense environment through 
which the words have travelled (Bakhtin 1981,276). It combines the 'micro' focus 
of discourse analysis on details of linguistic exchanges with ethnographic interest in 
the relationship of content to a wider (and very diverse) social, cultural, historical 
( macro' context. 
Danielewicz and her colleagues outlined their method in discourse analysis terms- 
Once we identified speech events, we analysed individual utterances and 
patterns of interaction between the participants. In the course of this line- 
by-line analysis, we recognized and traced the development of what we 
called linguistic routines ... We analyzed all of these routines to 
determine 
their meaning and function for the children and their teacher over time. 
(316-7) 
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My method involved identifying the discourses and words of others on which the 
children were building; considering situational factors (school context, relationships 
within the group, demands of the activities) that influenced the participants' 
selection of meanings for the discussion; investigating (through detailed analysis of 
the children's talk) what happened to those words and meanings during the 
communicative event as they were affirmed, questioned, rationalised, negotiated, 
mystified, reconciled, assimilated; tracing the emergence of new ideas, concepts 
and values. As the interests of the two studies differ, so too do the methods. 
ID'o. co R. e gnising the roots of the term 'dialogue' in movement and meaning, I prefer to 
see the difference between the two approaches as a difference between discourse 
analysis and dialogue analysis. 
-1-23 
Objectivity 
The remaining sections of this chapter look forward to the reception of the 
ethnographic text by a critical audience and reflect on the principles according to 
which it might be evaluated: objectivity and generalisability. The appropriateness of 
, applying these standards to a small-scale, qualitative study such as my own 
has 
been questioned, but in what follows I wish to argue that they are both important 
to my method and purpose. 
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Ae Problem of Objectivity 
The problems of objectivity in empirical research and ethnography are well 
documented, the conclusion often drawn from quantities of contemporary 
methodological or theoretical research literature is that 'objectivity is de4d' 
(Phillips 1993,57). Jackson and Nesbitt set out the reasons why this might be so in 
relation to their ethnographic study of Hindu children citing 'the obvious influence 
created by the ethnographer's presence", and the influence of 'the ethnographer's 
range of concepts and thought patterns' on the selection of data and writing of 
field notes. The authors were conscious of the 'artistic' nature of the enterprise 
following Geertz's view of ethnographies as literally fictions in that they are things 
made (Geertz 1973). Other people, they claim, 'might have done it differently' 
(Jackson and Nesbitt 1993,21-20). Any commonalty in the end products of such 
enterprises, Elliot Eisner would see as the result of the c artists' using common 
ffameworks provided by education or culture- 
Indeed acculturation and education can be considered the psychosocial 
processes used to provide ftameworks to the young so that the worlds they 
make for themselves will have some commonalty with those of others. 
(Eisner 1993,54) 
Though many aspects of our fieldwork are closely related, the interpretations 
Danielewicz and I make of our data bear little resemblance, because we employ 
different frameworks for understanding. If I applied my framework of dialogue to 
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her data,, or she applied hers of discourse to mine our representations of the same 
research events would differ significantly. Eisner writes: 
Different ways of seeing give us different worlds. Different ways of saying 
allow us to represent different worlds. (54) 
There is,, he says, 'no single legitimate way to make sense of the world'. (54) 
In arguing for the retention of a concept of objectivity, I wish to comment on týe 
idea of different worlds and pick up the question of legitimacy. Though the plural 
'worlds' is often used loosely to denote different discourses and perspectives on 
life (Jackson 97,30), an underlying realism means that I hold to the concept of the 
world as one endlessly complex and evolving reality, its plurality of meanings 
giving rise to a diversity of interpretations. To illustrate this by returning to the 
comparison above; if Danielewiczs research team and I had analysed the same 
research discussion working within our respective ftameworks, we would have 
selected different meanings and produced different interpretations,, but the aqtual 
event would have remained the same. 
Though I reject the relativism of plural 'worlds, I agree that there are many 
legitimate ways of making sense of the real world, and, indeed, of making sense of 
particular research events. Some ways are more legitimate than others, howeviýr, 
and some have no legitimacy at all. My interpretation of the children's 
contributions to the research discussions had something in common with Fowler's 
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cognitive approaches to religious understanding. His model of progressive stages 
of faith development, however, did not fit the evidence I had before me unless 
substantial changes were made (Chapter 2.2). 1 found less legitimacy in Hay's 
approach with its emphasis on children's innate spirituality and corresponding 
downplaying of the value of cognitive, religious and social factors. A language- 
based, dialogical model that recognised the variety of influences on the children's 
understanding and allowed for movement of thought, accorded best with the data. 
To consider some types of enquiry better than others is to imply that they 4re 
closer to reality, that there is some regulative ideal outside our own perceptions of 
what is going on. Karl Popper uses the image of a mountain to portray truth as that 
essential regulative ideal: 
The status of truth in the objective sense, as correspondence to the faqts,, 
and its role as a regulative principle, may be compared to that of a 
mountain peak which is permanently, or almost permanently, wrapped in 
clouds. The climber may not merely have difficulties getting there - he may 
not know when he gets there, because he may be unable to distinguish , in 
the clouds,, between the main summit and some subsidiary peak. Yet this 
does not affect the objective existence of the summit. (Popper 1968,226 
cited in Philips 1993,59-60) 
Even if the existence of an objective reality is understood, the question about the 
possibility of objectivity remains. It is not a question about truth, now, but about 
limits of human capabilities; does the humanity of the researcher make objectivity 
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impossible? Like the climber on the mountain unsure of the summit, we may not 
know when we arrive at a truth, but certainty is not the same as objectivity. 
Objectivity does not exclude error; its opposite is not falsehood but bias. Here, too, 
researchers face their human weakness. As the ethnographers with whom we began 
noted,, the subjectivities of the researcher cannot be removed entirely from the 
research but are there in selection and interpretation. We are given the same 
message about the humanity of the researcher in other fields of research. Popper 
wntes, 
We cannot rob the scientist of his partisanship without also robbing him of 
his humanity, and we cannot suppress or destroy his value judgements 
without destroying him as a human being and as a scientist. (Popper 1976, 
97 cited in Phillips 1993,70) 
A. J. Youngson puts the historian's case- 
It may be possible to imagine an investigation into the past based on 
extremely full information, conducted without any reference to the present,, 
unbiased in any way and therefore, in a sense,. final and conclusiveý-, but it is 
not easy to believe that such an investigation could be carried out by a 
human being. (Youngson 1985,30) 
53 
fhe Case of the Historian 
The position of the historian is of particular relevance to my argument for 
objectivity, both because I have earlier given the raw material of my analysis (the 
transcriptions of the children's interviews) the status of historical texts, apd 
because it is in the field of history that there has recently been a resounding victory 
for objectivity in research in the Irving Judgement (2000). It was also an ethical 
victory, for, while Troyna saw partisan research founded on postmodern relativism 
as a tool for reform by leftist social scientists (Troyna 1995), the association of 
extreme relativism with the far-right in history has been a cause for concern, 
particularly when applied to revision of the history of the Third Reich (Evans 
1997). German history specialist, Jane Caplan has argued: 
Theories that appear to discount rationality as a mode of explanation, t4at 
resist the claims of truth,, relativize and disseminate power, cannot assign 
responsibility clearly, and do not privilege (one) truth or morality pver 
(multiple) interpretation. (cited in Evans 1997,242). 
This was especially the case, she continued, with recent history. For ethnographers 
whose subjects are living individuals and communities, the ethical arguments for 
objectivity are equally strong. How that objectivity might be achieved is the issue. 
The trial in which Holocaust denier,, David Irving, lost his case, was the occasion 
of rigorous re-exarnination of the role of the researcher in the field of history. in his 
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report for the trial, the historian, Richard Evans recognises the beginnings of 
research in the researcher's subjectivity 
[Historical researchers] bring a whole variety of ideas, theones,. even 
preconceptions to the evidence to help them frame the questions they want 
to ask of it and guide their selection of what they want to consult. (Evans 
D- 
Report Chapter 5,15) 
Like the historian, I brought to my task initial theories and preconceptions 
concerning the link between religious understanding and social encounter, between 
language and thought, the agency of the child, a certain understanding of human 
nature and of the children involved as a group and as individuals. These ideas 
pfided my research design and analysis, but the subjectivity of the beginning did C; I-- 
not preclude any claims to objectivity in what followed. Once the historians get to 
work, Evans' report for the trial tells us, it is their duty, to read the evidence fully 
and 'fairly' and 'if it contradicts some of the assumptions they have brought to it, 
to jettison those assumptions. Objectivity should be their aim. Citing Thomas 
Haskell,, Evans says of the pursuit of history 
[It] requires of its practitioners that Vital nýnlmum of ascetic self-discipline 
that enables a person to do such things as abandon wishful thinking, 
assimilate bad news (and) discard pleasing interpretations that cannot pass 
elementary tests of evidence and logic. (Chapter 5,15 also in Evans 1997) 
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I was influenced by the 'range of concepts and thought patterns' (Jackson and 
Nesbitt 1993,20) with which I initiafly approached my study, but, to be 'fair' in my 
interpretation, I was prepared to move outside that range. As the work progressed 
I found myself jettisoning some assumptions and altering frameworks pf 
interpretation to incorporate unexpected findings, contradictions In the children's 
thinking and variations in their style, for example (Chapter 2.2.6). The plan of ýhe 
thesis underwent several radical changes, proposed chapters and headings were 
I'll abandoned and replaced, and content was reorganised to match the demands of 
(evidence and logic'. I also had to assin-fflate 'bad news',. acknowledging the extent 
of tension between Muslim and non-Muslim children in the school, and ýhe 
inadequacy of some of our education programmes to promote inter-religious 
harmony. The pursuit of objectivity was an exercise in self-discipline. 
The Role of Readership 
The emphasis so far in this reflection on objectivity has been on the individi4al, 
whether on the individual's subjectivity or the individual's responsibility. This 
contrasts with Popper's view: 
It is a mistake to assume that the objectivity of a science depends on the 
objectivity of the scientist. (Popper 1976,96 cited in Phillips 1993,70) 
Objectivity, in his thinking, is not the property of the individual researcher but pf 
the research community. Following Popper, Phillips argues that the validity of an 
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individual's research is compromised by the personal biases and valuations noted 
above and so needs to be checked, tested and critically evaluated by oth(ýrs 
working in the same field. He writes that good research work 'will be objective , in 
the sense that it has been opened up to criticism, and the reasons and evidence 
offered in both cases will have withstood serious scrutiny' (70-7 1 ). 
It is not the fact of being criticised by others that makes research writing objective,, 
it might not meet the criteria for that community's endorsement. Nor is it the fact 
that it has withstood the test of critical scrutiny by the research community, 
otherwise a research report left unread could not in itself be objective. I understand 
objectivity to be inherent in the text even before it is viewed by others, on accotint 
of the work's 'addressivity', its orientation towards a critical audience and its 
responsiveness to the reader's demands for reason, internal consistency aTid 
supporting evidence. Phillips stresses the importance of responsible readership. 
This can be provided by the researcher himself, 'le premier lecteur' (Ricoeur 1986, 
142). Evans recommends 'detachment' from oneself, seeing oneself as one object 
among many, as a way of achieving objectivity (251). 1 aimed for detachment from 
my text so that I moved between the position of writer of the work, with the 
investment of self that involves,, and that of reader, viewing and evaluating it as p 
outsider. By this process the bonds between author and text are loosened, linuts 
are set for the 'artist's' imagination and the text itself is objectified. Opportunity 
for research objectivity is given in the interval between a researcher as author of a 
research text and as a critical audience of the same. This dual role puts me as 
researcher in a position to promote within myself the discipline objectivity requires. 
57 
1.24 Generalisability 
'j"he Problem of Generalisability 
While issues of generalisability have received much attention from researchers in 
quantitive research traditions, they have until recently received comparatively little 
attention from qualitative research schools. There are several reasons for this. Qne 
is assumptions made about the subjectivity of qualitative research and the influence 
of the backgrounds and viewpoints of individual researchers on research data. 
Another is the focus on single-case studies not meeting the statistical sampling 
procedures usually seen as essential for the generalising of research data to a wider 
population. In recent years, however, the climate has changed. There is an 
increasing concern with more general application of research findings, associatýd 
with a change in focus of qualitative research away from 'exotic foreign and 
deviant local cultures' to evaluation and basic research on issues in our own 
society, particularly in the field of education (Schofield 1993,94). As the group I 
am working with is being studied in an educational setting and their lives aTe 
enmeshed in the complexities of 'our own society', it seems appropriate to raise 
the issue of the generalisability of the findings of this thesis. I do so by looking at 





The first question is how the knowledge of these particular children, gainqd 
through qualitative research activities, can be of general relevance to a wider 
society and population. N. K. Denzin did not think that generalisation was aý aim 
of qualitative research- 
The interpretivist rejects generalization as a goal and never alms to draw 
randomly selected samples of human experience. For the interpretivist 
every instance of social interaction, if thickly described (Geertz 1973), 
represents a slice ftom the life world that is the proper subject matter for 
interpretive inquiry 
... every topic ... must 
be seenas carrying its own logic, 
sense of order,. structure and meaning. (Denzin 1983,133-4 cited in 
Schofield 1993,, 92) 
By this view the value of the study is internal and the knowledge gained specific; if 
the group being studied is worthy of attention, it is so in its own right rather than 
as an illustration of a wider phenomenon. Like the researcher above, I set out on 
this project convinced of the inherent worthiness of its participants as subjects of 
study. I do not, however, see the proper subject matter for my inquiry as a distinct 
way of life. The diversity and complexity of the children's social context is such 
that fluid structures and multiple meanings replace the 'sense of order' Denzin's 
'interpretivist' seeks. The interconnectedness of a considerable variety of 
discourses in the children's lives has two seemingly contradictory implicationý for 
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the generalisability of my study: it relates their experiences to a context wider than 
a discrete 'life world', yet at the same time makes it even more problematic to 
generalise from those experiences to other situations. 
A multitude of factors had a bearing on the results of my search, and these factors 
could come together in endless combinations. As well as broader societal and 
cultural influences (the membership of a particular group, racial, ethnic and 
religious identity), there were numerous others (the viewing of a particular TV 
programme, the outcome of a playground football game) which could affect ýhe 
participants' perspectives, and relationships. These variations make it difficult to 
generalise even within the community, the school or group of children with whorp I 
was researching. Time factors also affected the findings, the time of year ('Id time) 
at which the data was collected, and the time in the life of a constantly changing 
community. Between the interviews and the production of the final text, the 
children's context has already undergone marked changes with the movement of 
Somali families into the area. One measurement used for the generalisability of 
research has been replicability (Schofield 1993,93) yet the myriad elements and 
interconnections that made up each of the project's research events were so 
complicated they could not be replicated even with the same group of children. 
Guba and Lincoln wrote that, 'generalizations are impossible since phenomena are 
neither time- nor context-free'. They qualified this statement, however, by arguing 
that 'working hypotheses' might be transferred from individual cases to other 
situations 'depending on the degree of temporal and contextual simiýlanty' (1982, 
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238 cited in Schofield 1993,, 96). Though exact replication of an individual case 
may not be achievable, qualitative researchers (Stake 1978, Guba and LincQln 
1992, Goetz and LeCompte 1984) have argued that it is possible to take findings 
from one study and apply them to understanding another similar situation. The 
greater degree of sameness between two situations the more valuable the study of 
one will be to the understanding of the other. To identify these similarities 'current 
thinking' requires of the researcher a depth of knowledge about the site in which 
studies are conducted and of the site to which one wishes to generalise. 'Thick 
descriptions' as advocated by Geertz, are seen as vital (Schofield 1993,97). 
The complexity of the children's context, however, makes reliance on thick 
description problematic. In trying to match two sites, judgements have to be made 
about which similarities are important, which differences can be discounted. ThOre 
are so many variables that the thicker the descriptions of comparative sites the 
greater the multiplication of differences between them. As the researcher delves 
more deeply, the task of explicating from one situation to another becomes 
increasingly difficult and likenesses can become lost in a mass of qualifications. I 
see the points of contact between the experiences of my research subjects and 
those of others being not so much in the intricacies of their situation as in the broad 
outline. Specific,, individual circumstances give my findings local colour and make 
them impossible to replicate or even imitate, but the 'big, themes of response to 
diversity, of children's agency, of the interaction between language and thought, 
give them general relevance as part of the collective experience of human kind. 
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Theory 
This move from the particular to the general put my study in contact with 
theoretical literature around the themes cited above. In this context the role of an 
individual qualitative research study such as my own is not to produce 
generalisations, but to assess the generalisability of statements that have been made 
by others. I related my findings to broad theories about children's religious 
understanding. Underlying assumptions of these theories were questioned or 
rejected if they did not fit the instances of religious thought I had recorded. This 
was the case with Hay's model of children's spirituality, for example. I gave 
greater credibility to those theories which did agree with my findings such as the 
link between acts of communication and the movement of understanding. I also 
proposed ways in which general theories might be adapted to incorporate the 
results of my research: seeing Fowler's patterns of faith as styles rather than stages, 
for example; finding new significance in Bakhtin's 'authoritative voice'; combining 
different models of dialogue. The narrow base of my study in a small number of 
specific instances of interaction means my contributions cannot be conclusive; they 
have the status of suggestions in a wider debate. 
Practice 
In his reflection on the generalisability of qualitative research projects in 
educational settings, J. W. Schofield writes of the value of studies of both typical 
and atypical situations (Schofield 1993). The former are the common and ordýnary 
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that can be used as indicators of what is going on in our schools, the latter provide 
the forward-looking educationalist with examples of what could be achieved and 
are designed to promote good practice. To illustrate the point we again return to 
the study Danielewiez and colleagues carried out with a teacher, Mrs Shriver, apd 
her class. The researchers chose 'sharing time' as the focus of their study. One of 
the reasons for this choice was that sharing time 'is a representative sample of 
school culture' (Danielewicz et al. 1996,314), 'an event familiar to almost all 
elementary school teachers' (3 12). The early stages of the study involved 4n 
evaluation of what goes on in a typical sharing time. As a result of this evaluation 
the format of the sharing time was changed to give more control to the children (it 
became atypical) and the children's interactions in the new situation were analysed. 
The researcher's conclusions from these case studies included recommendations to 
teachers: 
We would like to strongly urge teachers to implement some structur9d 
speech situation in which children use language to direct, negotiate, make 
alliances, and build complex dialogues around content. (330) 
Convinced of the value of the differently structured sharing time for the children's 
social and linguistic development, they were urging educationalists to apply these 
methods more widely than Mrs Shriver's first grade class. 
This is the third fonn of generalisation- the practical pedagogical lessons that can 
be drawn from a research study conducted by a teacher, with children in a 
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classroom context. I did not design this project as a piece of educational research 
but because of my profession it was perhaps inevitable that there crept in alongside, 
and secondary to, the researcher's analysis, an assessment of the educational value 
to the children of the activity in which they were engaged, and its pedagogical 
possibilities. Though group work is commonplace in my classroom and school, 
what was atypical about the research events was the degree of freedom given ýo 
the children to take the discussion wherever it led them, - the minimum 
level of 
teacher guidance and the open-ended nature of the event. These loosely structurfd 
dialogues served the purposes of my research and also engaged the children in the 
exercise of valuable cognitive, social and personal skills. In an occasional papor 
produced for Warwick Religious and Education Research Unit, I set out for a 
teacher readership what I perceived to be the benefits of classroom dialqgue 
activities of this nature (Ipgrave 200 1). 
Progress in education ideally works through trial and evaluation. Practices triýd 
and evaluated as successful in one setting are promoted in other settings, tried and 
evaluated there. They do not always transfer well from one school to another; ' a 
variety of factors, circumstantial and human, affect outcomes and successful pilots 
do not ensure the unqualified success of a general implementation of the saTe 
scheme. Nevertheless something that works well in one setting is worth trying in 
another. I suggest in the Warwick paper how a dialogical model might be appliVd 
more generally to religious education in other educational settings. In keeping with 
the above, though, any conclusions on the generalisability of this pedagoýical 
method would have to wait on the results of its implementation elsewhere. 
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MIND 
2.1 God Talk: Experience-based and Cognitive Approaches 
The religious understanding being explored in this project takes its shape in the 
public domain. It is researched through group discussion and draws on a wider 
dialogue between the participants and their social context of encounter with 
various religious traditions. It emphasises the role of social interaction in 
children's religion. By contrast, the experientialist school of religious education 
and research prioritises pupils' exploration of their own 'inner space', developing 
their own individual responses to the spiritual dimension (Hammond, Hay et q1. 
1990ý. 22). The experiential i sts identify a need to cut away the social and cultural 
overlay to find the true 'spirit of the child' buried underneath. In the dialogical 
approach engaging the children's religious understanding is a communal activity 
characterised by rational discourse, for the experientialist it is a personal, inner 
journey based on intuitive spirituality from which it is claimed religious 
experience arises. Two central texts for the experientialist movement in religious 
education and research are New Methods in RE Teaching: An Experiential 
Approach written as a teachers' handbook by David Hay and John Hammond in 
1990,. and David Hay and Rebecca Nye's 1998 study, The Spirit of the Child 
which lays out the background, records and draws conclusions from their researýh 
project into children's spirituality for Nottingham University's Centre for the 
Study of Human Relations. 
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In this chapter I position my research against the method of experientialism and 
aim to demonstrate that findings from a cognitive approach based on public 
language are not of less value as representations of children's religious 
understanding. What follows is not a systematic critique of David Hay whose 
work does indicate an awareness and experience of the complexity of the issues, 
but it will draw on his writings and those of some of his critics to identify the 
premises on which his 'experience-based' approach is founded. These will be 
related to empirical evidence of what is actually happening in children's meaning 
making, employing examples from the Nottingham study and my own research 
projects. I shall then use the 'private language' debate to consider whether it is 
possible to get closer to the core of a child's religiousness through a personal 
I inner journey' approach. To end, I introduce the idea that, - rather than restricting a 
child's religious understanding, an approach using learned religious language and 
based on reason,. could free it to move in exciting new directions. 
2 1.1 Contrasting Approaches to the Development of Religious Understanding 
Much of the dialogue that constitutes my research data has God as its theme. The 
children debate whether their god is the same as their neighbours', whether he is 
one or many, what he is like, how he operates, what he is thinking. They explore 
related concepts such as eternal life, heaven and hell, creation, incarnation, and 
can therefore be said to be engaged in 'God talk'. The term 'God talk' dates back 
to 1967 and the book of the same name in which John Macquarrie discussed the 
problem of language in contemporary theology. The term was adopted by John 
Hull to describe children's religious discourse (Hull 199 1). Hay and Nye also used 
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it to refer to a tradition of research which examines children's grasp of religious 
concepts Cheaven', 'creation' and 'God') by discussing explicitly religious 
material with them (Nye 1996,2-7; Hay 1998,54). This tradition is closely linked 
to Piagetian models of cognitive development. Foremost among practitioners of 
such methods was Ronald Goldman, who related children"s mental development 
to their ability to grasp the meaning of religious narrative, primarily Bib4, al 
stories (Goldman 1964 and 1965). He suggested that the boundaries of children's 
cognitive development meant that they were unable to access religious language, 
particularly the language of metaphor. Goldman famously questioned the 
readiness of young children for religion, recommending that Biblical material 
should only be used sparingly in schools. His theories were very influential at the 
time. He has been credited with responsibility for the move away from Bible- 
based religious education in primary schools (Ashton 1997) and continued to be 
cited into the 80s and 90s as providing an accurate picture of children's 
intellectual incapacity for understanding religion (Bastide 1987,18-23; Wes 
19961,13-18). From his work came an impetus for creation of the stage 
development models of religious understanding considered in the next chapter. 
While 'God talk' has its advocates in the field of religious education and in 
research into children's religious understanding, others see it as affording only a 
limited view of the subjects' religion and spirituality. Ray writes: 
The difficulty with almost all research on children's spirituality up to the 
very recent past is that it focuses on God-talk, or, in Goldman and his 
descendants' case, the Piagetian development of God-talk. (Hay 1998,, 44) 
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Hay's position is not as far from Goldman's as is implied in his words above. The 
latter's conviction of children's cognitive limitations led to his advocating a 
different approach to religious education using music, dancing, painting and 
creative work to help them 'fantasise' their way into religion (Goldman 1964, 
233). Religion is, he wrote, 'fundamentally a pattern of belief, and not an 
intellectual formula ... the emotional aspect of religious thinking Is of great 
importance', (Goldman 1964,3 1) 
Nevertheless, Goldman's research bias towards cognitive development set a trend 
followed in the works of other developmentalists, noticeably Fritz Oser and James 
Fowler. Even though he has considerable admiration for these researchers, flay 
finds problems with their method: 
Stress on the development of intellectual and moral reasoning in children 
means they downplay the spiritual dimension. (Hay 1998,, 42) 
There are then two perceived difficulties with the 'God talk' approach: the 
limitations of children's intellectual ability, as outlined by Goldman, and 
secondly, Hay's criticism that an overemphasis on the intellect and religious 
language does not offer a true picture of children's spirituality. 
In a 1996 paper for the training of social workers (Nye 1996), Hay's research 
I 
colleague, Nye, distinguishes between contrasting approaches to children's 
religious development 
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I. 'Cognitive and Religious' approaches interested in children's rational 
handling of traditional religious terminology and concepts,, 
2. 'Experience-based and Personal' approaches which engage with 
children's spiritual potential. 
Of these,, the former are used in my research. The use of religious language is 
explicit, questions and discussion encourage rational thought. The experience- 
based approaches are those adopted by Hay and Nye for their Nottingham 
research project. The purpose of their study was to find out 'how ordinary children 
talk about their spirituality' (Hay 1998, vi). They aimed to strip away layers of 
cultural constraints, such as religion and communal language, to find the spiritual 
being underneath. 
21.2 Experience-based and Personal: relational consciousness and its critics 
Underlying the experientialist approach is a belief that spiritual or religious 
nI--. lowing is not taught or learned but is received directly (Hay 1998,52). Hay 
follows the zoologist Alastair Hardy's hypothesis as expounded in the Gifford 
Lectures (Aberdeen University, 1965), that spiritual awareness is a biologic4l 
phenomenon which has evolved in the human species through the process of 
natural selection because it has survival value. In this understanding, spirituality is 
a human universal often hidden by the assimilation of culturally constructed 
norms. Hay argues that this spirituality is most clearly present in children Wore 
they have leamt how to suppress it (Hay 1999,3). 
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The Nottingham study began without a definition of spirituality to avoid 
(prejudging areas children might experience as spiritually significant' (Nye 1990, 
2-7), but a common thread running through the children's responses was needed 
to provide an object for the search. As a result of their study, Hay and Nye 
identify a 'core category' which they called relational consciousness. This 
relational consciousness has two components: 
1. In every case where children talked about spirituality there appeared to 
be an unusual level of awareness or perceptiveness compared with 
their conversation on other matters. 
2. Without exception, all spiritual talk referred to how the children related 
to reality: either to God, other people, themselves, or the material 
world. (Hay 2000,83) 
Hay's argument is that this relational consciousness is not only being neglected in 
our times, but is in danger of being lost beneath a weight of social and cultural 
pressure. 
The natural relational consciousness clearly richly present in young 
children as our research has shown, is currently being obscured, overlaid 
or even repressed by socially constructed processes. (Hay with Nye 1998,. 
151) 
In The Spirit of the Child, these constructed processes are identified and 
characterised as follows. 
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* religion- In its traditional forms religion, in particular Christianity, has 
imposed restrictions on spiritual expression. Christian culture has 
experienced a value blockage at many points throughout history bringing 
about a narrowing of the original universalistic image. 
9 language: Tonventionalised' language also narrows the vision. By 
contrast,. relational consciousness gains value from its position outside the 
boundaries of language. It is an 'all-pervasive preverbal knowingness' 
which 'because it predates the potent analytical emphasis of grammar 
encompasses an awareness of our indissoluble link with the seamless robe 
of reality. ' (145) 
9 rational / scientific thought. The 'natural knowing' of young children is 
contrasted with the intellectualism imposed on us by history (66). The 
rationalist, - scientific tradition of the Enlightenment with 
its religious 
scepticism is responsible for a collapse of interest in the spiritual in British 
society. In our own time the increase in the importance of science in the 
primary curriculum is a cause of concern: 
That children are now often receiving scientific instruction from a 
much younger age may have the effect of inhibiting early 
spirituality at an even more sensitive, vulnerable stage. (50) 
It is around the role of religion, language and rational/scientific thought,, that much 
of the argument for or against an experientialist method turns. It is also my 
interest in the positive role of these three in children's religious understanding that 
distinguishes my methods and conclusions from those of the Nottingham Project. 
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The publication of Hay and Hammond's handbook, New Allelho& in RE Teaching 
- An Experiential Approach (Hay and Hammond 1990) was followed by a flutTy 
of criticism, the debate being pursued through a number of articles in Ae British 
-Journal of Religious Education (Thatcher 199 1; Mott-Thomton 1996, Wright 
1996). Experientialist attempts to isolate children's spirituality from a cultural and 
social overlay engendered concern about the 'polarisation of religious education'. 
Critics focussed attention on the three areas identified above and the 'new 
method' was criticised for its dualism,, for promoting a separation of commupal 
from individual, of public discourse from experience and of (scientific) fact from 
value. 
Hay's theories are criticised as both mistaken and harmful. Wright argues that t4e 
separation of children's spirituality from the formative influences of religious 
tradition,, operates on a false, ahistorical view of children's experience (Wright 
1993) and 'aggravates the separation of self from society' (Wright 1996,142). For 
Thatcher the emphasis on 'private interiority damages the sociality of the human 
person' (Thatcher 1991,25). Wright stresses this sociality when he argues that 
C experience does not constitute an autonomous realm of private meaning, but is 
always informed by and dependent on public discourse' (Wright 1996,167). A 
more moderate position is that taken by Mott Thornton who is prepared to 
acknowledge the possibility of a private state of mind but sees its expression as 
necessarily public language (Mott Thomton 1996). The experientialists' suspicion 
of scientific,, analytical thought is seen as detrimental to morals,, reducing spiritual 
education to 'no more than an abstract cultivation of will and desire devoid of any 
criteria of meaning or truth' (Wright 1997,14). Thatcher accuses the authors of 
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The New Allethodv in RE Teaching of a damaging relativity towards truth 
undermining public standards and giving full scope to individual prejudices 
(Thatcher 1991,25). 
In his contribution to Michael Grimmit's Pedagogies of Religious Educatign 
(Grimmit 2000), Hay defended himself against accusations of dualistic 
Cartesianism with claims that his and Hammond's views were misinterpreted. 
Nevertheless, the debate between public and private, communal and individual, 
rational construction of meaning and direct spiritual awareness, remains. In the 
following chapters of this study it will be evident that my research methods and 
analysis move towards a presentation of children's religion as embedded firmly in 
their communal,, linguistic and cultural contexts. Confidence in the validity of my 
approach requires my engagement with the debate, and a testing of my position 
against empirical evidence and theoretical argument. Evidence from Hay and 
Nye's Nottingham study, where the researchers avoided the use of explicit 
religious terminology is employed, as well as examples from my own research 
where conventional religious language was introduced by me as stimulus for 
discussion. 
21.3 Religious Language and Cognitive Activity 
In the Nottingham Project 
In Me Spirit of the Child (1998), Hay's theories and Nye's interpretation of the 
data produced by their Nottingham study are reported. It is to the results of this 
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project that we now move in order to relate them to the criticisms raised above. 
Was the researchers' 'experience-based and personal' (as opposed to a 'cognitive 
and religious') approach reflected in the attitudes of their respondents? Although 
Nye was careful not to introduce religious terminology herself in her fieldworý,, 
and she and Hay observe that the children were able to express relational 
consciousness in a variety of other languages available to them, the children's 
readiness to discuss their spirituality within the framework of the public language 
of religion was marked. 
Many of the children, even those who were highly secularised, resorted to 
religious language without prompting when referring to spiritual matters 
(Hay with Nye 1998,87) 
It was noticeable how readily this largely secularised sample of children 
introduced religious terms in the course of our conversation. 
This readiness to draw on religious conceptions in the task of meaning- 
making, despite a background of lack of knowledge of formal religion was 
especially noteworthy. (103-4) 
Examples are given of occasions when a child's discussion of what seemed to be 
an implicitly spiritual theme led into more explicit articulation using religious 
language (107-8). Nye explains the frequency with which her respondents used 
explicitly religious terminology as a defence strategy. a way of legitimising the 
'Illegitimate stuff of spirituality' in a climate hostile to expressions of spiritual 
meaning (129). Another interpretation could be that their fluency in religious 
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language showed the degree to which the children felt at ease with God talk, that 
they recognised their experiences within its framework and understood them in 
the light of public religious discourse. 
The rationalising tendency evidenced in some of the children's spiritual utterances 
are played down with such phrases as, 'apparently cognitive signs in reality 
secondary products of spiritual stirrings' (74), and 'The term 'mental' is not used 
to suggest that this phenomenon is only an intellectual or cognitive quirk, but 
rather gathers together the psychological functions of cognition, emotion, action 
and sensation' (192). Nevertheless, the 'primacy of mental effort' cannot be 
denied in the approach of ten year old Tim (98-99) who struggles to work out 
answers to the questions, 'Is there a single true GodT and 'How can we cope wiýh 
the mystery of infinity?, or of Harriet (also aged ten) the subject of whose 'deep 
pondering I include the nature of thought, the relationship between the mind and 
the brain, the nature of language, the origin of the universe (109). The very asking 
of such questions implies the existence of an answer even if the children feel, liýe 
Tim,, that they can never 'get the right answer or get even near it' (97). It is very 
clear that Tim rates the rational higher than the experiential. When asked if 
children of his age could have religious experiences such as a sense of the 
presence of God, he replied: 
I think they just look at it and think Wow! And uh ... 
forget about it, really 
or just um think about it, but don't think how they were made. (99) 
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The children's mental activity was not just a response to 'spiritual stirrings' but 
was also a means to create,. or,, as Nye expresses it, to 'maintain' (132), a sense of 
the spiritual. A number of deliberate strategies are outlined including mental or 
physical withdrawal, focus on an object, seeking communication through prayer, 
exploiting aesthetic and sensory experiences, 'philosophizing'. The children's 
skill in providing themselves with such opportunities was remarkable- 
I was impressed by the children's diversity, range and level of mastery of 
rather complex mental processes. (130) 
In some cases it caused Nye to question the general applicability of Piagetian 
stages of cognitive development. The children did not seem to be 'locked in' to 
concrete and literal forms of thought but showed ability to use analogy and 
metaphor in expression of their spirituality. Within the results of the Nottingham 
Project signs can be found of a spirituality that readily draws on both the rational 
faculties and the public language of religion. These provide indications that 
spiritual experience is not always the primal and most direct, but can be generated 
by mentally prepared strategies. Though Nye favoured the 'experience-based and 
personal' approaches to spirituality in her 1996 paper, in The Spirit of the Child 
she incorporates the 'cognitive and religious', the religion, language and rational 
thotight, into a continuum of children's spiritual expression suggested by their 
responses in many different interviews. Direct experience of spirituality becomes 
only one form of perception- 
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At one end are those who perceive spiritual matters in terms of questions 
and principles. Then there are those who go on to make conscious or 
unconscious associations with the traditional spiritual language of religion 
in their attempt to articulate these questions and find meaningful ways of 
answering them. Finally at the other end of the continuum are those who 
have experienced their spirituality directly and personally in the forM of 
-religious insights. (110) 
Jn the Children's Discussions 
Employing a 'cognitive and religious approach, my research produced data with 
some echoes of Nye"s findings, examples of which are set out in the interview 
extracts below where discussion was centred round the term 'spirit'. What they 
are describing appears to fit within the category of spiritual experience- AY 
reflects on times when she feels close to God: 
AY: Like if I've been naughty and my mum and dad are cross with me, I 
go to my room and I feel upset. And I feel God's spirit in me and it makes 
me feel better. (C23-25) 
HA and JH speak of their awareness of the presence of the spirits of dead 
grandparents. 
HA: Because my grandma died and I think that her spirit still lives 
(animated) I think she's just right next to me right now. 
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J-H- (points) Just there"? 
HA- Yes! (E90-93) 
JH converses with his grandfather's spirit at times of quiet after he has been 
reading the Bible and in the hospital when he is visiting his sick father. 
JH- I believe that when you speak to them [spirits] you can actually hoar 
them, but you can't hear them so, like I sit down and just like speak to my 
granddad and in my head I think I can hear him (E98-1 00) 
The contexts of the experiences described are times of emotion (a quarrel with 
parents, remembering a dead grandparent, visiting a sick father) or times of 
stillness and concentration (alone in one's room, the moments after reading the 
Bible) and consequently times at which a heightening of awareness of the kind 
Hay and Nye were looking for (Nye 1996,2-8), might be expected. The 
experiences are private and personal, positive and comforting- JH's granddad has 
much to say but his main message is 'Don't worry' (E 102). 
The children are relating in a significantly close way to the spiritual world, ýo 
God,. to their dead relations,, aware of being 'in relationship with something or 
someone' in a special sense (Hay 1998,114). The conversation shows the 'shift in 
style' that indicated to Nye that her child respondents were expressing core 
spirituality (Nye 1996,2-8)- AY and JH are reflective, HA excited. The response 
of the other children in the group to the children as they speak, also reflects this 
shift. Noticeable was the quality of the attention given to the speaker, the pause 
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for reflection after the comment and the interested involvement in JH's 'Just 
thereT Certainly the children's expression is experience-based and personal. It is 
also cognitive and religious. The linguistic content of the children's contributions 
is that of conventional religious language. As with Nye's 'secular' respondent,, 
even ': secular' AY,, with no background of organised religion, uses a traditional 
religious expression to speak of 'God's spirit in me. All three accounts of 
experience are initiated by the introduction of the term 'spirit' to the group on a 
flash card. Examining their responses in more detail we come across issues of the 
relationship between language, meaning-making and experience. 
A Ys experience 
AY's discourse is about feelings, her experience was a private one. We cannot 
know the exact relationship between the special feeling AY experiences and the 
spirit terminology she uses to describe it. It may be that she recognised or 
interpreted the feeling she had as God's spirit within her, being familiar with the 
concept already or understanding it from JN's words that preceded hers in the 
dialogue. It could be that at a time of upset AY comforted herself with an idea 
provided by encounter with the Christian tradition (God is always with you) and 
so felt his comforting presence. Whether it came before the experience and 
encouraged it, or after and interpreted it, the language acted as a spur to revisiting 
that experience. The fact that her experience had been couched in religious 
language (the terminology of spirit and God within) meant AY was able to draw 
On it when she wished for a moment of reflective awareness, rather than wait for 
that experience to happen again. It became a spiritual resource; not diTect 11 
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perception, but perception with memory to reawaken the sensation. If the 
respondents in both Nye's project and my own had not been able to verbalise or 
recognise their experiences in a common language, such as that of 'spirit,, they 
would have been unable not only to describe them to researchers, but to conjure 
up the memories of such experiences in the first place. They would have 
recognised no cue. 
HA 's experience 
By contrast HA's experience was public, her awareness of her grandmother's 
presence happening as she spoke. Its identification as a spiritual experience was 
dependent on her excitement and animation which stood out from the rest of her 
discourse, From her words it is possible to trace the build up to the experience. It 
began in shared discussion with her sister: 
HA: I said, 'imagine if there was a spirit next to us,. imagine it! ' (E89) 
She then constructs her experience as we speak, leading to a direct perception of a 
spiritual presence in the room. Once this moment has passed, she builds on it to 
open the way for future such experiences for the other children present: 
HA: imagine if there's a spirit next to all of you - yeah, it'd be so good 
too. (E93-4) 
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She is in fact setting the scene for JH's account of his communications with his 
grandfather's spirit. Imagination, it would seem, plays a significant role in HA'S 
construction (the line between imagination and actual sensory perception is 
notoriously difficult to define) but there is also logic, the whole scene being the 
consequence of a particular belief that the spirit lives after death,. linked with the 
causal connective 'because 
JH's experience 
JH"s story is another example of how the logical consequences of particular 
beliefs and understandings lead children to the kind of spiritual experience they 
describe. In his account he is not surprised Samuel-like by a sudden encounter 
from another, spiritual, dimension, but is guided by his understanding that it is 
possible to commune with spirits in a special way to seek out opportunities to 
converse with that of his grandfather. He addresses him at the end of his Bible 
reading and visits the hospital toilets where he can commune with him 
undisturbed. There are parallels here with the strategies used by Nye's 
respondents to support their spirituality (page77). JH uses the 'potent analytigal 
emphasis of grammar' of which Hay is so wary (145) to make the logical 
connections that underlie his spiritual experience ('because, I believe ... so'). 
He 
does the same at the beginning of the exchange when he links his ideas to explain 
the association of God with 'spirit'- 
JH: It's like a ghost but you can't see so people call God a spirit as well 
because you can't see him but he's everywhere so you can't ... 
(E79-80) 
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In the interpretation, expression, recall, construction and preparation of spiritual 
experience,. then, the children draw on the communal language of religious 
tradition and the logic of grammar. The whole exchange generated by the 
introduction of the religious term (spirit' shows an intermingling of belief, 
reasoning and spiritual experience. To isolate a spiritual dimension in the young 
participants' religious expression, and downplay the 'cognitive and religious' 
would not do justice to this blend. 
2 1.4 Religious Language: the Theory 
Empirical evidence demonstrates the impracticality of a Lpolarisation' of religious 
understanding into the 'experience-based and personal' and 'cognitive apd 
religious'. What follows addresses the question of its theoretical possibility. 
Thatcher challenges the view of the human being that underlies New Methods of 
ME Teaching, labelling it 'philosophically spurious' (Thatcher 1991,22). He 
objects to talk of 'the inner self, 'inner space', 'inner me', 'the very private self, 
as subscribing to an 'inner/outer dualism' which, he claims, Wittgenstein has 
shown to be a 'grave mistake' (23). Hay responds to the accusation by using 
Wittgenstein to defend his position. He quotes his critique of Frazer's Golden 
Bough where similarities and differences are traced in various rites of recurring 
themes- 
But then a part of our contemplation would still be lacking, namely what 
connects this picture with our own feeling and thought. This part gives the 
contemplation depth. (Wittgenstein cited in Hay 1992,149) 
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The idea of 'contemplation' and 'depth' supports Hay's use of the language of 
interiority; 'inner is about depth' (145). Supplying this depth is, Hay states, the 
role of experiential religious education (149). Elsewhere in Wittgenstein's critique 
of Frazer, Hay could have found more common ground. Frazer is criticlsed for 
supposing that religious observances embody rudimentary insights, for 
Wittgenstein's concern (like Hay's) was to separate scientific thought from 
religious intuition (Hay 1998,23). Scientific beliefs and religious beliefs are 
totally unlike. The latter are not hypotheses, are not based on evidence and cannot 
be regarded as more or less probable (Pears 1971,174-5). Wittgenstein's view of 
religious belief was anthropocentric; the issue is not truth but the attitude of 
believers. 
For Hay, spirituality is a human universal that pre-exists language, it is a 
9 preverbal knowingness' (Hay 1998,145), direct, intuitive. His concern is that this 
spirituality should be preserved from socially constructed processes which serve 
to obscure it. These processes include public language. Hay removes spiritual 
experience as far as possible from the linguistic limitations that threaten to 
suppress it when he links it to direct sensation. In the fieldwork of the Nottingham 
Project the four qualities looked to as evidence of spirituality are all to do w# 
f. sensing' (Nye 1996,2-8). It is a move away from the use of 'intellectualization' 
as the most valid criterion for assessing religious understanding, an emphasis 
which Hay sees as a mistake of false philosophical categorisation- 
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Spiritual or religious knowing is very different from knowledge of factual 
information,, or speculation about religion. It is much more like a direct 
sensory awareness. (Hay with Nye 1998,52) 
Here he has something in common with Wittgenstein's view of religious 
propositions but his resort to direct sensory awareness does not put a fence of 
privacy around spirituality. In fact it draws him into the 'private language' debate 
stimulated by the philosopher's Philosophical Investigations. 
Wittgenstein stresses the difference between sensations and material objects. They 
cannot be shared in the same way, do not exist before they are felt and cannot be 
passed on. To this extent they are different from that experience of material 
objects from which our everyday language derives. While many can perceive the 
same object and check their perceptions against each others' when coming to a 
common understanding of what it is, only one person has perception of a 
particular sensation. The same criteria for understanding do not apply, -- the 
expression of a sensation cannot use the 'object and designation' model 
(Philosophical Investigations Sect. 293) Are then each person's sensations 
inaccessible to everyone else? What does this mean about an individual's 
perceptions of their own sensations? Are direct sensations outside language 
altogether? 
Though Hay understands spirituality as 'primal' and 'pre-verbal', his working 
relationship with children's spirituality means he cannot leave it as something 
untouched, un-discussed, a mystical truth outside the 'boundaries of language). 
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His interests and those of his colleagues are twofold. research work dependent on 
the respondents' ability to relate their experiences; educational theory concerned 
with the child's ability to build on their spiritual experiences for their personal 
fulfilment. The related questions are how personal spirituality can be expresspd 
and how it can be understood by the child. Nye writes of the problems she 
encounters in her fieldwork with the children's limited 'memory over time for the 
spiritual' and notes the difficulties children experience in 'articulating and storing 
this kind of event in an accessible way' (Hay and Nye 1998,134), accessible both 
for the researcher and for the children themselves. In the former problem lies the 
experiential i sts' dilemma. If spirituality is researched (as in the Nottingham 
Project) it has to be expressed else it cannot be tracked. If it is to be encouraged 
(as in New Methods in RE Teaching) pupils need guiding in its use. How can it be 
expressed or guidance be given without a common language? The second problem 
concerns the use of their experience outside the public discourse of research and 
the classroom. If spiritual experience is to be of greater value to the child than a 
transient awareness which appears and then disappears from consciousness, that 
direct sensory experience needs to be translated into something that can be built 
on. The child has to register the experience, to make sense of it and store it in the 
memory so it can be retrieved when needed. Engaging in this meaning-making 
process requires the employment of language. 
The next question is whether the child can engage in this translation process 
through her own private language or whether she is necessarily drawn into using a 
public language whose conventions will influence the interpretation of the event. 
Wittgenstein denies the possibilitY of sensations being expressed in their own 
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private language. Language is a tool for meaning-making and therefore it must 
include the possibility of checking the sense (the correctness or otherwise) of ýts 
statements. If there are no rules there is no way of determining whether something 
is sense or nonsense. A language must have rules. Rules can be learned and uspd 
by others to verify the individual's statements. They make a language 'teachable" 
and therefore public. 
The question of how there can be a public language for something as private as 
personal spiritual experience, is answered by Wittgenstein's idea of 'teaching 
links'. Sensations are understood and described by 'teaching links' with other 
language, in particular with the language used for material objects. The idea of 
teaching links has direct relevance for Nye's research findings. The links with 
images from other language are evident in the empirical data. Language from the 
material world is commonly used for spiritual sensation. Tina (aged ten) describes 
her response to ladybirds as being 'like I just popped out of my body' (Nye 1996, 
2-11); Joanna (also aged ten) describes her inner feeling through the imagery of 
the garden and states that, 'if life is a little brighter you see brighter things' (2-17). 
Nye identifies a number of languages used by her respondents to relate spiritual 
experience- autobiographical language, language of science and technology, 
language of fiction, language of play, language of philosophy / theology, religious 
language. She also recognises the influence these different languages have on the 
children's awareness of their own spirituality: 
Our conversations revealed that several different languages can be used by 
children to give voice to their spirituality. In subtly different ways these 
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conditioned the forms which relational consciousness took. (Hay and Nye 
19981.129) 
The argument that spirituality cannot be directly known but can only be 
understood by the child and related to the researcher through the use of analogous 
teaching links, counters claims that the 'experience-based and personal' 
approaches have privileged access to the 'inner self of the child. It also means 
that the child's spiritual experiences have necessary links with the contexts which 
supply their means of expression. Their environment and experience provide them 
with a bank of discourses and images from which they can draw the tools of 
thought and communication. In chapters 3.1 and 3.2,1 explore in detail the 
processes whereby the children select their ideas from a wealth and diversity of 
meanings. In his study of Wittgenstein, Pears writes of the pupil's role in the 
establishment of teaching links. He does not become a mere passive recipient of a 
language of sensations from the teacher. The very diversity of teaching links 
requires selection and manipulation of the linguistic tools available. 
So there are several varieties of what might be called 'teaching links', and 
an adequate discussion of them would have to include a description of the 
ways in which the pupil fills in the gaps, and makes moves which go 
beyond his literal instructions. (Pears 1971,149) 
In particular the use of analogy requires personal choice- 
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Analogical descriptions provide an example of the kind of thing which 
only the pupil can do for himself (149) 
This understanding of the pupil's role is bome out by Nye's own work. She 
recognises the wealth of images available to children and is impressed by the 
mental activity of the children in their employment of analogy to describe the 
spiritual. The children are themselves agents in the process of meaning making. 
Nye writes of recent research which challenges Goldman's view that children 
have fundamental difficulties with the mental processing required to understand 
and use analogy: 
This helps to make sense of the frequent use of an analogy-making 
strategy by children expressing spirituality, as a number of examples have 
already suggested. life's meaning as a 'jigsaw puzzle'; the soul as a 
'hologram' and as 'smoke on a misty day; God as 'eternal love', 
'kindness between people' and as 'amazing places in nature' (Hay and 
Nye 1998,132) 
Thatcher does not just question the value of 'inner talk' but disputes the very idea 
of spirituality as an inner essence (like Hay's relational consciousness) from 
which other experiences and insights derive. The imperative towards public 
language outlined above means that the existence of such a spirituality cannot be 
proved or disproved by empirical research; we can only hope to monitor 
contextualised 'spiritual' activity. An experientialist might focus on the spiritual 
activity of the child making sense of personal spiritual experience in a quest for 
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self understanding. Another school may look for spiritual activity in the child's 
engagement with traditional religious discourses to explore that which is of 
ultimate value and ultimate truth. This latter brings us back to God talk and the 
is on two perceived problems with which the chapter began* that the emphas' 
intellect and religious language does not give a true picture of children's 
spiritua ty, and the limitations of children's intellectual ability. 
2 1.5 Readiness for Th eology 
As no language can be said to offer a true picture of children's spirituality, Hay's 
criticism of God talk for its failure to do so is unfair. The first reservation about 
God talk,. the limitations of children's intellectual ability remains, and whether the 
children are ready for the kind of intellectual activity described above. Some 
trends in religious education have worked on the assumption that they are not. A 
Piagetian understanding of the relationship between cognitive stages and theology 
was basic to Goldman's hesitations about children's readiness for religion. Once a 
child has reached her 'cognitive boundaries' it should not be pushed further or it 
will become hopelessly confused. Such thinking was enshrined in the Plowden 
Report of 1967- 
Children should not be unnecessarily involved in religious controversy. 
They should not be confused by being taught to doubt before faith is 
established. (Plowden 1967,207) 
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Add to this a liberal concern to promote tolerance for as plurality of religions by 
emphasising the common and avoiding the controversial, and the result is that 
school religious education often takes what Wright calls, 'the easy route of pre- 
packaging religion' ignoring complexity, ambiguity and ultimate questions 
(Wright 1993). 
Such an approach is limiting, but research and teaching that focuses on children's 
intellectual capacities for religion does not have to be like this- Nye's own work 
has shown children leaping over cognitive boundaries set for them by Piaget and 
Goldman,. and presents examples of a natural interest in, and faculty for, rational 
thought among her interviewees (Hay with Nye 1998). The religious language 
used in cognitive and religious approaches need not be limited to definitions of 
4pre-packaged' concepts, but can become a tool for discussion and disputation. 
Wright advocates a religious education that develops not just religious language 
but 'religious literacy' so that young people are well prepared for the 
contemporary religious situation at the heart of which is 'not a common variously 
expressed, experiential dimension of human essence, but rather a set of 
ambiguous, competing and often overlapping narratives about the true nature of 
reality'. (Wright 1993,173) 
Living in a context of religious plurality, and engaging on a day-to-day basis with 
people of different traditions from their own, the children in my research project 
are well aware of these overlapping narratives, and encounter religious ambiguity 
face to face. There were indeed cases during the collection of data, where children 
appeared to be relaying received ideas with little original reflection; there were 
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also many instances where the tension they experienced between their existing 
religious ideas and the challenges to them engaged their minds in active meaning 
making as they tried to reconcile their differing views of God or deliberated on the 
possibility of bringing an end to inter religious strife through the creation of a new 
religion (GI 12f, H105-119). Rather than limiting and restricting their religious 
expression, it will be seen that the cognitive and religious approaches of this 
research gave children opportunities to employ their rational faculties in displays 
of purposeful creativity and individuality. 
In her research, Nye noted her need to distinguish between passages which were 
made up of 'religious information' and those that seemed 'more personally 
grounded' (Hay with Nye 1998,101). She was distinguishing instances of 
spiritual activity from among the 'casual chatter. Similarly with my research,, 
among the children's discourses there were examples of repetition of learned 
religious speak and others of a dialogue where different ideas were brought 
together in an active search for meaning. This distinction takes us back to the 
origins of the term God talk, in Macquarrie's writing. He observes that not all God 
talk is theology and identifies a need to draw more sharply 'the line between 
theological language and the wider phenomenon of religious language 
(Macquarrie 1967,18). He distinguishes between the two as follows. 
Theological language arises out of religious language as a whole, and it 
does so when a religious faith becomes reflective and tries to give an 
account of itself in verbal statements. (19) 
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He later cites Barth's definition of theology for the Church as, 'the task of 
criticizing and revising her language about God' (Church Dogmatics cited by 
Macquarrie 1967,, 34). 
In the next chapter I employ a more inclusive definition of 'theology', but the 
theologians' statements provide pointers towards a key strand in this definition: 
theology as a creative activity. The children in my project are productively 
engaged in creative theology when they use language to give a reflective account 
of their own beliefs in dialogue with others, and revise that language in the light of 
encounter with different ideas. A number of features of the children's discourse 
indicate a cognitive capacity for such theological God talk. Indicators of this 
engagement of the mind include: 
1. The grammatical linking of ideas through causal connectives (as in 
JH's response to the word 'spirit' E98-1 00); 
2. Making choices between alternative ideas (F56-66, G67f, H105f, 
170f); 
3. Creating frameworks to bring together seemingly contradictory ideas 
(the idea of a God of many features or colours, to accommodate both 
polytheism and monotheism F60-6, HI 13-6), 
Questioning receiVed ideas from within or outside their own tradition 
(for example, JK's doubts over the raising of the dead (F204) and the 
questioning of Muslim strictures on what people should or should not 
do (G361-2),, 
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5. Questioning the authonty by which religious statements are made (the 
truth of the Qur'an E361-2, the motives of parents F143-5), 
Constructing hypothetical situations to explore the logical 
consequences of their own beliefs and understandings (the 
establishment of a new universal religion G8 If, imagining their 
reactions should their children wish to change religion G340f),, 
7. The use of analogy or metaphor to illustrate thinking (CS's image of 
the fairy's spell to illustrate the relationship between God's activity 
and our own G149-152). 
Some of the products of this creative process will be explored in more detail in 
Chapters 5.1 and 5.2 of this study. 
At the beginning of this chapter, I set out Nye's distinction between 'cognitive 
and religious' and 'experience-based and personal' approaches. Through the 
chapter I followed the 'experience-based and personal' thread and used it to 
establish., by counter argument, the basis for my understanding of children's 
religion as grounded in public discourse and mental activity. I now return to 
Nye's distinction to pick up the 'cognitive and religious' thread. In the next 
chapter I position my project in relation to the work of Goldman's successors and 
consider the appropriateness of applying Piagetian theories of cognitive 
development to the examples of religious children's understanding that emerged 
from the research discussions. 
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2.2 God-Talk and Stage Development 
Having established this project's interest in a 'cognitive and religious' approach to 
children's religious understanding (Nye 1996), 1 will now relate its findings to the 
tradition of stage development in religion. In particular I Will explore the theories 
of James Fowler as an example of attempts to draw the cognitive and religious 
together into a structured developmental model. This model, as set out in 'Stages 
of Faith' (Fowler 198 1) will be examined for its usefulness in the interpretation of 
the children's participation in dialogue. 
2.2.1 Fowler's Model of Faith Stage Development 
Fowler draws on the work of a number of developmentalists in the Piagetian 
psychology school. In 'Stages of Faith'. he recognises his indebtedness to Erik 
Erikson's work on the development of personality and realisation of identity 
(Erikson 1963), and to Lawrence Kohlberg"s model of universal stages of moral 
reasoning (Kohlberg 1981,1984). Their emphasis on a cognitive approach, the 
developmental dimension, and focus on structures significantly influenced Fowler's 
work (Nipkow, Fowler and Schweitzer 1991,2). Coming from a theological 
background, Fowler brings to the Piagetian theories of these writers the outlook of 
theologians and historians of religion, Paul Tillich, Wilfred Cantwell Smith, H. 
Richard Niebuhr and Robert Bellah among others. Underlying Fowler's 
developmentalism is Tillich's and Sn-ýith's broad understanding of faith as a 
universal human concern for finding meaning in life outside dependence on the 
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traditions of particular religious communities (Fowler 1981,5). His model of faith 
stages is influenced by structural interpretations of the history of religion such as 
Bellah"s evolutionist model charting the progression of religion through five stages 
from the 'primitive' to the 'modem' (Bellah 1970,22), while Niebuhr contnbutes a 
pattern of progression of faith in the individual with his three-fold categorisation of 
faith into different relations of loyalty, henotheism, polytheism and radical 
monotheism (Niebuhr 1960). Fowler's faith development theory is part of this 
intellectual response to the religious pluralism of the twentieth century. 
Faith development theory and research have emerged as part of the late 
twentieth century effort to address and account for unifying patterns in the 
pluralism in person's appropriations of religious and ideological traditions. 
This work seeks to take account of the relativity of construing and 
constructing life-orientating meanings while avoiding the trap of falling into 
the shallowness of dogmatic relativism. (Fowler ed. Oser and Scarlett 1991, 
42) 
This combination of 'construing and constructing ... meanings' and eschewitig 
'dogmatic relativism' brings together Fowler's cognitive and religious concerns. 
The dialectic between them is that of form and content. Developmentalism, is 
aligned with form- 'The result of the stage development approach is to substitute 
form for content' (Hull 1991,214). The focus is not what people believe but the 
style or form of their faith; what Fowler calls the 'knowing and construing' rather 
than the 'known and construed' (Fowler 1992,12). To get full value from 
Fowler's thought both need to be given due weight. It is often the former that is 
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employed in studies of people's religiousness as Fowler's stage model of faith 
development provides a ready tool for the interpretation of empirical data. A fQw 
examples out of many projects using Fowler's stages are studies by Kalam in South 
India (198 1), Parks with young adults, Barnes, Doyle and Johnson with Catholics, 
and Green and Hoffinan on people's perceptions of others (Astley 1992). 
Fowler postulates six different stages of faith following an initial period of 'Primal 
Faith'. The stages are- 
Stage 1: intuitive-protective faith, a fantasy-filled, imitative phase of early 
childhood; 
Stage 2: mythic-literal faith, where the child takes on the beliefs, storios, 
observances,, moral rules of his or her community with literal interpretation; 
Stage 3: synthetic-conventional faith of adolescence and beyond whýre 
faith provides a coherent orientation in the midst of a more complex range 
of involvements and synthesizes values and information to provide a basis 
for identity and outlook, 
Stage 4: individuative-reflective faith, a challenging stage where the late 
adolescent or adult faces tensions between individuality versus group 
definition and subjectivity versus objectivity and critical reflection; 
Stage 5: conjunctive faith, a new reclaiming and reworking of one's past; 
Ricoeur 1) s r-second naivete' in which symbolic power is reunited with 
conceptual meanings,. 
Stage 6: universalizing faith, attained by very few, an 'incamation' of the 
imperatives of absolute love and justice, the self spends and is spent for the 
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'transformation of present reality in the direction of transcendent actuality' 
(Fowler 1981,200). 
There are aspects of Fowler's stage developmentalism which relate closely to the 
experience and approach to religion of children in this project. The very 
background of religious pluralism that has proved an impetus to Fowler's thinking, 
is the context of the children's own mental activity. The emphasis on faith as 
4 construing and constructing meaning' reflects the interest in the children's active 
engagement of the mind with which the last chapter ended, and developmentalism's 
principle of movement and the 'human being actively organising his or her 
experiences by structurally transforming his or her cognitive-emotive deep 
structures' shares this project's understanding of children as active agents (Chaptor 
1.1.3). Nevertheless there are difficulties that work against a systematic application 
of Fowler's model to the findings of my research. These are the underlying 
assumptions of a stage development model that individuals move through the 
stages progressively, and the loose association in Fowler's pattern of particular 
stages with particular chronological ages. As will be seen in this chapter, the 
children taking part in the discussions show signs of styles of thinking from a 
variety of different stages and not just those assigned to their age group. They also 
demonstrate marked inconsistency in the styles they employ, individual children 
showing a tendency to jump around between the stages. 
There are also the uncomfortable issues of normativity. The hierarchical structure 
of developmental models, where each successive stage is closer to an ideal , implies 
a value judgement on the faith styles of individuals and of communities. The 
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imPlications for valuing the faith of small children at the earlier stages is an issue 
(Nye 1996,2-14), and some in the field of empirical research have argued that 
Fowler's model confers comparative inferionty on whole cultural groups. Vincent 
Murray, for example, finds that the approach to their religious tradition of Sikh 
young people largely fits within the Synthetic-Conventional Stage 3 showing little 
inclination to move to the Individuative-Reflective Stage 4 (Murray 1991). The 
model of faith progression raises a number of questions for my own research. Does 
the fact that the participants are children mean their faith necessarily immature? 
Does the tendency towards Mythic-Literalism demonstrated in the reported speech 
of the Muslim children mean that their faith is less aýdvanced than the more 
reflective faith expressed by some of their peers? When the children ground their 
faith statements in the authority of their community, is that faith less adequate than 
a more autonomous consideration of life's questions? These practical and 
ideological reservations however, do not deny the usefulness of Fowler's work to 
this prOject. Rather they indicate a need to find different emphases in his theory, in 
particular to explore the relationship between content and form, and form and 
context. 
2.2.2 The Theological Content of Faith 
As has been seen, Fowler's Faith Development theory was the product of a 
creative alliance between two intellectual disciplines, theology and developmental 
psychology. As Fowler says of himself in his reflexive first chapters of 'Stages of 
Faith': 
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A citizen reared in the land of theology began to try to earn dual citizenship 
in the new world of the psychology of human development. ' (Fowler 198 1, 
38) 
This union is not without its tensions. Nipkow draws attention to the problem that 
the structural-cognitive approach with hierarchical implications based on 
psychological development criteria, can lead to a theologically difficplt 
undervaluing of the 'firm trust in God' or the 'joyful feeling of belonging to God) 
of the child or mentally handicapped adult (Nipkow 1991,96). At times the 
balance is thrown the other way. While Stages I to 4 follow a familiar cognitive 
pattern towards autonomous and critical thought, the final stages draw back from 
that autonomy, affording more space to the action of God; room for a 
'transforming vision' (Fowler 1981,198), for 'transcendent actuality' (FowtOr 
19817.200). In fact, 'Stages of Faith' ends with an acknowledgement of God's 
4' extraordinary grace' that can break through at any stage: 
There is a limit to how much one can talk about faith and development in 
faith without acknowledging that the question of whether there will be faith 
on earth is finally God"s business. '(Fowler 1981,302) 
At issue here is the use of the term 'faith' which, Nipkow claims, Fowler has 
introduced '"ithout discriminating between a psychological and theological 
definition' (Nipkow 1991,96). In order for it to be of general application across 
the boundaries of different religious and secular traditions, Fowler widens the 
scope of 'faith' from the strictly theological to include secular loyalties and 
99 
cognitive activity, but in so doing loses some precision in employment of the term. 
I-Es writing appears to contain different discourses of laith"; a discourse of 
Piagetian cognition, a theology of covenant and loyalty, and a 'Kingdom of God' 
eschatology. The first of these focuses on the processes, or form, of faith but with 
the others the content re-emerges. 
In spite of his enthusiasm for developmental psychology, Fowler wrote: 
As a theologian I never lost sight of the crucial importance of the 
"'contents" of faith - the realities, values, powers and communities on and in 
which persons "rest their hearts". (Fowler 1981,273) 
Following Niebuhr, who was himself influenced by the philosophy of Josiah Royce, 
Fowler sets out an understanding of faith as a relational enterprise involving a 
commitment to a centre (or centres) of value and power (Fowler 1986,16f) and so 
introduces into his model an object (or objects) of loyalty. In describing the final 
Universalizing Stage of his model, Stage 6, Fowler puts at the end of faiffs 
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journey, the ultimate centre of power, a 'transcendent actuality' (1986,200) and 'a 
power that unifies and transforms the world' (1986,201). Faith has its objects; not 
only that, but these objects have different values. Though he writes of faith as a 
human universal, of the existence of faith without religion, and of the possibility of 
individuals having as their centre of value and power the secular foci of financial 
success, career, nation., family (1981,16f), it is clear that Fowler holds a 
hierarchical view of these objects of loyalty. Loyalty can be directed towards a 
false object; committing oneself to finite centres of value and power is 'idolatry' 
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(1981,18). The issue of normativity is not just an issue of faith style, it is also an 
issue of faith content. Fowler makes a comparison between the faith of a Marxist, a 
follower of Ayn Rand and an Orthodox Jew best described by the structural 
features of Individuative-Reflective faith, and relates it to that of others who share 
their content commitments but at the earlier Synthetic stage: 
Evaluations based on the truth, ethical adequacy or humanizing power of 
their faiths relative to each other however,, would have to be based on 
criteria that included both structural and content-structural dimensions. 
(1991,301) 
Here the dialectic is not between structure and content but between structure and 
the structuring power of the contents of faith for, 'the operative contents of our 
faiths - whether religious or not - shape our perceptions, interpretations, prioritips 
and passions. ' (1981,281) For Fowler, the 'adequacy' of an individual's faith, or 
indeed a community's faith tradition can be evaluated on its capacity to lead 
through the faith stages towards the development of universalizing faith (198 1, 
302). Though faith as a propensity towards meaning-making may be a hum4n 
universal (1981, xiii), 'good faith' (1981,293. ) or 'adequate faith' (Fowler 1992, 
13) is not. The latter cannot be evaluated in stage developmental terms alone but 
through theological reflection: 
But the overall question of adequacy and its criteria can be answered only 
in relation to that which is known or construed in faith - namely human 
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relatedness to the Transcendent. God - and man in relation to God -is the 
object of theological reflection. (Fowler 1992,13-14) 
As Fowler moves into Stage 6 of his model he brings us closer to a very 
(. particular' vision of what constitutes the focus of 'good faith' (1981,207). FowlOr 
recognises that his normative images owe much to Niebuhr's descriptions of 
'radical monotheistic faith",, a faith in which 'the reality of God - transcendent aild 
ever exceeding our grasp - exerts transforming and redeeming tension on the 
structures of our common life and faith' (Fowler 1981,204). It is an understanding 
firn-dy rooted in the Jewish / Christian image of faith in the Kingdom of God. 
Fowler attempts to answer any problems readers may have with his use of 
specifically Judaeo-Christian imagery with what he calls the 'Absoluteness of the 
Particular' (Fowler 1981,207). It is with this concept that he avoids 'týe 
shallowness of dogmatic relativism'. Fowler believes in a universal human vocation 
'to lean into God's promised future for us and for all being' (Fowler 1981,210). 
For Jews and Christians their particular vision of the reality they call the Kingdom 
of God is a moment of absoluteness within their particular faith tradition to which 
they have a duty to witness (Fowler 1981,209). 
Through numerous works in which he holds in tension these psychological, 
covenantal and eschatological understandings of faith, Fowler's own (Christian) 
theology emerges. From this process two points stand out of particular relevance 
to the interpretation of the dialogue of the children in my research project: the 
phenomenological anchoring of Fowler's model in a reality of God and his 
Kingdom, and the recognition that this reality lies behind the varied stages or styles 
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of faith he characterises. This contrasts with the approach of Hay, for example,, 
where the underlying phenomenon 'spirituality' is associated closely with a 
particular style (the characteristics of relational consciousness),, and other styles are 
viewed as a hindrance to its expression (Hay 1998). Hay and Nye's project seeks 
to isolate a particular style while the stage characterisations of Fowler can lead to a 
consideration of the interplay of a variety of different styles in a portrayal of 
children's thinking about God. 
223 The God Referent 
In order to make use of Fowler's model for this task of interpretation, I wish first 
to relate it to insights from the biblical hermeneutics of Paul Ricoeur. The Bible,. 
like Fowler's theory, has as its underlying perspective God's Kingdom - `le 
royaume de Dieu' (Ricoeur 1986,126) or Ia realit6 de possible' (128). Ricoeur 
uses the sense-referent model by which the sense, or meaning, of what is written in 
the variety of biblical discourses has God (and his kingdom) as its background, its 
referent (128). This referent may be signaled by the use of 'qualifiers' or 'limit- 
expressions' (Klemm 1983,113) such as the expressions 'Kingdom of God, 'new 
being' or indeed 'God". 
Moving to the dialogues of this project we also find God as the referent. The 
discussion transcriptions are records of children's God talk. God is the background 
of much of their sense or meaning-making; in the frequent use of the limit- 
expression 'God' (or 'gods), the reference is explicit. The religious provenance of 
the stimulus words given to the children, and the nature of several of the questions 
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formulated for their consideration, mean this is to be expected. However, the 
results of the research study go further to suggest that the sense of much of the 
children's discourse outside these discussions, has God as its referent. They relate 
discussions with their peers about religious issues (F58-60, F1 58-162, E 16-18, F, 8- 
10, C9), and thinking around questions of faith that has taken place outside the 
confines of the research situation (A167-8, C23-5, F245-6). The children's 
context,, living in close encounter with an observant Muslim community, means 
that God is the referent of much of their everyday experience. Not only do their 
Muslim peers 'talk a lot about God'(E236), but the sense of the dress, buildings,. 
food shops, and many of the practices of their neighbours, is to be understood in 
terms of relating to God. Ricoeur writes about the introduction of the 
extraordinary into the ordinary signaling the God/Kingdom referent in the Parables 
(Klemm 1983,115). For these children much of the ordinary is given an 
extraordinary gloss by their peers: discussions about whether or not you watch 
television (D57), sing in the choir (D40), dance to music (D69), what happens to 
pictures on the wall at night (D73-8) and even (in one overheard conversation 
where a Muslim child refused to share his school equipment with a non-Muslim) 
with whom you share your rubber. 
In contrast to Hay and Nye's concern that resort to 'conventionalised' religio4s 
language limits the expression of children's spirituality, Ricoeur sees it as having a 
liberating effect on thought: 
Comprendre le mot "Dieu", cest suivre la fleche de sens de ce mot. Par 
fl&he de sens, j'entends son pouvoir double- de rassembler toutes les 
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significations issues des discours partiels, et d'ouvrir un horizon qui 
&happe a la clOture du discours. (Ricoeur 1975,86,129) 
Likewise with the children, the fact that God is the referent keeps the dialogue 
open. Not only is God the referent of their (Muslim) peers' talk, he is also the 
referent of their response. For them he is the reality behind their encounter not just 
the product of another's speech. They may talk in defining terms about him but 
cannot encapsulate him in that definition; there is always more to say. When the 
Muslim children set out their ideas of God, the others respond with different 
understandings or understandings that take the idea of God further- the idea of a 
retributive God is contrasted with that of a forgiving God (B332f), the idea of a 
God who orders his people around with one who gives more freedom (G3 5 5f), the 
idea of God as strictly one, with ideas that include elements of plurality (D221f, 
F65-6, HI 13-6). Sometimes there is so much to say that he escapes definition, 
'God is God, definitely' (B467), 'God'sjust there' (G125). 
224 Religious Styles and God- Talk 
There is not only much to say about God, there are many ways of saying it. In 
keeping with Fowler's model of a variety of faith styles, the children bring together 
various understandings of God and various styles of religious speech that refer to 
him. There are examples of a credal style; 'here's what I believe ... 
' (F201), 'I feel 
that what they teach us at my church ... 
' (M), 'we have to believe all of 
them... '(HI 11), of rational argumentation, (HI 13-6, G138-143, F154-5, F63-6); of 
empathetic speech '[God] might be getting bored' (F218),, -, of mystery, J want to 
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know - how did God ever make? - how did it? - when did heT (F195); of direct 
experience,, 'I feel God's spirit in me, of moral imperative, 'I know God teachýd 
them to be good to anyone' (H194). Religious language is 'une langage 
polyphonique' (Ricoeur 1975,123) and it is through this coming together of a 
variety of styles of discourse about God that God talk proceeds. As Ricoeur says 
about biblical language: 
La signification de ce r6f6rent [Dieu] du discours biblique est impliqu6e 
d'une mani&e sp6ciale qu'iI reste a dire dans les multiples significations 
solidaires des formes littýraires de la narration de la prophdtie, de I>hymne, 
de la sagesse, etc. Le "God-Talk"' - pour reprendre 1'expression de 
McQuarrie - procede de la concurrence et de la convergence de ýes 
discourse partiels. Le referent 'Dieu" est a la fois le coordinateur de ces 
discourse divers,, et le point de fuite. (Ricoeur 1975,86,129) 
Hull takes this recognition of the variety of forms of religious speech, each with its 
own perspective on religious life, as the benefit to be drawn from Stage 
Development Theories. The imperative is to 'prevent the colonization of the 
religious consciousness by one form of religious speech' (Hull 1994,222). To 
identify a particular style as the genuine expression of spirituality (Hay 1998), or,. 
indeed, to give a particular style hierarchical status over others, would be to risk 
that colonisation. To free Fowler's faith categories from their hierarchical structure 
so that they become styles rather than stages, is to give due recognition to the 
value of each of a variety of forms of religious speech and fit better the variety of 
expression used by the children in the project. An alternative model would be a 
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number of parallel (rather than sequential) styles which set side by side, jigsaw 
fashion, build up a fuller picture of the divine referent to which they all tend. 
However,. adoption of such a model would downplay the value of the sense pf 
movement and tension between stages within Fowler's scheme. Perhaps the 
dynamism of plate tectonics creates a more useful metaphor than the passiviýy of 
the jigsaw puzzle. 
225 Movement between Styles 
In the movement between Fowler's stages there is a series of confrontations 
between different styles of faith where one loses out to another. Individuals will 
plateau at various stages but for those who move there is a degree of restlessness 
in their faith. Though the idea of progression is not being used in the interpretation 
of the children's discourse, that of movement is, and here Fowler's model can be 
employed. In the faith stage descriptors, of particular relevance to this study is the 
identification of factors which lead to transition from one stage to another. These 
have been extracted from Fowler's model (Fowler 198 1) and set out below- 
Factors Leading to Stage Transition 
Stage I -> Stage 2 
Emergence of concrete operational thinking 
The child's growing concern to know how things are and to clarify for him 
or herself the basic distinctions between what is real and what only seems 
to be. 
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Stage 2 --ý Stage 3 
The transition to formal operational thought 
The implicit clash or contradictions in stories that leads to reflection on 
meanings 
Cognitive conceit" leading to disillusiom-nent with previous teachers and 
teachings 
Conflicts between authoritative stories 
Stage 3 -> Stage 4 
Serious clashes or contradictions between valued authority sources 
Encounter with experiences or perspectives that lead to critical reflection 
on how one's beliefs and values have formed and changed and on how 
c relative' they are to one's particular background 
Stage 4 -> Stage 5 
Restlessness with self images of Stage 4 
Images and energies from a deeper self 
Stories,. symbols, myths, paradoxes from one's own or other traditions 
break in on the neatness of previous faith 
Recognition of complexities and multi-levelled meaning 
Stage 5 --ý, Stage 6 
Transforming vision 
The call of the radical actualization of Stage 6 
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Elements of Piagetian cognitive development can be observed in the transitional 
factors in the earlier stages, 'emergence of operational thinking", 'formal 
operational thought', 'cognitive conceit', but of increasing importance in the 
movement through the stages, is the influence of encounter with external factors. 
The need to discriminate between real and unreal,, the reflection on meanings, the 
critical viewing of one's own beliefs, the recognition of multi-levelled meaning, are 
all responses to the conflict in stories and meaning, the conflict between authorities 
and the complexities of the religious and cultural pluralism of contemporary 
society. The context within which the children live and work, that of daily 
encounter with these differences of ideology, narrative and lifestyle, provides 
impetus for movement. 
With their particular experiences at a young age, it might be expected that the 
children would move through Fowler's stages at a faster rate than their peers living 
in a more homogeneous community. There are a number of instances of children's 
discourse bearing the signs of the reflective Stage 4 associated with late 
adolescence by Fowler. However, while they are factors in transition 'up' throu*h 
I 
Fowler's stages, their experiences of context and encounter can also provide 
motivation for not moving, or indeed for 'returning' to 'earlier' stages. Hull applips 
Kegan's distinction between 'stage transitionals' and 'stage resistors' to the 
characteristics of movement from one stage to another (Hull 1997,10). The factors 
are described in terms of emotions - 'hostility, denial, rationalisation' etc - but 
each emotion can be a reaction to a number of experiences of fife, environment, 
and encounter. With the children of the project, for example, the situation of being 
in a cultural and religious minority can lead to defensiveness, lack of confidence, 
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fierce loyalty to their own group or hostility towards the larger group, which in 
turn can affect the direction of movement between stages. The contrasting terms of 
cstage transitionals' and 'stage resistors' does impose a hierarchical sense of 
progression or regression. For the purposes of this project I prefer to interpret the 
children's employment of different forms of religious discourse in terms of multi- 
directional movement between styles. This movement is demonstrated in the 
children's speech. Fowler's categories will be used in an interpretation of the 
influence of context on the styles the children employ. 
226 Applying Fowler's Faith Styles to Children's God- Talk 
The context of my research project is one of encounter* the children's encounýer 
with the religion of others, their encounter with different groups negotiating power 
relations; their encounter in a context of dialogue within the research discussion 
activity. What follows are examples of how these different encounters influence the 
children's styles of religious discourse. 
Encounter in the Context o Plurality ?f 
The subject of much of the children's talk is their encounter with the faith of their 
Muslim peers. As a mixed group identifying themselves as Christians and Muslims 
respectively, they are also encountering each other's religious perspectives. Their 
forms of religious speech are influenced both by their experience of religious 
diversity with its complexities and contradictions, and by the specific content of the 
dominant religious discourse in their environment, One response by the children to 
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a context of diversity and conflict between the authoritative stories of different 
traditions, is a close identification with their own religious tradition and with the 
god who is seen as the god of their group. This is reflected in statements that begin 
'the church I go to believes' (E37) 'what I've been brought up to believe is- 5 
(H134), 4 what they teach us at my church... ' (W), 'that's what we mean by 
(B46 1). There is a 'my god/your god distinction" (F80-3, H140), and the 'my god' 
may be described in close personal terms. He is someone who has a particular 
interest in the child as one of his own, 'my god made me' (B430), he is someone to 
whom the child feels loyalty and on account of whom the child feels protective 
anger should he be denigrated by others, 'he was cussing my god down and thep I 
was getting so angry with this person' (B412); be is someone in whom the child 
believes whatever others say, 'he can say whatever he wants because I know my 
god's good(B417-8), and someone to whom the child can relate as having a 
distinctive personality different from that of other people's gods, while the Muslim 
god is 'going to be bad to them when they die... ' (B3 3 2), 'when we get to heaven I 
think our god's going to be good to us' (B344). This use of faith as a basis fpr 
one"s identity, and the emphasis on personal relationship with God has links with 
Fowler's third,, Synthetic-Conventional faith stage. 
With the Muslims' emphasis on one god, and the idea of God as one, expressed by 
Christians in the group, monotheism has a prominent place in the children's 
thought. It is an example of the content- structural dimensions of which Fowler 
writes. An imperative towards unity in a context of diversity leads children to 
devise all-embracing models drawing disparate focuses of faith into a unified 
Godhead. They may speak of God as one with many names (G71-2,172-3), as one 
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with many features (HI 16) or as a main god with many subsidiaries (D221). In this 
process of 'construing' and 'constructing', the discourse reflects critically on the 
traditions being brought together and, rather than choosing between them and 
adopting one wholesale, - 
it uses logical reasoning to work out a creative solution to 
the contradictions of religious plurality. This critical theologising is closest to the 
fourth of Fowler"s stages , individuative and reflective faith. 
Another content aspect of the Muslim faith they encounter is the emphasis on God 
as judge, on reward and retribution. This can have a very different affect on the 
faith direction the discourse takes. The 'reliance on reciprocity' and "works 
righteousness' of this approach to God is incorporated by Fowler into his secono,, 
Mythic-Literal stage. It is occasionally imitated by the research participants,. 
notably in JH's judgement on those perpetrating violence in the name of religion in 
Ireland and Algeria. They are 'going to be burnt in a Hell of fire' (E129-130). JH's 
advice to those wishing to avoid such punishment is, 'if you do anything wrong 
you have to go on your own hands and knees and you've got to pray to God for 
forgiveness and you promise him you won't do it again' (E133). 
The children are encountering different religious contents and styles. In this context 
they are coming across the same issue of normativity that is evident in Fowler's 
work. We find them both making value judgments about the religious thinking of 
their neighbours, and questioning the appropriateness of so doing. The negative 
association of the religions of peers with animistic idol worship is found in the 
discourse of Christians: 'have you ever seen a god that's gold - that's rock solid 
gold? ' (R235-6); 'your god's just a pure statue! ' (G308), and Muslims, 'they say 
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our god's made out of stone" (B388). There are several examples of children 
sniggering at what are deemed to be the 'silly' beliefs of others. 
JE: One time Ashraf told me - he said he prayed to his god and his god 
dropped money down. 
(general laughter) 
MA: That ain't true. 
JO: It's so stupid! (B396-400) 
The Muslim children's belief that pictures of living creatures will come to life is the 
occasion of mirth among both I-Endu and Christian children (D73f) and though the 
Christian children often try to accommodate their Hindu friends" religiops 
understandings during the course of the dialogues (H 113-6), they do have difficulty 
with some of their ideas, particularly the figure of Ganesh with his elephant's he4d 
(A129). Occasionally a voice is raised that calls for respect for the beliefs of others; 
'I think if they believe it, then I don't think it's nice to laugh. '(D87) 
The creativity of several of the children's theological discussions shows a dynamic 
view of religion into which ideas of progression and development fit easily. The 
idea of progressive religious development is evident in the dialogue in which CS, 
JS and AK discuss the establishment of a new religion as a culmination of previous 
traditions and reward for religious activity (G115f, G138f). In the same 
conversation JS implies that a logical development for Hinduism would be a move 
away from polytheism to monotheism, 'Will your temple stick to one god one day, 
any day' (GI 82) Again the dominant 'one god' discourse is asserting itself 
113 
Encounter in the Context qf Power Relations 
The children's responses to encounter with different religious traditions are 
influenced by the power relations between the groups identifying with those 
traditions. The Muslim children are very much in the majority. The Christians and 
Hindus sometimes feel threatened by this and are therefore on the defensive in their 
relationship with the Muslim tradition, but supportive of each other as sharing the 
minority position. The clash and contradictions between the stories and authorities 
of the different religions initiates response, the direction the response takes is 
influenced by the power games in play. In the negotiation of these power relations 
in religious discourse, children can be observed moving to and fro across the style 
boundaries. An example of one child's movement across boundaries and 
employment of a variety of styles can be seen in different statements made by JN 
during the course of discussions. 
* JN explains that he would not enter a mosque 'because I feel that what they 
teach us at my church that there's only one like religion and there's only one 
god - because I'm a Christian I feel I should always go to church' (HT-9). 
e Speaking to a black fiiend about her negative encounter with a group of Muslim 
children he advises, 'well you should have said this -well your god must have 
been more black than Asian because he was brought up in one of the hottest 
places in the world so he must be sort of dark brown, '(H 173 -5) 
* To a Hindu friend taMng about the variety of gods, he says, 'yeah, because - 
they can all be the same god because God can - God can ... change - like 
different features. He can be in you. '(HI 13-6) 
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0 Flis response to the word 'Spirit' is, 'It's in you. it's God's Spint and it makes 
you do good things. It guides you. We sing a song about the Spirit in church. 
(C 19-20) Sometimes, he says, he feels the spirit in him. 
In these four examples (three of which come from the same discussion) JN seems 
to jump around from one understanding of God to another- God as one and 
exclusive; a different god for different groups ('my god / your god'); God as one 
but inclusive; God as spirit. It is not just his understandings that vary but his styles 
moving from an acceptance of belief on his church's authority (Stage 3), to a very 
literalistic construction of a mythical black God (Stage 2), to a more creatiye, 
reflective image of God amalgamating ideas from different traditions (Stage 4), to 
a personal sensing of the indwelling presence of God (Stage 3). 
Each style is employed in response to a different social context characterised by 
power relations. JN is positioning himself within a context of religious diversity by 
communal identification with one group as opposed to another; responding 
defensively to unequal power relations in the pressure put upon black children by 
their majority Muslim peers; seeking mutual agreement in dialogue with a Hindu 
. 
C.. 
mend; engaging personally with the charismatic, spirit-based ethos of his 
Pentecostal church, and relating to God. JN's God talk shows how contexts of 
social interaction influence the form of faith that is presented. It is not just that the 
children are being presented with different, often contradictory, ideas to employ 
their meaning-making faculties, but that these ideas are presented in different 
contexts which affect their thinking styles, 
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Encounter in the Context qf Dialogue 
These experiences of encounter with different religious traditions and different 
groups are brought to the context of the discussion set up for the research project. 
The meeting together of the child participants with myself as researcher and with 
each other adds another dynamic to the encounter and further influences the styles 
of religious discourse employed. The presence of the researcher / teacher who 
poses questions, occasionally asks for clarification but otherwise is more an 
observer than participator in the discussion, provides an impetus towards 'telliný`. 
The children are to some degree presenting themselves to the researcher, defining 
their identity in the form of credal statements, 'I believe ... ' (F20 1), '1 
just believe" 
(F242),, 'because I am a Christian ... 
' (M). 'the church I go to believes' (E36-7), 
or sharing their own life story (E199f). This focus on faith as identity and 'persoijal 
myth' fits Fowler's Stage 3 Synthetic-Conventional faith. With the impetus 
towards telling comes the story-telling and sharing of tales from their o-,,, yn 
tradition; a way of holding the researcher's attention, or that of the group. 
Examples of this are MA's account of Hanuman swallowing the sun (B52 If), and 
PT's eagerness to bring and show the storybooks of her religion (B285), instances 
of the 'rise of the narratiVe' in Stage 2. 
The presence of other children contributing sometimes conflicting ideas to the 
, encourages a rationalising tendency 
(Stage 4) as children find grounds discussion, 
for disagreement with those ideas, or try to synthestse them into a creative whole. 
Examples include the interruptions of JN and SN when AY tries to account for her 
belief in 'other people's gods'- 'That ain't answering the question', 'No! How can 
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you believe in thaff, "If you've got one god how can you believe in other 
gods? "(H237) The idea of one god with different names '; so we believe in all the 
gods' (H238) emerged from the discussion. CS's concept of a 'new religion' is 
produced in response to the tensions he perceives in the context of religious 
pluralism, but the form it takes is also a response to JS's reservations and 
suggestions. JS's interventions mean he has to reason his model through careýilly 
(GI 22,128,142). 
The discussion's context within the school, with its official ethos of a united 
community of harmony and mutual respect, brings another authoritative story to 
the encounter. In the tension between the separatist sense of group-belonging and 
defining identity of 'my god and yours' outlook, and a unifying 'God is for all' 
approach, the school context weighs in favour of the latter. JH's syncretic image of 
a God of all colours is an example of a resolution of this tension along these lines 
(F58f). Working in the opposite direction is the absence of Muslim children at 
these discussions which leads to an emphasis (perhaps an overemphasis) on them 
as 'the other. Countering the movement towards syncretism are the strong 
criticisms of the Muslim children's religious stance. These criticisms are sometimes 
on the grounds of hypocrisy. The Muslim children's interest in judgment is turned 
around against them and their literal concern with reciprocity (Stage 2) is matched 
with an equally literal concern by some non Muslims to consign them to 
punishment for not living up to their words, 'when they're teasing us they 
sometimes say that you're going to hell but they're the ones teasing us so they 
might go to hell-they're doing bad things' (G283-5). Another approach is to doubt 
the authority which guides the faith of their Muslim peers, whether their parerlts' 
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authority (F140-2), the authority of their religious leaders (F154-5) and the 
authority of the Qur'an (G361-3), calling into question the foundations of the 
Muslims' Synthetic-Conventional faith. 
The very experience, then, of being engaged in a school-based research project 
away from their Muslim peers has influenced the thinking styles of the children 
involved. It may have exaggerated existing trends or encouraged new directions of 
thought by bringing into sharper focus the complexities of the religious context in 
which they live. 
The Meeting between Stages 3 and 4 
The examples above have demonstrated the children's readiness to move to and fro 
I 
between styles of God talk. The final part of this chapter will focus on the point of 
encounter between two of those styles. 
The final chapter of Fowler's 'Stages of Faith', 'Faith on Earth', brings to the fore 
the areas of creative tension in his scheme providing several points of departure for 
those wishing to explore further the implications of religious plurality for human 
faith. One area is that of possible links between his stage categorisations and the 
faith development of 'average people' in different cultural settings and eras 
(Fowler 81,299). He suggests links between faith stages and different societies 
while acknowledging the speculative and conjectural nature of his observations. 
Those relating to Stages 3 and 4 are as follows. 
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Synthetic-Conventional faith as a widespread cultural style could only 
emerge, I should think , in a social context where the uniqueness and value 
of each person is recognized and where the clash and competition of 
cultural myths has given rise to a speculative and synthetic literary tradition. 
In my judgment the emergence of Individuative-Reflective faith as a 
relatively widespread structural style in a society could and would emerge 
only in a cultural setting marked by ideological pluralism, by some degree 
of individualism as an ideological ethos and by the spirit of critical methods 
of empirical enquiry. (Fowler 1981,299) 
The social contexts of both,, the 'clash and competition of cultural myths' and 
'ideological pluralism', are contexts of encounter with plurality. The responses to 
that encounter differ; in the former the reaction is a tightening of boundaries in 
communal identification, and in the latter a loosening of the same and emphasis on 
the individual's faith joumey. Both this tightening and loosening are evident in the 
children's responses their context. As has been seen, they may adopt a Stage 3 
sense of commitment, loyalty and belonging, holding tightly to their religigus 
identity (through credal statements for example) and religious symbols ('my god") 
making clear the boundaries between them and other groups ('their god'). 
Alternatively they may adopt a Stage 4 reflective approach questioning authorities 
and ideas, creating their own new syncretic frameworks. Or they may do both. 
Looking at the words of some of the most reflective, creative thinkers of the 
project, JK, JH, RA, JN, there is evidence that they are being pulled in both 
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directions. The thinking of CS and JS also illustrates this tension between religious 
styles. 
CS' thinking bears the hallmarks of western individualism. This is clear in his 
understanding Islam: 
CS: I think that em. Muslim religion is wrong to say that they can't eat 
certain things and can't do certain things because everyone has the right to 
do what they feel is right' (G355-7). 
If he had children it would be up to them to make up their own mind about their 
religious beliefs: 
CS: I think if my kids sort of disagreed I'd try to reason with them but if I 
couldn't it would be difficult. (G340) 
Together with JS, he discusses instances of conversion from Christianity to Islam 
and both are agreed that the use of reason guided by empirical evidence is the best 
way. CS's aunt was not forced to become a Muslim by her Muslim boyfriend, 'She 
actually done it by herself ... she was reasonable' 
(G251-3), and JS parallels this 
conversion with a case he knows of a woman who read through the whole Quran 
in the library before making up her mind to convert (G254-9). The two boys jointly 
create a carefully thought out model of a new religion that will answer the 
problems of religious rivalry (G] 15f). Their model is based on critical assessment 
of the current situation and consideration of what is or is not possible in the light of 
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their understanding of God's power and purposes. The result is something quite 
creative and new. Yet, in spite of their ideology of reasonableness and choice, both 
have a fierce loyalty to a religion that has been decided for them, by God in JS's 
case, 'Im happy what God made me and if he made me a Muslim, whatever - 
whatever he makes me ... 
I'd be proud' (G232-4), or by family history, in CS's case: 
CS: I'm proud of who I am because really it's my ancestors that started 
this and I'm going to carry on for them 
JS: Yeah, that's true 
CS: I just feel sorry for them because they were slaves and I don't want 
that to happen again - people to be slaves and not this time by colour but by 
religion and colour - both. (G23 6-24 1) 
In the contrast between the boys' styles of religious discourse is a tension between 
loyalty and reason, the urge to belong and the urge to think. How and whether this 
tension is resolved and what emerges from the encounter of the two is of 
significance to an understanding of the children's theology (Chapter 3). As with 
Ricoeur's forms of biblical language- 
Non seulement chaque forme de discours suscite un style de confession de 
fol, mais la confrontation de ces formes de discours suscite,, dans la 
confession de foi elle-meme, des tensions, des contrastes qui sont 
th6ologiquement significatifs (Ricoeur 1976,86,120) 
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It is the fourth, Individuative-Reflective, stage, of all Fowler's stages, that comes 
closest to that engagement of the mind, that questioning, constructing and creatin 
I 
g7 
that was identified with the children7s theological God talk in the first half of this 
chapter (2.1.1). If we heed Macquarrie's advice that the line between 'theological 
language' and 'religious language' needs drawing more sharply, are we to 
determine that of Fowler's stages (at least of the first four), it is only the fourth 
that can be described as theology? If this is the case then that line is to be drawn 
between Stage 3 and Stage 4, the two stages in question here, with loyalty and 
belonging on one side of the theology line and reason and thinking on the other. 
Yet there is a theology in the discourse of Stage 3. When children begin 'we 
believe 
... 
' or 'at our church they teach us ... 
' they are making theological 
statements. The understandings and beliefs about God that they identify with are 
the results of theological thinking that have been verbalised and formulated over 
the years in the histories of faith traditions. The difference is that the theology at 
Stage 3 is something the children assent to whereas the theology at Stage 4 is 
something they do as they reflect, criticize, revise and construct. Returning to the 
relationship between content and form, the distinction could be made in which 
Stage 3 theology is content, at Stage 4 theology is form, the referent God being the 
foundation of the former and the direction of the latter. 
Murray's contrast between the religious questioning of a Sikh girl and that of an 
Anglican girl, illustrates this difference between theology as a phenomenon and 
theology as an activity* 
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Ranjit, a Sikh girl at college describes Sikhism as a cupboard inside which 
is stored all that she needs to know. She just has to select the appropriate 
shelf "Questioning her faith" means asking questions of Sikh leaders in 
total confidence that they will be able to provide the answer. Not only does 
she not doubt the teaching authority of these leaders, she has no standpoint 
at the moment from which this doubt might even be envisaged. Stage 3 
Synthetic-Conventional Faith. Barbara, an Anglican classmate, on the other 
hand understands faith as the very ability to question what she has receivý,, d 
from her religious upbringing. For her questioning inevitably involves 
doubting and making up her own mind, an example of Individuative- 
D- 
Reflective Faith. (Murray 1991,4) 
Using Fowler's model, Murray stresses the difference between accepting gn 
outside authority and doing on one's own authority (Murray 1991,6). There is, 
however,, a danger of an over simplified view of the tension between Stage 3 and 
Stage 4 as a community/individual dialectic. Examples of children's speech in 
subsequent chapters will show that the creative and reflective thinking t4at 
characterises Stage 4 readily proceeds from dialogue with others in a joint activity 
of meaning making. 
Those who advocate an experience-based and personal approach to children's 
religion, and followers of the Piagetian cognitive development school, have 
something in common. The interest of the experientialist in the child's inner 
consciousness and the interest of the developmentalist in the realisation of the 
child's inner potential, are both based on a child-centred, 'naturalised and 
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individualised model of childhood" (Burman 1994, p 163). Fowler's Stages of Faith 
model of religious understanding has its roots in this model of childhood as 
adopted by followers of Piaget, however the analysis of his faith stages in relation 
to this project's research discussions has drawn attention to the action of outside 
influences and the contextualised nature of the children's religion. The movement 
of individual children's understanding from one stage to another is not simply part 
of a natural process of maturation. Many social, cultural and historical factors 
influence the diverse and changing styles of religious thinking employed. Fowler's 
own faith means he also recognizes the working of divine grace. Both this chapter 
and the previous chapter have tended in the same direction, towards the 
recognition of children's understanding as a social construct, molded by the 
contexts of their mental activity and the encounters they experience. The tool pf 
this process of meaning making is language. A detailed consideration of the role of 




3.1 Social Setting: Words of the Other 
Nlikhail Bakhtin coined the word 'heteroglossia' (ramorecie) to describe way 
language relates to diversity and change. The concept is summarised as follows: 
At any given time in any given place there will be a set of conditions - 
social, historical, meteorological, physiological - that will ensure that a 
word -uttered in that place at any time will have a meaning different than it 
would have under any other conditions. (Bakhtin 1981,428) 
The concept of 'heteroglossia' underlies the analysis of the children's use of 
language in this chapter. The focus of the project is the influence of encounter on 
the children's understanding. Their understanding is signified by their use of-words 
(Chapter 2.1.5). Their use of words is researched through a series of discussions to 
which encounter with Muslim peers in a predominantly Muslim community, is týe 
background. This encounter is there in memory and recall, the Muslim children not 
being present in the discussion activity as it happens. The project therefore involves 
both Bakhtin's frames, time ('at any given time'), and place ('in any given place') 
where place is understood as social context. The recorded utterances of t4e 
children belong to a particular time and place (discussion groups held in the school 
classroom during the 'Id celebrations of 1997 and 1998), and have as their 
background a history of encounter in the wider community. The discussions and 
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their context correspond to two social domains from the 'domain theory' as set out 
by Derek Layder in Modem Social Theory (Layder 1997), 'social setting' and 
c'situated activity. While recognising the interrelationshil? between these two 
domains, for the purpose of analysis the children's use of language will be 
consi ered under these separate headings. 
At the time of writing the actual discussions of the project are historical. týe 
particular circumstances and dynamics of the discussions are unique and cannot be 
reproduced, and the children have moved on to experience numerous subsequqnt 
encounters further influencing their thought and providing resources for yet more 
encounters. At the time when the children's words were first uttered they had t4e 
status of 'contemporary word' (Bakhtin 1981,346). The encounters that preceded 
them took on a 'pastness, both as they happened in the past and so had become 
part of the children's personal histories, and because behind those encounters were 
traditions, - 
identities,, 'discourses' formed over time in the histories of the 
commumfies of fEghfields. As Layder writes- 
The 'pastness' of the inherited circumstances transmitted through 
reproduced relations and practices is brought into the 'presentness' of 
unfolding encounters between people. Social activity has to be understood 
in the context of the intermingling of these very different time ftames and 
social processes. ' (Layder 1997,23) 
In a footnote to his Discourse 717 the Novel, Bakhtin wrote- 
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One's own discourse is gradually and slowly wrought out of others' words 
that have been acknowledged and assimilated. (Bakhtin 1981,345) 
It is through tracing the acknowledgement and assimilation of the words of others 
in the speech of the children that we gain some idea of the influences of social 
encounter on their understanding. The picture cannot be a complete one as we qo 
not have privileged access to the inner processing of others' words in the children's 
minds; we are looking for those words at the point of reemergence, as they appeýr 
and are used in the situated activity of research discussion. The words may be 
'implicitly or explicitly admitted as someone else's' and 'are transmitted by'a 
variety of means' (Bakhtin 1981,354). Recognising the variety of means of 
transmission, this chapter will track the words of others in 'assimilated discourse', 
C. I 
reported speech' and 'assimilated words . 
3. LI Assimilated Discourses 
Bakhtin's use of the word 'discourse' (slovo) contains an understandipg 
somewhere between a word and a method of using words. When he uses it in 
relation to particular domains of knowledge he might combine it with thought, for 
example religious, ethical, legal 'thought and discourse' (350,351), to bring 
together the meanings and their linguistic expression. In this section, howevpr, 
'discourse' will be used as a shorthand for both ideas,, speech and meaning', as they 
engage people in particular themes or areas of interest. It follows Layder's 
exposition of the concept which views 'discourses' as having developed over time 
being 'collective, historical emergents and residues of past activities' (Layder 1997, 
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127). These 'discourses' have their own language patterns employing particular 
vocabularies and rules. 
The children's contributions to the discussions reveal their degree of participation 
in a number of the 'discourses' of their social setting. The emergence of particular 
themes in their talk is partly guided by the stimuli used for the discussions. For the 
later discussions key themes have been identified for the participants by three of 
their number who produced the series of questions for the others to use. However, 
the quick recognition of most of the terms and concepts with which they are 
presented, and the readiness with which the children move from the vocabulary pf 
religion to that of diversity and power, from the concept of minority status to 
lengthy discussions on religious, race and equality themes, indicates an establishqd 
interest in these 'discourses'. To illustrate the children's assimilation of social 
'discourses' I will identify examples of discourses of diversity, power and religion 
from the discussion in which JR. JK and RA formulated the questions to be used 
by their peers and so influenced the agenda of the discussions that followed (F). 
Diversity 
In the questions produced by the three children, the recurrence of the words 
'different', 'same" and 'other' signals the importance of diversity in their 
experience. Different forms of diversity are recognised in the conversation by the 
use of associated temiinology. Different religious identities are indicated by specific 
vocabulary whether it distinguishes between faiths, 'Muslims' (F24), Ifindus' 
(F42),. 'Sikhs' (F3), 'Christian' (F467), 'Rastafafian' (F314)-, places of worship,, 
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'temples' (F449), 'mosques' (F440), and 'church' (F452); or forms of dress,, 
4 scarves),. 'topis' (F7). 'turbans' (H). Racial diversity is very present in the 
children's thinking and evident in the use of words of colour and ethnic origin, the 
distinction between 'white people' and 'Indians' (F416-7), between 'white kids agd 
half caste kids,. mixed race' (F374), questions about the colours of Adam and Eve 
(F156-7) and of God (F58-69). The children show their familiarity and confidence 
with the language of colour in word play using colour words. Twice JH adds 
outlandish colours to his list of racial identies, 'if [the school population] was 
balanced,, Hindus, Muslims,, Chinese,, Black,, White,. Mixed Race, Pink, Blue, 
anything ... 
' (F298-9), God is all colours, "black, white,. Asian - pink, blue 
(F60), and the children are amused by the idea of a green Muslim god and a blue 
Hindu god (F68). 
In some cases the terminology used to distinguish different groups becomes a 
problem: 
JH: People think that Rastafarian is a different religion to Christian but it 
means Christian but it's just a different name (F3 14-5) 
RA: The way you say Chinese people! Chinese people are from China - it 
doesn't mean that's their religion though, so they might be Muslims or they 
might be Sikhs. (F292-4) 
RA: Some people call Asian people 'Indians 
JK: I think they should call them their own names, or something. (F427-8) 
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RA: I don't like people calling me half-caste. I like mixed race or dual 
heritage (F421-2). 
The vocabulary and function of language associated with diversity discourse is that 
of labels. The children's words reflect the search for and uncertainties about such 
labelling in the wider community. 
Power 
Though it could be argued that relations of power are present in most verbal 
exchanges, the workings and results of these power relations are a distinct theme in 
the children's discussion. The degree to which they have assimilated* the langua$e 
of power and are confident in its use gives an idea of the impact of its exercise on 
their lives and thinking. The different sources of power the children recognise are 
identified in the variety of power words used. A sense of being at the receiving end 
is present in the terms 'teasing' and 'racist remarks' used for their peers treatmept 
of them; the being 'in trouble' and 'told off for relations with teachers, and being 
either 'allowed' or 'punished' for relations With parents. 
The children's language reveals more than an awareness of power in action, it also 
demonstrates an understanding of the means by which power is acquired and 
exercised. The language of numbers is part of the power discourse in the school. 
The Muslim children have the strength of numbers; they have 'more people' so 
they can 'fight back more' (F43 1), they have 'so many people behind them" 
(F433)) 'like there's one gigantic group of Muslims and you've got the small 
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groups of Hindus and you've got the small groups of Christians' (1186-8). As AN 
carefully explains'. 
Al: It's how big the group is really. If the Muslims are bigger than the 
Christians and IFEndus,. the Muslims will take the mick out of all of us. If we 
have the same groups [numerically] we don't argue about religion so you 
can't take the n-&k out of people because we've got the same people in 
each group (1198-202). 
The scope of the cHdren's power language is wider than the immediate school 
setting and shares the adult perceptions of power relations in fEghfields in general. 
JK7 JH and RA discuss at length the group dynamics of their community startipg 
with the same language of number. Discussing communal relations in Highfields, 
RA talks of 'a big group of Muslim people' (F434). Larger numbers means greater 
financial power; they have 'more money' (F466) which can be used in what the 
children perceive to be a bid to take over the communýity through 'buildiný', 
4 getting' and 'taking' prime sites in the area. The children are using language of 
territorial aggression with different sites in the area named or identified and the ilse 
of the verbs 'got' for those already in the Muslims' possession, and 'take' for those 
they believe the Muslims have their sights on next, leading to the conclusion- 
RA: The Muslims in Highfields think that FIighfields belongs to them and 
they can do whatever they want (F49 -4). 
1, 
I) 
The link between the children's use of language and a wider 'discourse' of power 
is evident in the following statement: 
RA: Because there's lots of Muslim people that they can start - they c4n 
sort of like - not rule,, but they start deciding where they want to put 
mosques, if they want to take other buildings down they feel they can 
decide themselves without having a meeting and invite everyone else as a 
community except for just one religion (F435-440). 
Here we have the language of political organisation being used in opposition to the 
actions of the majority Muslim community. The word 'rule' is rejected but it is 
introduced into the conversation and so is part of RA's understanding of the 
situation. It is decision-making power that she settles on as the issue, and decisions 
should be taken at 'meetings' where 'everyone ... as a community) can 
have a say. 
This language of political democracy is taken up again by JH- 
JH: Yeah,, have a vote. Tony Blair should stand up and say - Tony Blair 
should go, 'I order a vote. If you want the mosque you vote and if you 
don't want a mosque, you want something else you vote' - Most people 
want other things (F496-8). 
But here the language of democracy comes against the problem of numbers- 
JK: But actually there's more Muslims and they would vote (F499). 
1 32 ) 
The children's argument starting from the greater number of Muslims, has come 
full circle and democratic processes do not provide an answer, They therefore 
resort to criticism of the minority groups for not taking an active enough role in 
local politics, CI think they're lazy' (F502), and to the language of resistance, 'they 
should be fighting for the right to have more churches'. (F503) 
This discussion of communal dynamics in I-Eghfields reveals the extent to which the 
three children have assimilated the political power 'discourse' not only of their 
immediate community but of wider society. It also shows how that 'discourýe7l 
gives them resources to use in their argument but does not necessarily provide a 
solution. The excursion into politics soon breaks down after this last exchangQ and 
discussion returns to relations with Muslim ffiends. 
Religion 
Discussion that starts with ideas of group identity (of which religious affiliation iý a 
vital element) moves into a more general religious 'discourse' about belief It has 
already been seen that religion is a prominent theme in the children's experiences of 
encounter: the Muslim children 'talk a lot about God' (E236), so the dominance of 
God talk is a natural product of their social setting. The verb 'believe I is used 
several times and is incorporated into three of the questions children formulated for 
the discussion groups. Religious terminology that can be applied across faith 
boundaries is employed, 'god' (F58), 'the devil' (F62), 'afterlife' (F200), 
C everlasting life" (F203). The recurrence of the word 'real' implies a 
theological/philosophical concern with truth in their religious discourse- 'some of 
133 
the Muslims say our god isn't real' (F36); 'your god is not real and mine is' (F44- 
5); 'if you're a Muslim and you thought that Allah is real ... you might not think 
that other gods are important' (F230-2); 'Muslims just think about Jesus like real 
and don't think that Hindu gods are real' (F228-9); 'your god is a devil and he's 
not real' (F271). 
The enormity of the God theme, -- the fact that it is a 'limit expression' (Chapter 2,2) 
that both answers and creates mystery, is acknowledged in the children's use of 
questions as a way of relating to it; 'How did God make this world? " (F171), 
'What I want to know is after everyone dies and say God never makes anyone 
again what will happen to the world and how will he feel? " (F216-7), 'how qan ýrr ý, 
they believe in God if they haven't seen God? (F155), 'don't [the gods] still walk 
on this earth? ' (F170), 'There's a big question I'm going to ask God when I get 
there: how did he make the earthT (F196-7). Questions about creation and life 
after death are to the fore, others about God's unity are incorporated into the 
questionnaire for the discussion groups. References to the words of Muslim peers 
show that these themes are prominent with them too, as they talk about Allah 4s 
the one true God (E187), and as having created everyone (B427, H156), or predict 
the fate that awaits those who do not believe or who disobey (G215-6, B3-33-4), 
A closer look at JH's account of a many-coloured god, shows how he brings 
together the two 'discourses' of diversity and religion and ' sub-discourses' of 
colour and God's universality. JH tells his listeners that he replied in the following 
terms to the question posed by Muslim peers as to whether he believes there's only 
one god- 
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JH: 'Yes,, I believe there's only one god' and they ask me, 'What ýcolour do 
you think he isT And most people my colour will say he's black but I thi4k 
he's all nýiixed colours, black,, white,. Asian - blue, pink. I think he's every 
single colour in the world. I don't just think he's one particular colour .. 
God must be like everyone's colour because to me I think he's everyone's 
god, because in my religion I think there's only one god and he's 
everyone's god so he's got to be everyone's different colour. He can't just 
be black and then he's everyone's god' (F57-66). 
The speech shows how this child has assimilated different discourses from his 
social setting of religious and racial diversity and from his own particular black aqd 
Christian-Rastafarian background, and is able to combine them creatively to make 
something individual and new. It also contains explicit references to the words pf 
others; the words of his Muslim friends in the interchange that give the stimulus to 
thought and creation of his model of a many-coloured god, and the woros 
introduced as authorities in JH's personal history; those spoken by 'most people 
my colour' and those that are 'in my religion. One of these authorities is rejectpd 
with 'but I think ... ", and the other is given as the grounds 
for his thought, "because 
in my religion I think ... 
' This example leads us to consideration of how týe 
children relate to the words of those who engage them in the 'discourses' of their 
social setting. 
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3.1.2 Reported Words of Others 
One obvious distinction in the forms in which the words of others are presented is 
that between explicit and implicit, the reported speech (direct and indirect) that is 
still identified as belonging to 'others", and the speech that has become týe 
children's own through adoption or adaptation. Much of the children's talk uses 
reported speech. As yet relatively unprocessed, it has been brought to týe 
discussion as raw material to be dealt with there. It is brought from 'past' 
interaction and made 'present' in a new context. In its 'raw' state the reportpd 
speech is not completely uninfluenced by the children, it has been selected by 
memory or choice from others' speech and in the telling is given emphasis of tone 
or gesture. The significance given to the speech and its use in the discussions, gives 
some indication of the way the children received it and the importance t4ey 
attached to it initially as hearer. The speech they report supplies them with 
knowledge about the worlds inhabited by 'the other', helps to delineate 
relationships and provides new ideas to incorporate into their understanding. 
Knowledge 
There are varying degrees of engagement with the speech reported in the 
discussions. In some cases the words are reported as providing information about 
the speakers. The absence of the Muslim children from the discussion context (and,, 
indeed, from the school on the 'Id days during which much of the data was 
collected) makes them a focus of discussion and emphasises their 'otherness. 
What the Muslim children have said is often attributed to a generalised group 
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persona, 'they'. In these exchanges the children in the discussion groups are 
detached observers with interesting knowledge about their Muslim firiends' belids 
and practices to share. Several of the words presented in the word card activity are 
recognised as terms used exclusively by Muslims and examples are given of that 
use- 
Guna: 
JO: If Muslims - if they do something bad or eat something ... 
JE* That you can't eat 
JO-. Yeah, they get 'guna' - that's what they say (B4Q-4). 
HA-. Oh yeah, Muslim people use it 
JH: Mustafa always says that ... 
like if I get fouled he goes - whoever fouled 
me he goes 'Guna! ' like that. ' (E 120-3) 
Haram: 
MA: They can't eat - 
M1- It means to Muslims - some Muslims say small Mars bars are hararn 
(B 145-7). 
Detailed customs are explained such as the reasons for wearing a religious pendant: 
JK- They say that if they're ill and if they press those necklaces inside 
there's Allah's name (D162). 
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The statements above are used to inform; they have been stored in the memory as a 
kind of data bank. Other statements outlining practice and belief provoke a more 
engaged response from the present context of the discussion group- 
JN: People tell me that - in the Muslims if you're naughty you get whippod 
with a cane or something, and people showed me where they got hit and 
they got marks on their arms. 
LH: That's wicked! 
AY: That's - that's - what's it called again? 
SN: You can get arrested for that - that's child abuse! (H32-9) 
AN: Do you know in our class some people always say that - that 'Ah, 
you're going to get told off by Allah and that) 
BU: 'Allah's going to put you in the fire - Allah"s going to put you in the 
fire'. 
AN: To someone else -I hear them. 
CA: I don't believe them. 
CS: I say 'Eh, what you lying forT (A235-243) 
JE: Like they say their god's going to be bad to them when they die - he's 
going - if they do something bad they're going to - they say their god's 
going to chuck them in the fire and make them eat some cockroaches 
JA: Our god's not like that - our god's not like 
JH- If you pray to him it'll just be alright - if we say sorry and all that 
(B332-6). 
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The emphasis and excitement given to the telling, support the impression that these 
examples are introduced to provoke a counter response of distaste and 
contradiction. The children listening are hearing nothing new in accounts of 
mosque school discipline and images of etemal punishment, but they express as 
much outrage as if they are hearing them for the first time. Perhaps the statements 
are chosen to provide an opportunity for enjoying shared righteous indignation. 
Likewise the listeners' scornful amusement can be predicted for the report of 
Ashfaq's claim to have received money dropped down by God in response to his 
prayer (B396-8), and of the Muslim girls' fears on a school residential that pictures 
of badgers would come alive at night (D75). In these instances the unity between 
reporter and listeners is indicated by their shared laughter. In the negativity of these 
responses is reflected something of the struggle for status between different groups 
in the school. 
Relalionships 
Another category of reported speeches is speech directed at the children 
themselves and perceived by them to be hostile in intent. These examples are often,, 
though not exclusively, reported in response to the children's questions about 
teasing and racist remarks. In some the hostility is evident- 
CS: And they always say that erm "Your god's shit" and all that lot,. and 
erm, they say, 'My god's going to kill your god" and everything' (G220- 1). 
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JK: There's this boy in dinner time who sits next to me, his name's 
Hussain, he's a bit racist. He goes, "Your god is a devil and he's not real" 
(F270-1). 
JS: They were saying like - er - "one day our god's like going to take over 
and all the Christians are going to Hell because they haven't got the real-, 
- because they chose god what they want and that ain't the right god' 
(G210-6). 
In others it is perhaps read into the Muslim children's words by their hearers: 
JE: They say we're Allah's children! ... they say 
Allah made everything. 
PR: He made us. 
PT: He made even the Christians and children and all them. 
JE: (indignantly) Their god made us? No! Our god made us, their god 
made them (B427-43 1). 
In the reporting is the upset and anger of the teller. Sometimes it is stated; 'I BpIt 
quite insulted' (G223), 'You feel like you want just to get them and go (strangling 
gesture) (G225), but often it is left in the air, perhaps supported by gesture or 
facial expression. Several of the examples refer to situations where the child felt 
alone or unsupported- 
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AK: In Year 2 and Year 31 was the only fEndu in our class and the 
Muslims, they used to say, 'Our god's better than yours', and used to tease 
me. I felt bad (G200-2). 
TR: Sometimes I feel a bit left out because some of the religions are racist 
and not very nice about what religion you are (HI-2). 
SH: Some people don't let other people play because they"re different 
religions (H160). 
Reporting the unkind words in the new context means that on the second hearing 
the children are not alone but share the sympathy and indignation of a supportive 
audience. 
When reporting what others have said to them the children occasionallY record 
their immediate response (H 15 5, H292-4, F80-2), but often they did not respond at 
the time for a number of reasons,, ethical or pragmatic- 
JK: I don't laugh to them because they find it bad (D121). 
AK: You feel like hitting them but the teacher said - plus there are more 
Muslims and I'm the only fEndu (G272-3). 
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TR: I don't think you should tease them back because you know how you 
felt when you were bullied - so you don't want them to go through it 
(H290-1). 
RA: If you tease them back then they're more likely to carry on doing it 
or they'll go and tell the teacher and you'll be in trouble yourself (F 103 -6) 
JE: I was watching this film called Ghost and I was just about to sýy 
something bad to him and there are these demons in Ghost and I kept 
thinking they was going to come and get me when I did if I be bad so I just 
left him - to call my god whatever because I know my god's good. (B413) 
By bringing others' 'mistaken' or 'hostile' speech into the discussion, the children 
are giving themselves a chance to respond again to the statements in a context 
where they have more time and freedom in the formulation of their responsýs. 
Their conversation can provide an emotional outlet, the children feeling able to 
show the hurt they would hide from the perpetrator. It also gives them the freedofn 
to examine the motives of those who made the statements. In the new context they 
can (temporarily) reverse the hierarchy and undermine the superior status of tho$e 
handing out hurtful comments by emphasising weaknesses of character that prompt 
them to behave in this way. These weaknesses include pride, insecurity 
1 _7 
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uncertainty, being subject to parental pressure-. 
JH: I've heard people say that their god's most important. 
RA: They think they're most important, that's why they say that (F235-6). 
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TR: I think they're desperate. They can't get no attention or something, 
like they fight at home, and when they come to school, they take it out on 
other people (H251-2). 
JS: I think they're jealous because they think, 'Oh, that - yeah, their god's 
true but I should appreciate what god I've got and I can't step back' 
(G244-5). 
LH: I think their parents told them - tease someone about their religion 
because their god"s different (H254-5). 
Ideas 
As well as reviewing their relationship with the original speakers of the reported 
speech, thereby revising their understandings of themselves and their Muslim peers 
in the original encounter, the children are also relating to the ideas contained- in the 
statements. Talk of the harshness of Allah leads to a description of God's 
personality understood by members of the discussion group to be forgiving and 
compassionate, followed by an exchange about Heaven and the different dimension 
in which it exists (B329f). In refutation of Muslim claims that Allah made even the 
Christians, JE expresses a plural understanding of God whereby different gods 
created different groups of people, and considers the idea of souls being stored in 
heaven before they are bom (B430-1). In these cases the reported word is 
awakening or organising the children's own words and ideas. 
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Analysis of the speech reported in the discussions has so far considered examples 
of difference and tension between the others' word and the children's. There are 
also instances of reported speech being used to expand the children's thinking by 
introducing new ideas. The relationship between reporter and speaker in these 
cases is cooperative rather than confrontational. Hafsa and Zaheera are quoted not 
as part of the majority Muslim group (the 'they' of the children's talk), but as 
personal friends of the reporter. MI introduces the idea of one God with different 
names into the conversation with Zaheera's words, 'Zaheera says theres only one 
God but you call it different names' (B447). It is an idea that she has entertained 
but does not know whether or not she agrees. TR reports, 'Hafsa tells me you have 
to be scared of Allah' (C9) and initiates a discussion of God's disciplining power. 
JN supports TR's contribution with another quote, 'the man at our church tells us 
you have to be scared of what Jesus will do to you if you don't be good" (C 10-11). 
There are other examples of adults' speech used in this way: 
MN: My mum told me that if you be bad - yeah - and you go up to heaven 
you'll come back down and be borned (B363-4). 
YLII 
SK: I think - my mum says that sometimes - sometimes it's [stories about 
Krishna] not real you know, it's just made up and all that ... and she says 
that sometimes Kri shna 's not really, he's just made up (D210-3). 
JH: Quite a lot of grown ups say there's too much Asians in the schools. 
(F276-7). 
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In each of these cases the statement being made has an element of controversy. 
MN's introduction of the idea of reincarnation is against the flow of the previous 
conversation based as it was on a strictly Muslim/Christian idea of heaven; JK's 
questioning of the reality of Krishna jars in the climate of the preceding discussion 
of Krishna's multi-faceted reality, being 'scared' of God is not a very comfortable 
idea, the comment on the Asian population of the schools does not conform to 71 
standards of political correctness. Unlike the examples above where the use of the 
reported statements is dependent on a confident prediction of the audiencq's 
response, how the listeners will react to these statements is uncertain and might be 
hostile. By introducing such statements as the words of others the chitdren are not 
risking themselves in their contributions. 7 rather they are signalling, 
'these words 
might be worth considering, but they are not mine. ' If the reception given to the 
words is positive the child may become more confident in their use and employ 
them in future unattributed, as their own. 
Finally there are a few instances where the children introduce an idea from an 
authority that they respect in order to question or 'overturn' it gospel-fashion. It is 
different from the straight contradictions of some of the Muslim children's 
statements as there is a sense of having considered the statement and perhaps 
entertained the idea before finding problems with it. JK's question about creation 
stories she has heard is an instance of this- 
JK: When people say that when it was a long time ago they had gods 
walking on this earth and then when they die ... 
but I want to know how 
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come they just become gods because don't they still walk on this earth? 
(F 168-170). 
An example of an 'overturning' comes from JH's speech about God's colqur 
C where he says, most people my colour will say he's black but I think he's all mixed 
colours (F59). Similarly JK describes a conversation with the mother of a friend: 
JK: She said that if Muslims don't believe in our god why should we 
believe in their god? But I said 'No, I still believe in every god' (F245-6). 
This is more a moving away from the initial statement than a reaction against it. 
The words reported are the ideas that have been left behind. 
Objectification 
Reported speech has various functions in the children's discussions, but the overWI 
effect is a distancing or 'objectifying' of the other's word. In Discourse in the 
Novel Bakhtin approaches the concept of representing another's discourse throuýh 
a cspeaking person' in a novel. There is a difference between this artistic process 
and what happens in the discussions; the novelist is drawing on internal discourse 
and converting it into another's speech, the children are drawing on their memories 
of an exchange and reconstructing it. Nevertheless there are strong similarities for 
in both cases the one representing the speech is creating 'fertile soil for 
experimentally objectifying another's discourse' (Bakhtin 1981,348). In this 
experiment with the other's word 'It is questioned, it is put in a new situation in 
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order to expose its weak sides, to get a feel for its boundaries, to experience it 
physically as an object, " and even sometimes becomes 'parodic' (348). The analy3is 
of the children's use of reported speech above shows how that word was being 
subjected to all these activities, even being parodied in the statements that earned 
ridicule or outrage as their response. 
The result of such experimentation is that the children were able to maintain their 
subjectivity outside these words yet still employ them for social and intellectual 
ends. Socially, reported speech might identify the original speakers as different and 
'other',, it n-ýight provoke resistance, reduce the power of the original speaker and 
have set against it the solidarity of the reporter and listeners. Intellectually, it tni*ht 
be used by the children to dismiss ideas or to introduce new ideas yet disclaim 
responsibility for them should their reception be hostile, or it might be presented to 
be overturned indicating movement away of the reporters' thought. The words of 
others are acknowledged in reported speech; they are employed for re-ordering 
relations and argument,. but as yet are not integrated with the words of the 
children. 
3.1.3 Assimilated Words of Others 
Having analysed the children's use of reported speech we now turn to those words 
in their discussion which are 'implicitly admitted as someone else's'. Here the 
words are not attributed to another speaker but they have been assinfflated into the 
children"s own speech, integrated with their word. The value of Bakhtin's work to 
this study lies in his recognition of the numerous forces that come into play when a 
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word is uttered. In Bakhtin's chain of meaning no word stands alone but relates to 
a whole history of the already spoken, as well as to the answering word it 
anticipates (Bakhtin 1981,280). This complex environment of any utterance he 
calls,, 'dialogized heteroglossia' (272). It is the relationship of the children"s words 
with those words already spoken within the social setting that provides the focus of 
this section. Bakhtin places this history between the object (or theme) and the 
word,, and between the word and the speaker who uses it- 
No living word relates to its object in a singular way: between the word 
and its object, between the word and the speaking subject, there exists an 
elastic environment of other, alien words about the same object, the same 
theme. (276) 
The children have to draw the word ftom that environment and find in it something 
that makes sense to them. 
'Internally Persuasive Word' 
The dominant object or theme of the children's discourse is God. This theme is 
'entangled, shot through with shared thoughts, points of view, alien value 
judgements and accents' (276). From a shared (communal) interest in and resort to 
God language emerges a series of contrasts and contradictions seeming to pull in 
different directions. From interaction with others the children absorb ideas of 'only 
one god' (H8), of 'lots of gods' (F241), 'other people's gods' (F45-6), gods that 
are 'real' and gods that are 'not real'; they learn of a God that punishes and is 
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associated with 'fire' (B332-4), of a God that is 'good to us' (B344) and 'means 
love' (0), a God who I is in heaven' (A8) and who 'walks in India' (11212), who 
has many identities, 'God, 'Allah, 'Jesus, 'Shiva, 'Vishnu, 'Jah', 'Sai Baba', 
'Jehovah',, 'Krishna',, 'Omega and Alpha' (H201f, E199f, 186f) and others. The 
conflict of thoughts and values does not only come from differences in the 
language used about God, but also from the variety of speakers using it - if God is 
'love' how come his name is used by people 'killing and shooting' in Ireland and 
Algeria (E 11-3, E129-133); if God is 'good", how come his name is used by those 
who tease and bully (H193-6); if I-Endus,, Muslims and Christians all talk about 
God in their different ways, what does that mean about his identity? The children 
may reject some of the alien thoughts and values and adopt others, they may apply 
different meanings to different circumstances, or try to draw contrasting ideas 
together into a syncretic whole,, but in so far as they are taking the words of others 
and making them their own, the children are presented with a challenge. Bakhtin 
writes of this process of assimilating others' word- 
Expropriating it, forcing it to submit to one's own intentions and accents is 
a difficult and complicated process. (Bakhtin 1981,294) 
There are several examples of the children embarking on this process. JN tries to 
make meanings out of the variety of names used for God- 
JN: So I don't like say all the things that you're calling Shiva. I know like 
Allah as Jesus because I befieve Jesus is just one god or you call Allah one 
god. (H 13 7-8) 
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From others' words about God,. JN has chosen God's unity as his organising 
principle. With this as his starting point he is able to accept the correspondence of 
the words 'Jesus' and 'Allah' for he has heard that Allah too , is one. Shiva 
does 
not yet fit into his understanding of God for he has learned from the words of 
Hin . ends that Shiva is one name for a plural God. Through this reasoning he 
has persuaded himself to acknowledge 'Allah as Jesus'. JH's account of a many 
coloured god (F58f) has also organised the words of others,, accepting or rejecting 
them, around a given principle, that of GoTs universality. That God should be all 
colours is a logical conclusion of this principle. In these two passages the boys 
acknowledge the sources of some of their ideas, 'you're calling', 'you call% 4people 
my colour will say', 'in my religion', and so the process of assimilation is made 
clear. In other instances specific vocabulary or turns of phrase may indicate the 
origin of the child's speech in others' words, for example those written below in 
italics from CS's model for a new religion: 
CS: But I think first it's going to need someone that gives a lot of 
dedication to his name before he can come down to earth then he can 
actually take on that person's body and he can - his soul - the God's soul 
will be in the person's body, but it will be the person's body (G138-141)., 
The dual foundations of CS's new religion, human effort and God's incarnation, 
owe their definition to words and phrases he has absorbed from others' discourse. 
These understandings (principles, starting points and foundations) that guide the 
creative assimilation process Bakhtin terms 'internally persuasive word' or 
'discourse'- 
150 
The intemally persuasive discourse is affirmed through assImilation, tightly 
interwoven with "one's own word". In the everyday rounds of our 
consciousness, the internally persuasive word is half-ours and half-someone 
else's. Its creativity and productiveness consist precisely in the fact that 
such a word awakens new and independent words, that it organises masses 
of our words from within, and does not remain in an isolated and static 
condition. (Bakhtin 1981,345) 
The end of this quote returns us to Bakhtin's time frame with which the chapter 
began. The 'Internally persuasive word' is the contemporary word as the point at 
which all the 'pastness' of the word's history converges; it is also the 
contemporary, as opposed to the future, word because its condition is dynamic; it 
will not remain the same. Essential to 'internallY persuasive discourse" is Its 
provisional nature. It awakens and organises words to create meaning, but that 
meaning will develop as it encounters new material, new conditions and 
'interanimating relationships with new contexts' (Bakhtin 1981,346). As noted 
elsewhere (Chapter 2.2.6) such flexibility is one of the characteristics of ýhe 
children's talk. We observe them acting on the content provided by their context to 
forge new understandings which are themselves open to further change (Chapters 
5.1 and 5.2). When it is related to God language, links become apparent between 
the 'internally persuasive word' and the model of 'Stage 4 theology' that emerged 
from the application of Fowler's theory in the previous chapter (Chapter 2.2.7). 
Children operating within Stage 4 employ an 'internally persuasive theological 
discourse' open to the continual activity of reflecting, criticizing, revising and 
constructing described there. 
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'Authoritative Word' 
Opposed to the 'internally persuasive word' in Bakhtin's scheme is 'authoritative 
discourse or word'. Both originate with others' words, but while the former is 
assimilated by us through its ability to persuade us of the sense of its meaning, the 
latter holds its place in our mind and speech through something other than an 
appeal to reason as shall be seen below. The term 'authoritative discourse" 4a 
useful descriptor for those formulaic utterances in the cHdren's discussion where 
they appear to speak with an authority that is not their own but that is not explicitly 
attributed to others. They are advanced as fixed statements not open to question 
and their style often verges on the platitudinous. Examples include words pf 
religious authority, moral authority, and also the authority of the modem discourse 
of choice. In the statements we hear words of parents, teachers and other adulýs, 
'God is the one who gave us life' (B460), 'God can make peace on earth' (G146), 
'he put us on this earth to be friends and love each other like brothers and sisters' 
(E14-5),, 'violence is not the answer' (H276), 'that's wrong to hit' (E248), 'you 
have to ... try your 
best' (G160), 'everyone has the right to do what they feel'is 
fight' (G356-7), 'it's up to them ... they're the one's that 
have got to live with it' 
(1156-7). 
Bakhtin views 'authoritative discourse' in negative terms. This understanding was 
no doubt influenced by his personal history that experienced the turmoil in Russia 
before and after the 1917 revolution, and exile during Stalin's rule. Though he does 
recognise the possibility of a discourse being both authoritative and internally 
persuasive, he sees this as rare. It is the struggle between the two, he claims, the 
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freeing of one's own discourse from the authoritative wordý. that makes up the 
history of an individual ideological consciousness and an 'individual's becorniilg' 
(342). The 'authoritative word' is located in a past as 'the word of the fathers" and 
'prior discourse'. The 'authoritative word' has a fixed and formulaic style in 
common with the 'credal statements' cited as indicators of Stage 3 theological 
thinking in the previous chapter (Chapter 2.2.7), the 'prior discourse' parallels the 
faith traditions which children operating at Stage 3 assent to. Where God is its 
theme the authoritative word can be seen as a foundation for 'Stage 3 theology' 
Bakhtin's concern that the individual should free himself from the fetters of 
'authoritative discourse' shares the imperative towards autonomy found in Stage 
Development Theory; the move away from Stage 3 talk towards Fowler's 
Individuative-Reflective Stage 4 (Fowler 198 1). More recently his imperatiye 
towards autonomy, (this time emotional and spiritual rather than rational) is 
reflected in Clive and Jane Errickers' 'narrative pedagogy' for religious education: 
Young people as with all of us, recognise the difference between the 
authenticity of the individual voice and the rhetoric of ideological 
pronouncements. If we attend to the former and avoid the latter we shall 
gain their interest and engagement and advance their teaming and 
development. (Erricker 2000,204) 
The rhetoric of which the authors write could well be understood as 'authoritative 
discourse". 
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As the previous chapter questioned the hierarchical ordering that gave Stage 3 
styles of faith a status inferior to those of Stage 4, so this chapter questions the 
devaluing of the 'authoritative word'. 'Authoritative discourse' is not necessarily 
an obstacle to creative,, developing thought. It can provide the foundations on 
which an argument is based or provide the knot that ties an argument together. JH 
wants to argue that those using God's name to support acts of terrorism in Ireland 
and Algeria have no religious justification for their actions. This extract begins and 
ends with an authoritative statement on God's purposes: 
.. IIHXIL: He gave us life and that - and there's bad people in the world killing 
and shooting each other and they're saying that - they're using God as an 
excuse to say that he wants everyone to kill. He never put us on this earth 
to kill people. He put us on this earth to be ftiends and love each other like 
brothers and sisters. (E 11-5) 
CS uses an authoritative statement of God's power to answer JS's hesitations 
about the feasibility of his model of a new religion- 
JS: So he can say, 'I've made a new religion' - er - he can -I can't - 
CS: God can make peace on Earth (GI 45-6). 
Most noticeably, the authority of the cHdren's statements about God's unity give 
impetus to a range of theologies that seek to reconcile discourses of God's 
plurality with this basic truth. The syncretic models of God as one with many 
names (172-3), as one with many features (HI 13-8), as one with many colours 
154 
(F58f), as a big god with subordinate little gods emanating from him (D221-9), all 
depend on an authoritative incontrovertible word that says 'there is only one God 
being spoken in a context of plurality. 
Bakhtln*'s description of the way 'authoritative discourse' is assimilated into our 
own word does not entirely agree with the experience of the children. He writes- 
The authoritative word demands that we acknowledge it, that we make it 
our own; it binds us, quite independent of any power it might have to 
persuade us internally, we encounter it with its authority already fused to it 
it is not therefore a question of choosing it from among other pos3ible 
discourses that are equal. (342) 
The 'authoritative words' that predominate in the discussions are words of 
religious authority. Even in religion the children recognise an element of choice. It 
is acknowledged in their consideration the possibility that they rt-ýight in the future 
have their own children who do not wish to accept the authority of the family's 
religion- 
Al: I'd be very upset but it's up to them (115 6). 
DK: They Might not like it if we forced them to believe in what we say and 
things (1162). 
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SC: I'd try to persuade them but if they didn't want to I'd just leave them 
to go. (115 7- 8) 
CS and JS discuss instances of conversions to Islam, one of them being CSs sistfor. 
He insists that she did not become a Muslim 'by force' (G249) and commends her 
for converting on the grounds of reason (G252-3). Nevertheless none of the 
children expressed any wish to change their religious allegiance themselves. 
Given this element of choice,, the word of their religion does not have its authorjty 
'already fused to it'; the children have reasons of their own for assenting to it (see 
also Chapter 5.1 on religious identity). They could be reasons of conviction 
whereby the children were 'intemally persuaded' of the rightness or reasonableness 
of the authoritative word, or of the authority of one discourse over another. it is 
the perceived 'wrongness' of elements of Islamic teaching that causes CS to reject 
the authofitative base of the Qur'an: 
CS: I think that the Muslim religion is wrong to say that they can't eat 
certain things because everyone has the right to do what they feel is right 
[Allah's] not telling you that - it's just some person who's wrote a book 
and they don't even know if all these stories are true or not (G3 55 -3 62). 
They could also be reasons with emotional force. CS explains his commitment to 
Christianity in terms of pride, loyalty,, and sympathy- 
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CS: I'm proud of who I am because really it's my ancestors that started 
this and I'm going to carry on for them ... 
I just feel sorry for them. (G230) 
The encounter with other religious discourses also provides impetus for children to 
adopt the words of an authority of their own. When the children are presented with 
statements from Islam's 'authoritative discourse',. they often answer them with the 
authority of their own religion: 
JA: Our god's not like - our god's not like - 
JH: If you pray to him it'll just be all right - if we say sorry' (B335-6). 
JE: He can say whatever he wants because I know my god's good. (B417) 
JK-. I say that 'if your god made me then how come I believe in my god? 
(F80-1) 
Such responses may aid the children's own religious understanding or be a form of 
self-defence. Encounter with the word of Islam strengthens the children's 
identification with their own 'authoritative word' and their commitment to the 
religious discourse they feel they have inherited. 
The distinction between 'internally persuasive word' and 'authoritative word' is 
useful in the analysis of the cHdren's employment and assimilation of others' 
discourse, but an association of the former with &eedom and the latter with 
restriction it is misleading. Children's use of 'authoritative discourse' does not 
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signify the abdication of autonomy while there is an element of choice, nor does the 
C authoritative word' necessarily limit their own. They may be able to recognise the 
'rhetoric of ideological pronouncements' (Erricker 2000,204), they also know 
how to use it. In their speech the 'authoritative word' can become another tool 
(complementary to the 'intemally persuasive word') to serve their intellectual,, 
emotional and social needs. In fact there is a danger of creating an artificial 
internal-external divide. When the children adopt an 'authoritative word' being 
internally persuaded of its authority (by reason or desire) and employ it for their 
purposes, they make that word their own. 
In an article based on her research into school children's talk, Janet Maybin 
comments on the prominence of the words of others in our speech: 
We have no alternative but to use the words of others, but we do have 
some choice over whose words we appropriate, and how we reconstruct 
the voice of others in our speech. (Maybin 1994,132) 
Her combination of 'no alternative' and 'some choice' when applied to the children 
of my project, reflects the 'agency and structure' understanding of childhood with 
which this thesis began (Chapter 1.1.3). This chapter has demonstrated how the 
context of the children's lives provides the range of words and discourses within 
which they work. At the same time it has shown their ability to make selections 
from that range, to appropriate chosen words into their own thinking and ally them 
to their own needs. The reasons for the choices made are explored in more detail in 
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the chapter that follows as we move from the wider context of the children's social 
setting to t at of the actual research encounters in which the words reappear. 
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3.2 Situated Activity 
Having found evidence of the assimilation of the words and discourse of their 
social setting into the children's language, we now turn our attention to the 
children's language in relation to the social domain of situated activity; the point 
at which new words are assimilated and previously assimilated words re-emerge. 
Layder writes that situated activity, involves face-to-face conduct between two or 
more people who are each other's "response presence"" (Layder 1997,85). This is 
the domain of the individual research discussions which provide the data for my 
project. The word 'situated' ties the activity historically to a moment in time: it 
represents a coalescence of a particular set of historical circumstances and of a 
group of personalities each bringing to the gathering an individualisod 
understanding gained ftom previous encounters. As well as having these links to 
the past, the situated activity looks forward to the future, for agreements are 
reached and new shared understandings created that will in tum provide a 
background for further exchanges (Layder 1997-, 85). This chapter willrelate this 
continuous process of meaning-making to Bakhtin's account of the journey of the 
'living word' (Bakhtin 1981,276). A focus on the interrelationship of language 
and cognition also relates it to the work of Bakhtin's contemporary and fellow 
countryman, Lev Vygotsky. His theories as expounded and explained by James 
Wertsch in Vygotsky and the Social Formation of the Mind complement those of 
Bakhtin as background to the analysis of the children's verbal exchanges that 
follows. My concern will be not only to set out the relationship between social 
setting and situated activity in the creation of meaning, but also to explain the 
multi -directional movement of children's thought observed in 
Chapter 2.2.6. 
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3.2.1 Response and Understanding 
In her article Children's Voices: Talk, Knowledge and IdenfitY, Janet Maybin 
describes Bakbtin's 'chaining relationship' of utterance and response in the 
following terms: 
There is a complex chaining relationship between the utterances and 
responses both within and across conversations. Every utterance is always 
also a response, implicitly or explicitly, to some previous utterance either 
from within the immediate conversation or from some previous occasion, 
and every utterance also anticipates and takes into account its own pos$ible 
responses. (Graddol, Maybin and Stierer 1994,132) 
In this manner, each of the research discussions in my project draws on the 
assimilated words of encounters from the past and provides material for those of 
the future. Within each discussion a child"s utterance serves the same functign, 
responding to and initiating other utterances. In acts of response and initiation the 
speaker aims to understand and be understood by other members of the group. 
This interrelationship of response and understanding Bakhtin sees as the very 
nature of speech. Responsive understanding is 'a fundamental force' (Bakhtin 
198 1 
ý' 
280). Through it the word and discourse are changed: 
Understanding and response are dialectically merged and mutually 
condition each other; one is impossible without the other ... Thus an active 
understanding, one that assimilates the word under consideration into a 
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new conceptual system,, that of one striving to understand, establishes a 
series of complex interrelationships, consonances and dissonances with the 
word and enriches it with new elements. (282) 
As communication,. the utterance is directed towards the listener's understanding. 
[The speaker's] orientation towards the listener is an orientation towards a 
specific conceptual horizon, toward the specific world of the listemr, it 
introduces totally new elements into the discourse. (282) 
What Bakhtin is writing about is the 'living utterance' or 'living word' which he 
opposes to the 'direct word'. The 'direct word' 'acknowledges only itself and 
encounters no obstacle on its path towards its object (Z76). The 'living word' by 
contrast,, does not have a fixed meaning and encounters numerous obstacles as it 
journeys through an celastic environment' to find its meaning (276). With the 
spoken word that environment through which the word travels is the 'apperceptive 
background' (281) or 'conceptual horizon' (282) of the listener. In this study of 
their language and understanding in situated activity, the children will first be 
considered in their role as listener. Their conceptual horizon has been developqd 
through interaction with others in their social setting and the assimilation of 
other's words. Any word placed under consideration in the situated activity of the 
discussion comes into contact with this assimilated discourse and is open to being 
changed by it. Some of the children's contributions to discussion will illustrate 
this process. 
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3.2.2 Rrivileges qf Occurrence and the Assimilated Word 
Similar to a lesson situation, each of the project's group discussions is centred 
round a set task- responding to the stimulus of word cards,, formulating questions 
to be answered by other children or giving answers to the same. The children are 
also responding to the contributions of other group members during the course of 
the activity. In the first of these tasks the children are being presented with each 
word in isolation,, divorced from its lexical and discourse context. Wertsch calls 
these the word's 'privileges of occurrence " (Wertsch 1985,137) and questions the 
validity of assigning meanings to words without them. In the children's case, 
however,, it will be seen that, in their consideration of each word presentedto 
them,, they themselves supply the contextual clues to the meaning from their own 
memory of that word's use and their perception of what is relevant to it. This 
memory and perception constitute the meaning potential of the word. The 
contextualisation of the word by different individuals on the basis of their own 
past encounters with it, gives it a personalised meaning. To use Bakhtin's light 
metaphor (Bakhtin 1981,299-300), the word is 'refracted' on its way to the 
children's understanding by its passage through a wealth of experiences of that 
word, 
Former encounters with a word give children an awareness of its privileges of 
occurrence which determine its meaning potential for them. These privileges 
include the grammatical. The divine identity of Jah', for example, is understood 
from its grammatical force in the optative 'Jah always be with you' (E21 1). The 
diverse grammatical status of 'God', used variously as proper noun (God), 
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singular noun (one god), plural noun ('lots of gods'), as attached to possessive 
pronouns (my god" as distinct from 'your god) and other qualifiers ('Muslim 
god', 'Hindu god'), sets up dissonances and contrasts, efforts to reconcile which 
lead to much creative thinking on the children's part. There is also an issue of the 
speaking rights of various words: the significance of a word to the children 
depends on who they have heard using it. For MA, 'Allah' has overtones of the 
alien and even hostile as he understands it as a Muslim word, 'what Muslim 
C people say' (B308), one that he, as a IFEndu, is not allowed to use , can't say that 
word' (B306). For JN the significance he attaches to the word 'one' when applied 
to God has the authority of his church behind it: 
JN: They teach us at my church that there's only like one religion and 
there's only one god (H7-8). 
The physical context is also significant as individual words conjure up images of 
settings in which they have been encountered and the whole scene is incorporated 
into the word's meaning for the child. Talk of God as 'Father' brings to MA's 
mind the image from a film of a confessional with its secretive curtains behind 
which,. he believes, the 'Christian's God' is hidden (B468-73). A less sombre 
image is the picture that comes to JE's mind with the word 'God': 
JE: Our church - when we're talking to our God at our church I just saw 
this woman just jumping about with her hat coming off her head (B484-5) 
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The discourses in which words have played a part also colour their meaning so 
that 'Allah' can be understood in terms of teasing and unequal power relations at 
school (B423-431, H144-5), and 'God' is associated with ethics and the 
reprehensible behaviour of 'bad people' who do not follow his commands (E 11-5), 
E129-133). 
The influence of a listener's previous experiences and own perceptions cýn 
produce a very individual representation of a word's meaning. A clear example of 
this happening within the research discussions is JH's response to the word 'Jah'. 
For JH 'because I've got his first name' it initiated an autobiographical account of 
his early years of faith complete with dramatic details of his naming ceremony; as 
a ritual 'stick' was waved across the infant JH, 'my mum said I was coughing like 
it had smoke and it was tipping over me like that [demonstrates] I had my eyes 
closed'; with a recitation of a Rastafarian prayer, 'Jah always be with you and 
expressions of the personal importance of the event to him, 'I always remembfr 
that'), 'I'll never forget it' (E199f). In his account the occurrence of the word 'Jah' 
in a prayer and as the prefix to his name, the use ofthe authority of his mother and 
the holy man, the context of the naming ceremony and its role in his 
autobiographical narrative combine to give the word a deeply personal meaning 
different from that it had in the intention of the research exercise or would have 
had for any other child present. 
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3.23 Meaning-Rqferent Distinction 
Occasionally the children's understanding relates words to totally different 
objects. RA understands 'guru' as a piece of clothing Muslims wear (D327), while 
RJ associates it with a holy man (D3 33 -9), and RA and JK associate ' Jah' with the 
Gujarati word used when shooing away a neighbour's cat, rather than as a name 
for God (D378). More often though children agree about the object a word refers 
to, but the language they employ in response to the word contains a variety of 
meanings as in the different understandings of God above. 
Like Ricoeur (chapter 2.2.3), Vygotsky used Husserl's sense-referent (meaning- 
referent) distinction: 
It is necessary to distinguish the meaning of a word or expression from its 
referent, that is, the objects indicated by the word or expression. There 
may be one meaning and different objects or, conversely, differept 
meanings and one object. Whether we say 'the victor at Jena' or 'the loser 
at Waterloo' we indicate the same person (Napoleon). The meaning of the 
two expressions [however] is different. (cited in Wertsch 1985,97) 
In the examples above the referent of the children's utterances is the same, their 
words all refer to God (occasionally under the name of Allah or Jah), but the 
meanings given to God are different. Just as Napoleon was the victor at Jena and 
loser at Waterloo, so Allah is good and peaceful, respected by lots of people 
(DI 27-8), and he is the fierce judge who is going to 'put you in the fire when you 
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die' (A237-240); the Christian god is the rather sinister character to whom you 
whisper behind curtains (B468-473), and the exciting, lively spirit who makes you 
jump around and lose your hat (B484-6). The source of this varlety of meanings is 
'the background of other concrete utterances on the same theme, a background 
made up of contradictory opinions, points of view, value judgements ... one 
composed of specific objects and emotional expressions' (Bakhtin 1985,281), the 
assimilated discourse and individualised word which constitute the meaning 
potential of the word and contribute to the conceptual horizon of the listener. 
In the situated activity we can trace the re-emergence of this assimilatQd 
discourse, we can also view the process by which new meanings are assimilated in 
turn. The distinction between referent and meaning allows for change 'or 
development in a child's understanding of a word. Vygotsky writes of the false 
conclusions inevitably reached by those who hold that 'the end point of 
development in word meaning coincides with the beginning point, that a ready- 
made concept is given from the very beginning, anýd consequently there is no room 
for development'. (99) Vygotsky's interest is in development and the process by 
which children come to partake of adult understanding of the world in which thPy 
are growing up. The meaning and referent distinction provides the key to his 
theory of children's gradual acquisition of the elements that constitute the 
complete understanding of the word meaning. Though, for reasons that Will 
become evident later, I do not hold to a linear development theory of wQrd 
meaning with its teleological implications, the meaning-reference distinction helps 
explain the variety, the revisions and creations of meaning observable in the 
children's representations of the words, objects and situations under consideration. 
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The possibility of movement in word meaning is central to the process of 
assimilation of others' discourse through a series of situated activities. As children 
experience Words in a succession of encounters these words acquire new 
significance and so a word first encountered in the family home, for example, may 
take on an additional meaning when spoken by a ffiend in a school context. JN 
begins one discussion with a statement learned from his church, of the oneness of 
God and the exclusive claim of Christianity to the status of a religion (H7-9). 
During the conversation he is confronted with Hindu friends' use of 'gods' as 
plural. His definition of God and implicit understanding of other religions alters 
when he assimilates this plurality with the 'they' and 'all' of the fbIlOwing 
sentence* 
JN: They can all be the same god because God can ... change 
into 
different - like different features. (HI 13) 
Here JN is not only recognising different understandings of the word 'CTod' but is 
bringing them together into a coherent whole. In this brief statement he is 
responding to and organising the divergent meanings he has encountered. A§ he 
does so he is directing his speech towards the other children in the group. 
3.2 4 Byidging the Con ceptu al Gap 
So far the emphasis has been upon divergent and individual understandings 
generated in response to a given word. The children have been considered as 
listeners. Now we will view their use of language in their role as speakers. In the 
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discussion the participants act not only to receive words into their conceptual 
system, but also to convey them to others. It is what Bakhtin terms 'orientation 
towards listener' (Bakhtin 1981,280). The challenge faced by the speaker is that 
of communication- how to formulate utterances in such a way as to be understood 
by those to whom they are addressed; how to bridge the gap between their 
understanding of the word or situation under consideration, and that of their 
listener. The gap may be one of knowledge or outlook. False assumptions made 
about the degree to which either is shared hinder communication. To use 
Bakhtin's terminology, the influences we have observed on the word which give it 
a variety of different meanings are centrifugal forces acting on that word. Acts pf 
communication between different subjects require a certain minimum of mutual 
understanding and so centripetal forces are brought to bear, organising word 
meanings to create a jointly recognised medium for sharing thoughts: 
Every concrete utterance of a speaking subject serves as a point where 
centrifugal as well as centripetal forces are brought to bear. (272) 
Vygotsky's research focuses on the maturation of children's thought: his interqst 
was in bridging the gap between adult and child understanding, between their 
different definitions of objects and events. In Wertsch's tenninology, týe 
csituation definition' is 'the way in which objects and events In a situation are 
represented or defined' (Wertsch 1985,, 159). Importantly for the activities in 
which my research participants are engaged, these 'objec&' or 'events' may be 
C abstract and/or removed from the speech context' (236). In the process of 
education or socialisation the onus is placed on the adult partner in adult-child 
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interaction to find a way to communicate with the child so that the latter can 
eventually come to participate in a joint understanding, that is to share 'situaýion 
definitions'. It is the problem of establishing or maintaining intersubjectivity. 
In the research activity the adult-child gap still presents a challenge but the 
concern is the reverse of that set out above. My desire as a researcher to find out 
about the children's understanding means that they are the prime movers in the 
communication context,, relaying their understanding to me. In order to draw out 
the speaker I also frequently assume or exaggerate a lack of knowledge so that the 
gap between us is my supposed ignorance. As the research takes place in 
discussion groups the children are addressing their peers, not just the researcher, 
and so face the challenge of establishing common ground and points of contact 
with each other. 
Analysis of the children's utterances reveals the variety of strategies with which 
they meet that challenge. In their efforts to mediate their message to the listener 
they might attempt direct translation from one language to another, ftom Gujarati 
to English (D375), from a 'Muslim word' to one of more general application, 
'Ramadhan' to 'fasting' (E23), 'namaz' to 'praying' (B174); they might Lfse 
illustrations such as examples given of food that is 'haram' (B147f), or actions 
that are 'guna' (E122f), or analogy as with CSs 'fairy' (G148-152). They might 
break up the concept into a number of subsidiary ideas that contribute to the whole 
picture, for example explanations of what a topi is (D145f). All of these strategies 
act upon the words they describe to expand, restrict or alter their meaning in 
subtle ways. 
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3.2 5 Referential Perspective 
In his exposition and extension of Vygotsky's ideas, Wertsch writes of the use of 
referential perspective to communicate with another's understanding. The 
referential perspective is 'the perspective or viewpoint utilized by the speaker in 
order to identify a referent' (Wertsch 1985,169). For each referent the speaker 
can choose from a variety of referring expressions. At the simplest levef the same 
object could be signified by 'the while thing', 'the round thing' or 'the round 
white thing'. In attempts to identify a word- or expression and convey its meaniqg,. 
the children have a similar variety of options and their choice often reflects their 
perception of the listener's understanding or viewpoint. Bound up in the referring 
expressions they use is not only their own perspective, the words and discourses 
incorporated from their own experience and personal history of encounter, but 
also their perception of the listener's perspective, some recognition of which is 
needed to communicate meaning. The perspectives of listener and speaker, to a 
greater or lesser extent, are both incorporated into the referential perspective of an 
utterance. The degree to which the referential perspective is shared by both 
speaker and addressee is the extent of intersubjectivity in the exchange. This 
orientation towards the listener can introduce new elements into the meaning of a 
word, bring particular elements into prominence and suppress others. This process 
is evidenced in the following examples where the speakers are addressing their 
listener's perspectives as classified into understandings, knowledge and attitudes. 
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Perspectives of Understanding 
YN himself identifies as 'Hindu', yet his representation of that word's meaning 
owes much to the understanding of his non Hindu audience. YN's family is 
practising, both at home and occasionally at the temple. For him the word haý a 
wealth of associations. When trying to convey the sense of the word 'Hindu' to 
the discussion group he hesitates but finally states that 'it is a religion with lots of 
gods' (EI 12). Addressing a group of children and an adult from other, 
monotheistic, faith backgrounds he gives the word 'IFEndu' a very specific and 
narrow meaning that they might be expected to understand easily. This is not to 
say that YN is defining the word in terms that are someone else's and not his oWn, 
but that this is the particular perspective he adopts as relevant on this occasion 
from the many perspectives on God and religion that he has assimilated through a 
variety of encounters. 
Similarly NA, HA and JH use the word 'fasting' to explain the word 'Ramadan' 
and the referential perspective they give it contains the ideas of hunger and 
empathy with the starving of Africa, worthy sentiments befitting a school'settiqg 
and of general application to the non Muslims in the discussion group. Their 






JH- A Muslim word - fasting. People - Ramadan means that when people 
fast it means that all people in Africa - people that starve - they starve for 
thirty days - when they starve they"re just starving to see how it feels - see 
how it feels about all the people in all the different countries that starvlý - 
they want to - you know, pray for them that they get food sometime and 
that when they fast they want to know that how it feels to them that they 
don't have food all their lives (E25-3 1). 
It is a perspective they say they have learnt from their Muslim friends and the 
length and fluency with which JH discourses on the subject indicates that the ideas 
have captured his imagination. What is missing in this explanation is not only a 
specifically Muslim religious or communal perspective but also the particular 
perspective of the children in that group that caused them to snigger when thq 
were first presented with the word. The perspective they initially shared with one 
another and that they thought appropriate to share with the adult present were 
different. 
The importance of finding a referential perspective that includes the listener's 
perspective is evident in the following interchange in which the word fails to 
bridge the conceptual gap between the speaker's and listener's consciousness. JN 
asked TR how Hindus direct their devotions to a plurality of gods: 'Do you praise 
every one of themT (H120) As the word 'praise' is not recognised by TR, JN 
changes it to the word in TR's mind, 'pray' and tries to make himself clearer by 
using the illustration of prayer to Jesus (H124). As this does not advance the 
communication, SN steps in with the 'Our Father, as an example of Christian 
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prayer and only confuses TR further (H128-130). By using a specifically Christian 
referential perspective the boys were unable to convey the meaning of their word 
(praise' to the consciousness of the non Christian listener. 
Occasionally a third perspective is sought which, being common to both 
interlocutors,, will interpret the object of the speech in such a way that their 
different perspectives on it are brought together into a shared understanding. CS's 
use of a metaphor when proposing a model of a new religion to JS is an instance 
of this. He is trying hard to get across to JSs understanding the difficult concept 
of human agency in the creation of a new religion. The conceptual gap between 
the boys is the difference between CSs emphasis on human and JS's on divine 
action in the founding of a new religion. CS tries to overcome this with the shared 
referential perspective of the fairy tale (of Cinderella in particular)-. 
CS: People have to do something first before - em - God gives them 
something back - like, if it's a fairy -a fairy's not going to put a new spit 
on - you re not going to just stand there and get a new suit on - 
like you're 
going to have to twirl around or something - just do a little thing until the 
fairy actually does something (G148-152). 
That CS was right in judging this illustration to be part of JS's conceptual horizpn 
is demonstrated by JS's later implicit reference to the Cinderella story in 'a pair of 
new slippers' (G156-7). By working from this particular perspective 
CS not oqly 
brings JS's understanding closer to his but also develops his own understanding. 
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He converts it into a proverbial phrase, 'do something and you'll get something 
back' (GI 5 5) and returns to the idea later in the conversation (GI 84-8). 
Perspectives of Knowledge 
A listener's perspective varies from the speaker's not just in understanding but 
also in knowledge. Their referential perspective can include the ignorance or 
knowledge of the addressee. JH's personal account of his birth ceremony is a case 
in point: it is a very personal and individual speaker's perspective on the word 
'Jah' yet contains in its expression the perceived ignorance of the listeners. The 
other members of the group have already admitted that the word means nothing to 
them. This ignorance of the origin of JH's name, his religion and personal history 
is answered with careful explanations of terms- 
JH: That's what my name is, JK because it's the beginning of the god th4t 
I- the religion that I come from, Rasta ... 
It's not the actual god's name 
He's like Jahovah but we call him Jah for short. (E 199-2-0 1) 
Had JH been talking to his mother and meeting her perspective of knowledge, the 
expressions used about the referent, 'Jah', - would not 
have been the same. 
A contrary example, where the speaker's perspective meets a perspective of 
knowledge, is also linked to the naming of the child, In the Christmas play I 
produced at the end of the previous term, JO had been given the role of the 
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prophet Malachi. In the context of a discussion on the baptism of babies, JO 
remarks on a coincidence- 
JO: You know,. when we were doing the Christmas play, yeah -I coi4ld 
have been called Malachi - there was a choice - out of JO and Malachi. 
But my Mum picked JO. (B248-253) 
Our shared knowledge of the play, and of Malachi as the character played by JO 
in that play, means JO only needs to make a brief reference to the play and does 
not have to engage in any detail, to get his message across: 'you know, when we 
were doing the Christmas play' contains that shared knowledge and experiqnce. 
D- 
I erspectives ofAttitude 
The perspectives the children feel free to share in the situated activity also depend 
on their understanding of their listeners' attitude towards what they will hear, and 
on their anticipated response. They rely on much common feeling based on shared 
status as members of minority groups in a largely Muslim environment. This 
anticipation has already been observed in examples of*children describing tinjes 
when they have been hurt by the unkindness of those who tease them on account 
of their religion or race, for example, SH's report of a time when his Muslim peers 
would not let him play football with them saying, 'No, because you're a different 
religion' (H 183), or AK's account of the teasing he received in Year 3 as the only 
Hindu in the class (G200-3). In these cases the boys are conveying their hurt to the 
sympathy of their listeners. Similarly the children are eager to share with each 
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other examples of the corporal punishments of some mosque classes, knowing that 
they all share the sense of outrage, and bring up stories of their peers' 
superstition'. 
., such as 
Ashfaq's expectation of money raining down from heaven 
(B 3 96- 7), anticipating a response of amu sement or ridicule . 
In the research discussions the collective mood was such that conversation flowed 
freely, but the importance of the speakers perceptions of the listener's likqly 
reactions is shown in reported instances of the children not feeling free to express 
their thoughts in front of an audience that might be upset by what they say, 'I 
don't laugh to them because they find it bad' (D121), who might be unimpressed 
or disinterested, JN does not talk about his fasting to his Muslim friends becatýse 
'they'll think it's funny. They don't want to listen. ' (C34) There are also instances 
of speaker's orientation towards a listener's perspective being such that thqy 
couch their speech in terms deliberately designed to provoke. Memories of teasing 
on the grounds of religion and race are examples of this, the teasers havirIg 
enough knowledge of their listener"s perspective to know how to hurt, insults 
directed at the gods of others (G308, F44, B395, B412) claims of the superiority 
of one's own god over those of others (G95,211,221, B393-4) interfered with the 
meaning making taking place around the word,, God. Bakhtin recognises the 
negative effects orientation towards a listener's psychological perspective can 
have on the word's meaning 
Sometimes this orientation towards the listener interferes with the word's 
creative work on its referent (Bakhtin 1985,, 282), 
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Thus the dialogism bears a more subjective, psychological and (frequently) 
random character,. sometimes crassly accommodating, sometimes 
provocatively polemical. (282) 
3.2 6 The Role of Defin idon s 
In several of the above illustrations of the children's thinking, their referential 
perspectives were expressed in acts of word or concept definition ('Hindu', 
'Ramadan',, 'Jah'). The word card exercise required the children to provioe 
definitions for the words presented to them. Definitions were also employed by 
the children in other research discussions when it became clear that the 
participants lacked a shared referential perspective and communIcation was 
difficult; examples are JN and SN's attempt to explain their use of 'prayer, and 
CS's use of a metaphor to define the relationship between God and humankind's 
activity. Agreement about the meanings of words within a particular exchange is 
often implicit in word use but occasionally needs to be explicitly established (or 
defined) to create that minimum of mutual understanding needed for effectiye 
communication. The act of definition requires a process of selecting from the 
many meanings the word has acquired through past encounters, and of adapting 
these meanings to meet the needs of the present communication context. It thus 
links the social setting and situated activity which form the wider and immeqiate 
contexts for the children's thoughts. 
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Organisation (? fMeaning 
The word 'definition' carries the sense of the limits of a word; where its edges are; 7 11 
the boundaries of its jurisdiction. As such it provides an organising tool for both 
Bakhtin's and Vygotsky's models of meaning-making. For Wertsch and Vygotsky 
it is the gap between the situation definitions of adult and child participants in a 
communicative event that provides a motor for change and development. The 
adult is challenged to find a way to introduce 'context-informative referential 
perspectives' to lift the child 'up' to her own situation definition (176). The 
adult's situation definition is presented as normative; it is what the child needs to 
acquire to become 'a mature member of the culture' (176). The pressures on the 
children with whom I am working are more complex as they face the challenges 
of a confusing variety of cultures, discourses, values, beliefs and experiences. 
Parents, peers, the media, teachers and other adults in the community present them 
with a diversity of models and messages. For them Bakhtin's model., with its 
recognition of multi -directional forces and conflicting perspectives, has particular 
relevance. 
Bakhtin's 'living word' has no destination in sight when it is received into our 
understanding but is limitless in its activity. This does not mean it cannot be 
defined but that when it acquires a particular interpretation (such as definition 
gives) in a particular context, it is not for ever bound by it. Writing of the 
intemally persuasive word he says: 
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It is not so much interpreted by us as it is further, that is fteely,, developed,, 
applied to new material, new conditions it encounters. (345) 
is brought into 'interanimatin relationships with new contexts' (345); the 9 71 
discourse's semantic structure is not 'finite' but 'open': 
In each of the new contexts that dialogize it, this discourse is able to reveal 
newer ways to mean. (346) 
These interanimating relationships with new contexts include the encounýer 
between the speaker's and the listener's perspectives on that word, described 
-I- above. In any situated activity the word is dialogized by the meeting of differing 
conceptual horizons. As these perspectives are brought together in the referential 
perspective with which the speaker expresses the word', - the organisation of the 
word"s meaning takes place. In defining a word the children are representing not 
its full meaning potential but the particular meanings to be understood and used in 
a particular encounter. In new contexts of encounter the word is applied to new 
conditions and so newer ways to mean are revealed requiring new definitions. A 
definition is temporal and context bound. The definition of 'Hindu' in YN's 
communication to his non Hindu audience, is 'a religion that believes a lot of 
gods', that of 'Jah' is the personal name and whole context of the birth ceremony 
as described by JH. In the speaker's and listener's minds and memories there qre 
many other perspectives on those words, other meanings (or meaning potentials) 
not used in this situation,. but which might be organised into new definitions in 
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other situations of encounter. Added to these are the many more meanings that 
may, temporarily have slipped from the memory: 
At the present moment of the dialogue there are great masses of forgotten 
meanings, but these will be recalled again at a given moment in t4e 
dialogue's later course when it will be given new life. (Bakhtin's Estetika 
373, cited in Holquist 1990,39) 
As a word is received into our understanding its activity may be limitless but 
definition imposes temporary limits on a word's meanings and regulates them in 
such a way that agreement on its use can be achieved. Definition reins in the 
limitless activity of the word and so is a centripetal force towards a unitary 
language countering the centrifugal forces towards diversity and mutual 
unintelligibility. Recalling Dostoevsky's dictum that the heart of man is a 
battlefield between good and evil, Bakhtin proposes that the mind of man is the 
theatre of war between the centripetal impulses of cognition and the centrifugal 
forces of the world: 
I can make sense of the world only by reducing the number of its 
meanings. (Holquist 1990,47) 
Examples of the children's definitionsfor organising meaning 
When presented with different religious terms on word cards,. the children 
responded with a series of composite definitions such as the examples belovy. In 
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these they explain the significance of the topi, a familiar object worn by many of 
their classmates,, and the concept of God, a common subject of their conversation 
and thought: 
Card: Topi 
RA: It's a hat. It's religious. 
RJ: A Muslim hat. 
JK: Boys wear that. 
RA: They've got patterns on them. 
RJ: Miss, it's for they wear it when they go to mosque. 
JIK: It's religious. 
RA: To cover their hair. 
RJ: WhatP 
RA: No,. it's the girls isn't it - sorry. 
RJ: It's for boys, when they go to mosque. 
RA: It's like respect - to respect. 
RJ: It's like to protect them or something like that. 
JK: From evil. 
NI: Evil spirits and ghosts (D145-160). 
Card: God 
BT: Important person. 
AN: It can do - it can turn into anything. 
DY: He made you, 
AN: It "s the creator of the world. 
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CS: Very powerful. 
AN: The creator of the world. 
CA: He lives in heaven. 
BT: He's kind - He can do anything (A 1 -9). 
In response to the task they are set, the children use their previous knowledge to 
select and organise a variety of meanings around the two words they have been 
given: the topi is a hat; the topi signifies respect; the topi is something that wards 
off evil; God is all powerful; God is creator; God is kind. 
The examples of definitions of God and topi follow a 'brain-storm' model where 
the group members pile up more and more aspects of the definition to provide a 
fuller picture. SN takes another approach to the same task of defining 'topi' and 
organises a selection of meanings and associations into a short story 
SN: Muhammad,. the prophet, made an invention and it was a topi hat and 
he held it [holding out his hands] and said to God, 'This is a symbol of my 
love for God'. 
JN: Don't laugh about it. 
SN: I'm not (C58-9). 
His lacks the detail of the earlier definition but in its directness retains an aura, a 
sense of mystery and symbolism. The expanded definition of the topi set out 
above seems rather flat in comparison and misses some of the significance of the 
term. If, though he denies it, SN is poking fun, his contribution says much about 
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how he, as someone who is not a Muslim,, relates to this religious symbol worn by 
many of his classmates. 
The definition of God given above is wide, but the breakdown of the sense of 
'God' into a list of attributes and acts cannot contain the completeness of PR's 
brief definition: 
PR: God is God,, definitely (B467). 
In this statement no aspect of God's meaning is missing. His answer is full but 
perhaps is not the kind of definition required by the particular task or the 
expectation (the perspective) of the listeners. A similar definition of God is used 
by CS when he and JS are working on the idea of a new religion: 
CS: God's just there. (GI 25) 
In this case, the short definition is entirelY appropriate to the task in which týe 
boys are engaged. It serves as a warning in their model against ascribing too much 
power to humankind in the activity of making a new religion by denying t4e 
possibility of making a new God. This shared perspective on God is needed for 
the boys to create a model of religion acceptable to both. 
The journey of the word 'God' illustrates the processes of meaning-making that 
take place in the children's definitions. God is the referent of many different 
expressions; these expressions reflect different meanings ascribed to God and 
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assimilated into the children's understanding (their conceptual horiZon) ftom 
numerous encounters with the word and concept. Certain of these meanings are 
organised into definitions of God by the children to suit the particular situation of 
encounter in which the word is being used. Each definition expresses the 
referential perspective that emerges from a face-to-face encounter between the 
i erent perspectives of the interlocutors. In seeking a definition that reflects 
these different perspectives the children are engaged in organising meanings and 
creating new. 
This understanding brings us back to the relationship between social setting and 
situated activity earlier described in terms of a chain of meaning (page 162). The 
children's words originate in previous encounters but the element of organisation 
of meanings involved in the act of communication means that understandings 
expressed are not just cumulative, they are also selective. The children do not 
bring all their previous encounters with a word to the activity, but select those 
meanings that they perceive to be relevant to the task and to the understanding of 
the rest of the group with whom they are communicating. This means the 
children's understanding and the meaning of their word does not develop in a 
single linear direction but can move in a variety of directions in response to the 
different circumstances of encounter. It allows for the seeming contradictions in 
the children's expression of understandings and the movement between faith 
styles discussed in chapter 2.22 and exemplified in JN's differing statements about 
God, each understanding rooted in a different social context. 
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DIALOGUE 
4.1 Understandings of Dialogue 
This project began as an exploration of the influence of a particular context on the 
participants' religious understanding. As it progressed the active nature of their 
understanding became evident as did the place of dialogue in that mental activity. This 
dialogue was not just in the verbal exchange between the children and their Muslim peers 
that constituted the background of much of the research data, it was there in the exchange 
of the face-to-face encounter of the research discussion where dialogical engagement 
acted on memories and interpretations of experience to create new meanings. 
Understandings of what constitutes dialogue are so varied that I shall first steer my w4y 
through various uses of the concept to find a definition that has meaning in the context of 
my research. The sense of dialogue will be considered below as form, principle and 
onentation. 
4. TI Dialogue as Fonn 
The following are extracts from the children's discussions which will be used to explore 
the idea of dialogue as form. 
Extract 1,, '(F]82-190) 
The children are sharing stories they have heard about the beginning of the world-. 
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JK- I've got one. The earth was dark and God was getting bored of - you know,, 
doing nothing and not dying people or anything, and so he decided to make some 
animals first and then - 
JH- Yeah, I've heard this one. 
JK- Some people, because then the people can eat the animals - 
JH. And them two people make kids and their kids make kids and kids, kids, ýids, 
kids. 
JK. They make them out of clay - 
RA- And then they breathe and make life into them. 
Extract W(HIII-9) 
Children of Hindu and Christian backgrounds are discussing how many gods there are. 
SH- You have to believe in all of them because all of them have got something 
different,, like special. 
JN: Yeah, because- look, they can all - they can all be the same god because Qod 
can - God can - 
AY. Do lots of things. 
JN: Change into different - like different features - like he can be in you. 
SN- He can come into anything - he can change into anything. 
TR- We've got like a god who you can actually see. 
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Extract X (D190-202) 
The children are explaining what the word 'Krishna' means- 
RA- A blue god. 
JK- A Hindu god. 
RA: He's normally blue. 
JK: He has a- 
RA- Flute - he has a flute - he's in ston'es - 
JK- He's in stories -a lot of stories. 
RA- He has a- is it his wife? Rama? 
JK- No, Sita. He's a prophet. 
RA -A bit like Mohammed. 
JK A messenger of God. 
RA: A messenger - an angel- a bit like an angel, like the angel that came to tell 
Mary she was going to have a baby -a bit like that. 
CH- A prophet? What? Who? 
Extract Y (G] 15-134) 
CS is setting out his ideas for a new religion- 
CS: (slowly, deliberately, thinking it out) All the - em - religious - religious 
people get together and find different languages and everything, and actually find 
a language that actually says a word that's appropriate for being a religion, and 
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then people can get along and I think it will be much more - there won't be so 
much trouble in the future because they'll have more technology, but it's not just 
the technology, it's the - if people are getting on - so I think they've got to - get 
on more. 
JS. Are you trying to say - are you trying to say a new name or a new god? 
CS- No one can make a new god. 
JS: I know but what are you trying to say, though? -a new name or somet4ing? 
CS- People make one big religion that no one disagrees with - every - 
JS: You can't make a new religion really, can you? 
CS- Yeah. 
Js. How? 
CS- I'll explain that to you 14ter. 
J11- No,, I'd like you to explain that now. Can you explain it now? It's very 
interesting? 
CS. I've just told him! 
Txtract Z (F56-66) 
JH is giving his views on God's colour: 
JM- I say to [my Muslim 
friends], 'Do you believe about Jesus? ' They go, 'Np. 
But when they ask me, I say, 'Yes, I believe that there"s only one god'. And they 
ask me, 'What colour do you think he isT And most people my colour will say 
he's black, but I think he's all mixed colours, black,, white,, Asian - blue, pink. I 
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think he's every colour in the world, I don't just think he's one particular colour 
because, miss, you can't just have - even though you can have one god - people 
think the devil is red which he probably is because he's burnt - but God must be 
like everyone's colour because to me, I think he's everyone's God, because in my 
religion I think there's only one God and he's everyone's God so he's got to be 
everyone's different colour. He can't just be black and then he's everyone's Ood. 
JK- Muslims believe in a green god - green is their colour. 
On one level dialogue is understood as verbal exchange between two or more parties. It is 
interactive,. the separate utterances relating to each other sequentially and in the 
interdependence of initiation and response. The extracts above are all by this reckoning 
examples of dialogue and, having their origin in full discussions,, are parts of lengthier 
dialogues; a plurality of voices is involved. Recorded in written form they becorpe 
linguistic texts open to analysis. Dialogues of this kind constitute a primary source of 
data for numerous studies of teacher-pupil, pupil-pupil communication in educational 
research (Maybin 1994,13 1). Though the area of research might be the same the focus of 
these researchers' interest may differ. 
Exchanges such as those above have received the linguistic-based attention of discourse 
analysts, among them Sinclair and Coulthard (1975) who constructed a descriptive 
system of the organisational properties of dialogue informed by the functional rather than 
grammatical role of utterances. A common teacher-pupil exchange, 
for example, consists 
of 'initiation', 'response' and 'feedback'. The verbal to-and-fro 
between participants in 
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dialogue has been examined by conversation analysts Sacks, Schegloff and Jefferson 
(1974) to produce a set of turn-taking rules by which conversationalists alternate in turn- 
construction units with considerable variation in the order and length of turns. The above- 
named analysts have advanced the understanding of the nature of structures in dialogue 
but other researchers of classroom dialogue have a different focus. 
Analysts of classroom communication,. Edwards and Mercer,. use the term 'dialogue' for 
the exchanges of speech they are analysing (Edwards and Mercer 1987,65) and 'the 
substantial excerpts of situated classroom talk' (11), similar to the extracts above, thqy 
present to illustrate their theories. However they contrast their primary interest to that of 
discourse analysts- 
[It is] how common knowledge is established rather than how people engage in 
sequential dialogue (11) 
We shall be looking for continuities of talk and of shared experience that 
transcend the moment-to-moment flow of talk,. the alternation of turns at speaking 
and listening that are the principal object of Sinclair and Coulthard's analysis. 
(10) 
Their expressed concern is more with 'context', being 'everything that the participants in 
a conversation know and understand' (63), than with form (10-11). In Edwards and 
Mercer's work dialogue is secondary to this understanding. 
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All of the dialogue can be said to be dependent on context for its meaning (65). 
The dependence of all of the dialogue on current, or previously established, or 
implicit context is most clearly seen if we examine particular words' (65). 
They are interested less in dialogue than in the underlying knowledge and understanding 
on which it is based, the 'mental context' (65) of 'memory and perception' (66). In the 
account of dialogue-based research above dialogue itself is neutral, it can be studied as a 
text, or mined for data but cannot be discovered or advocated. 
To de-neutralise dialogue it needs to be set up against an altemative and distinguished 
from it. Vygotsky does this when he draws the contrast between dialogic and monologic 
forms of speech. Working against the early 20th century background of Russi4n 
Formalism, Vygotsky's theory of human psychology builds on an understanding of the 
interconnectedness of thought and speech, of language use and cognitive development. 
His theory thus brings together the interest in linguistic form and function of the 
discourse analysis school and the context of shared knowledge and understanding of 
which Edwards and Mercer write. In this union the concept of dialogue becomes central: 
The fundamental distinction between dialogic and monologic forms of speech 
takes on an overriding significance for linguistics and especially for the 
psychology of speech (cited in Wertsch 1985,86) 
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VY90tsky's interest in dialogic and monologic forms was fed by L. P. Yakubinskii's 
monograph, 'On Dialogic Speech' (1923) in which he aimed to examine the proposition 
that 'language reveals its genuine essence only in dialogue' (cited in Holquist 1990,56). 
The two fonns were distinguished as follows: 
Corresponding to alternating forms of interaction that involve a relatively rapid 
succession of actions and reactions by the interlocutors, we have a dialogic form 
of verbal social interaction; corresponding to protracted or drawn out forms of 
influence in social interaction,, we have a monologic form of verbal expression. 
(cited in Wertsch 1985,86) 
Dialogue retains the sequential 'action, 'reaction' model but is not applied generally to 
any verbal exchange between different parties. The number of people involved does not 
decide which speech is dialogic and which monologic, they are both forms of social 
interaction, for monologue presupposes an audience or readership. Both forms may be 
present in classroom interchange and so the excerpts from my research discussions will 
later be examined to consider whether they can be viewed as dialogic or monologic. 
Yakubinskii and Vygotsky identify a number of contrasting characteristics by which the 
two forms may be distinguished from each other. Dialogue is a rapid succession, it is 
often characterised by a simplified syntax, fewer words and condensed forms; monologue 
on the other hand is more discursive, is protracted and uses more explicit linguistic 
formulation. (Wertsch 1985,86-88) 
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For Yakubinskii the prime distinction was still linguistic, but as he explores the 
relationship of form and function of language he raises Edwards and Mercer's question of 
underlying knowledge and understanding. The communicative function of language 
differs according to the degree to which knowledge is already shared; whether those 
addressed are being told something new or being asked to use what they already know or 
have before them. According to Yakubinskii, dialogue relies less on the explicit verbal 
representation of a message than monologue because the speaker and listener already 
share a significant degree of knowledge or 'apperceptual mass' (Wertsch 1985,87), the 
most extreme monologue found in written form contains the most explicit linguistic 
representation because of the lack of a communicative context shared by writer and 
reader. The greater the shared knowledge and understanding the greater the ability of all 
parties to take an active part in the verbal interaction. In social interaction a crucial 
distinction between monologue and dialogue is this degree of participation: 
What distinguishes the two speech forms is the degree to which both parties 
participate in a concrete setting to create a text. (Wertsch 1985,86) 
While Yakubinskii considers dialogue primarily in a social setting, Vygotsky further 
weakens the association of dialogic form with numbers of participants by recognising it 
as the form employed by children in egocentric, and by adults in inner speech. There is a 
continuum between social dialogue, egocentric speech and inner speech- 
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Egocentric speech ... grows out of 
its social foundations by means of the 
individual's psychological functioning. (cited in Wertsch 1985,112) 
The dialogical form is the basis of 'intelligent, purposeful action and thinking' (117), of 
which egocentric speech is a transitional and inner speech a developed form. The degree 
to which the 'apperceptual mass' is shared is evidently highest where, as in inner speech, 
addresser and addressee are the same. 
In Yakubinskii and Vygotsky's view dialogue is a linguistic form but is of wider interest 
than a linguistic analysis of 'moment-to-moment flow of talk' and 'the alternation of 
turns at speaking and listening' (Edwards and Mercer 1987,10). Their understanding of 
the differences between dialogic and monologic forms, and the relationship between form 
and context is applied below to the five examples of children's talk from the discussions 
of my research project to see whether the distinctions made can be maintained. 
Protracted Speech 
Extract Z has elements of Yakubinskii"s monologue. It is discursive, the listeners do pot 
interrupt or make verbal contributions to the text; it is protracted as the speaker gives 
sources and reasons for his understanding: 
JU: ... when 
they ask ... most people ... 
but I think ... 
I think ... I 
don't just think 
... 
because you can't ... even though you can ... 
God must be... because to me I 
think ... 
because in my religion I think ... so 
he s got to be ... 
he can't just be 
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With this speaker,, JH,, in particular, there are several examples of such a monologic form 
of speech. His discourse is often autobiographical, accounts of contexts of which the 
listeners in the discussion groups have little or no previous knowledge (F357f, F386f, 
E95f, E199f). There are other voices present in JH's words nevertheless. Muslim friends, 
4 people my colour' and 'my religion' have been involved in the formulation of this 
understanding of God and so introduce elements of dialogue. An interpretation of this 
utterance as monologic is retained if it is conceded that these dialogical encounters were 
prior to the communicative act in which JH is now engaged,, they have become part of Ois 
private 'apperceptual mass' and the understanding he is now relaying to his audience in 
monologic mode, JH has overall control of the text's creation. 
The past voices in JH"s speech are not the only reason for a blurring of the dialogic / 
monologic distinction. In Thinking and Speech: Psychological Investigations (1934a) 
Vygotsky wrote about egocentric speech: 
It is in argumentation , in 
discussion, that the functional moments appear that will 
give rise to the development of reflection. In our opinion something similar 
happens when the child begins to converse with himself-exactly as he had earlier 
conversed with others, when he begins to think aloud by conversing with himself 
when the situation calls for it. (cited in Wertsch 1995,112-113) 
JH recalls how he has previously conversed with others about 
God's colour,, the results of 
his organisation of the ideas that emerged 
from these conversations are set out in Extract 
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Z. What is not clear is when this 'conversing with himself took place'. It is possible that 
it did not happen prior to the exchange recorded in Z but is taking place actually during 
the course of the conversation. If this is so this utterance can be interpreted as having a 
dual function and direction, as being a monological communication of JH's ideas to his 
audience requiring protracted syntax, and a thinking aloud where JH is conversing with 
himself using argumentation and discussion. It has been noted above that Vygotsky 
understands this reflective egocentric speech to be dialogical in form. Extract Z therefore 
contains a functional ambiguity or a functional heterogenity which means it is at the same 
time monologic and dialogic. A similar categorisation difficulty can be seen in CS's 
initial contribution in Extract Y where he is both setting out his own idea of a new 
religion at length to his listeners and, as his slow, deliberate manner indicates, working 
out his thoughts in his mind as he speaks. Again his speech has a dual function requiring 
elements of both monologue and of dialogue. 
Speech as Rapid Succession 
Of these extracts V, W, Xý and Y all display 'the rapid succession ... 
by the interlocutors' 
characterised as dialogue by Yakubinskii (Wertsch 1985,86). There are a number of 
individuals in each, speaking in turn and participating 'in a concrete setting to create a 
text' (86). Nevertheless there are significant differences of form between the examples. 
The exchanges between JS and CS in Y fit most clearly into an initiative and reactive, 
question and answer pattern. CS's contributions initiate JS's questions and those 
questions provoke further responses. It is perhaps closest to the dialectic of Socratic 
dialogue. Much of the children's talk recorded in the research discussions is not like this,. 
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however. In V, W and X the tum-taking pattern is more complicated and the grammatical 
relationship of the utterances appears to be not initiation and response but continuation. 
Change of speaker does not take place between linguistic units in a conventional turn- 
taking pattern as understood by conversation analysis (e. g. Sacks, Schegloff and Jefferson 
1974) but within phrases- 
JK- They make them out of clay - 
RA: And then they breathe and make life into them. 
JN: 
... 
God can -God can - 
AY: Do lots of things, 
JK: He has a- 
RA: Flute. 
There are several instances of similar patterns in the children's speech, earlier in JS and 
CS's exchange for example- 
CS- ... It would 
be much more 
JS. ... 







One religion. (G82-6) 
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The participants can be observed supplying words and finishing each other's sentences in 
a cconversational duet', a phrase coined by Jane Falk's in her study of couples talking to 
a third party (Falks 1980) and used by Jennifer Coates in her paper on the talk of women 
friends (Coates 1994). In these cases and that of the children in the project the 'duetting' 
reflects a closeness, a 'solidarity' between the participants* 
When a speaker completes an utterance started by another speaker they are 
demonstrating common ground to a spectacular degree ... 
In order to share in the 
construction of utterances you need to share a common point of 
view/knowledge/opinions etc. (cited in Coates 1994,186) 
Vygotsky and Yakubinskii's dialogic form was seen to depend on degrees of 
commonality and collaboration in creation of the text. Both these factors are present in 
Falks" and Coates' 'duetting' where speakers demonstrate common ground and share in 
the construction of utterances,, yet,, in this common understanding and joint activity a 
move away from dialogue can be traced. 
Where two speakers can rely on a great deal of shared knowledge as is the case of 
good friends then two speakers can function as a single voice. (Coates 1994,181 
my italics) 
Extract V exemplifies the 'common gTound' understanding of 'duetting'. The common 
knowledge behind the children's talk,. its communicative context , is a tale known to them 
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all. Once they recognise the story that JK has begun ('Yeah, I've heard this one') they 
join in the telling. Their talk is not the to-and-fro of initiation and response but movemipt 
in a single direction as the tale unfolds. They are not so much taking turns at speaking 
and listening as giving a collective presentation in which it does not seem to matter which 
of the three children is speaking at any time. Coates writes of the women she is studying- 
It matters little, who acts as spokesperson ... 
it is not the individual voices which 
count but the joint contribution. (18 9). 
Understood in these terms the story becomes a monologue directed at me as the listener 
who does not know the story and therefore shares less of the communicative context. 
More than a shared creation of text it is a shared representation of something the childrýn 
already know. Indeed, JK could probably have finished the story without the help of the 
others. If the change of voices is discounted, the story telling has the discursive ffavopr 
and explicit linguistic formulation ('so he decided, 'because then', 'and then) of 
monologue. 
Grammatically Extract W is also a 'conversational duet' the interlocutors completing 
each others' phrases and supplying explanations ('Yeah, because look-they can all be 
the same god) and illustrations ('Weve got like a god you can actually see') of each 
others' meaning. However, unlike V, W does not start from commonality but from 
difference; SH and TR believe in lots of gods, SN, JN and AY in one. What the childripn 
do share is a common intention,. a common purpose to find agreement. Through this 
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exchange the children bring together a variety of views to transcend their dIfferences and 
negotiate an agreement, one god with many features. Here they are jointly engaged in a 
creative act, the result is something new. This collaborative creativity is one of the 
features of the dialogic form as set out above, yet it stems from divergent rather than 
shared understandings. 
Such a negotiation of difference to create a 'temporarily shared social reality' ties at Ihe 
heart of R. Rommetviet's approach to communication which explores the 'question 
concerning in what sense and under what conditions two persons who engage in dialoýue 
can transcend their different private worlds' (cited in Wertsch 1985,160), and contrasts 
with analyses (such as Edwards and Mercer's) that begin with the understanding th, 4t 
interlocutors in a speech situation share a background fund of common knowledge that 
provides a foundation for communication. In the former a 'state of intersubjectivity" is 
established during the interchange as the basis of understanding on which the 
conversation can proceed. Difference is a spur to active organisation and creation of 
meaning. Again the earlier characterization of dialogic forms is in difficulty. The 
problems posed by the conversational duets V and W are that the exchange with the 
greater shared communicative context is more single-voiced and less creative, and that 
with the greater differences between the participants' starting points is the more creative 
and in that sense more dialogic. 
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Changing Forms of Speech 
The difficulties incurred in attempts to categorise the individual extracts as either 
monologic or dialogic form do not end there. Within the very short interactions the 
conversation adopts a succession of forms and functions. In Extract X, for example, týe 
girls begin with a conventional recount of their existing knowledge about Krishna (he's a 
blue Hindu god with a flute who appears in lots of stories and has a wife) and then move 
into unorthodox territory as they bring together Muslim and Christian ideas to describe 
Krishna as prophet, messenger and angel; associations which CH finds surprising. Týe 
beginning of the exchange could be interpreted as a shared representation and the end a 
shared creation. The function of the speech has changed. 
CS's speech (Extract Y) begins in a lengthy, protracted form as it is addressed to his 
audience,. he is not making openings for the contributions of others. JS though forces 
opening with his interruption and demand for clarification, 'Are you trying to say ?" 
There then follows a rapid, successive, dialogical interchange between the two boys. CS 
appears to think that JS should, having heard his original exposition, share enough 
understanding of his meaning to accept the abbreviated representation of his messaýe, 
'People make one big religion that no one disagrees with.. ' or to need no further 
C explanation because, I've just told himf' When it becomes clear that his audience (JS 
and myself) do not sufficiently follow his meaning CS returns to a more monologic style- 
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CS: But I think first it's going to need someone that gives a lot of dedication to 
his name before he can come down to Earth etc. (G138-9) 
Throughout this exchange the linguistic form and the pattern of involvement of the 
different voices change. 
Alternations between many voiced and single-voiced text, ambiguities about what is 
common knowledge and what is new, the multi-directional orientation of utterances 
towards different addressees (and towards self) simultaneously, and functional diversity,. 
all contribute to the complexity of the structures of verbal exchange and make simple 
designations of dialogic or monologic forms impossible. The complexity of linguistic 
texts is something N. Fairelough advances as an issue for discourse analysis'. 
Texts may be heterogeneous and ambiguous, and configurations of different 
discourse types may be drawn upon in producing and interpreting them. 
(Fairclough 1993,35). 
For those interested in defining dialogue the issues raised above indicate the problems of 
a linguistic based distinction. The Prague school linguist I Mukarovsky argued that the 
difference between monologue and dialogue does not correspond to a difference in 
functional language and that instead of purely dialogic or purely monologic speech, 
characteristics of both are almost always involved (Wertsch 1985,235). Ife has more in 
common with Bakhtin and the view that,. rather than dialogue being embedded in 
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linguistic form, dialogue is an underlying principle which has diverse influences on the 
way people speak. 
4.1.2 Dialogue as Context 
Bakhtin draws a distinction between the , in 
his view inadequate, linguistic superficial 
understanding of dialogue whereby 'Dialogue is studied merely as a compositional form 
in the structuring of speech' (Bakhtin 1981,279) and the underlying principle of dialogue 
central to his thought, 'the internal dialogism of the word' (279). This dialogue is not tied 
to particular forms of speech or particular speech acts. The problems of the previous 
section relating dialogue to form dissolve when that relationship is seen as one not of 
dependency but of influence. 
It is precisely this internal dialogism of the word which does not assume any 
external compositional forms of dialogue, that cannot be isolated as an 
independent act, separate from the word's ability to form a concept 
(koncipirovanie) of its object - it is precisely this internal dialogism that has such 
enormous power to shape style. (279) 
The concentration on linguistic units and turn-constructional units in discourse and 
conversation analysis (Fairclough 19993,13 and 17) runs the risk Bakhtin noted in 
contemporary linguistics of not giving due attention to the activity around the individual 
word. Linguistics and philosophy of discourse, he argued,. had given the word an 
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artificial and preconceived status' (Bakhtin 1981,279). Edwards and Mercer are moving 
towards recognition of the meaning significance of individual words when they write pf 
that the relationship between dialogue and context is 'most clearly seen if we examine 
particular words' ('pendulum', 'height', 'ground' (Edwards and Mercer 1997,65) though 
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their words have a more established,, less embattled character than Bakhtini's. While 
Edwards and Mercer, and Yakubinskii build their theories of communication on 
foundations of common knowledge and shared communicative context acting towards the 
unitary understanding of a word, Bakhtin also stresses the centrifugal forces that pull týe 
word's meaning in different directions and constitute its dialogicality. The dialogical 
word is the 'living word' of the previous chapter. It passes through, and is changed by, 
the tension-filled environment of other thoughts, points of view, alien judgements, 
previously spoken words on the same theme providing a rich and varied meaning 
potential, and the listener's conceptual horizon, knowledge, understanding and attitude 
(Bakhtin 1981,276). Dialogue, then , is not 
just a way of relating to the context, tpe 
context is dialogue. Dialogue is revealed in the speaking acts which supply the data for 
mine and others' research. Mukarovsky writes: 
[The] essential feature of dialogue (the interpenetration and alternation of several 
contextures) is already contained in the mental event from which the utteranpe 
originates and ... therefore 
has priority over the utterance. (cited in Holquist 1990, 
58) 
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The dialogicality of the context in which the children of the research project move and 
act, the dense environment through which their words have travelled, is very evident. It is 
an environment of explicit differences of religion,, race,, culture,. of horne, school and faith 
background, producing a multiplicity of thoughts, viewpoints, judgements and meanings. 
In the extracts analysed above the dialogue of the social setting, between Muslim, Hindu 
and Christian, between plurality and unity of religion or of God, between black, white 
and Asian are clear. To these are added the dialogue specific to the particular gatherings 
of the research discussions,, that between speakers and audience who share to different 
degrees knowledge, understanding and attitude, and who may also be influenced by what 
is or is not deemed appropriate to the school context of the exchange. It is the dialogue of 
situated activity. Extract W, for example, reveals the dialogue between difference of faith 
background and group solidarity, extract X between CS's individual thought processes 
and JS's demand for clarification. 
Rather than a dialogic form among other forms, we are presented with a 'dialoýic 
imperative' (Bakhtin 1981,426). The context of any utterance is necessarily dialogic. 
The word cannot help but be dialogised- dialogue is 'a necessary multiplicity in human 
i 
perception' (Holquist 1990,22). Like CS' God, dialogue is 'just there". 
4.1.3 Dialogue as Orientation 
If the word is necessarily dialogised through encounter with different uses and meanings, 
it would seem that it would become progressively more dialogised on its journey through 
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time as it encounters further alien words so that 'only the mythical Adam, who 
approached a virginal and as yet verbally unqualified world with the first word, could 
really have escaped from start to finish this dialogic inter-orientation with the alien word 
that occurs in the object. ' (Bakhtin 1981,, 279) 
If, since our first ancestor, all words have been engaged in dialogue, the question remains 
whether beyond the superficial structures of linguistic analysis, monologue dropý out 
altogether as a reality. In Marxism and the Philosophy ofLanguage, Bakhtin wrote- 
But the monologic utterance is, after all, already an abstraction ... 
Any monolo&lc 
utterance ... 
is an inseverable element of verbal communication. Any utterance - 
the finished, written utterance not excepted - makes response to something and'is 
calculated to be responded to in turn. It is but one link in a continuous chain of 
speech performances. (cited in Hofquist 1990,59) 
As with the 'direct word' that acknowledges only itself (276), and 'passive 
understanding' of an utterance's meaning (28 1), 'monologue' becomes a logical 
construct; it does not exist in absolute form. This is not to say that monologue has no 
influence,, however. Though 'the dialogic orientation of discourse is a phenomenon that 
is, of course, a property of any discourse' (279), there can be a counter orientation pulling 
in another direction; a movement of degrees towards as well as away from this mytlýical 
pole 
207 
Bakhtin provides clues for the identification of monologic tendencies that militate against 
dialogue in his considerations of genres, discourses, systems. In contrast to the dialogised 
world of the novel,. that of the epic is 'completed' (Holquist's translation of zaversen 
meaning 'closed off ), transfers the world it describes to an 'absolute past, that is 
'monochronic',, 'hierarchical' and 'walled off from the present (Bakhtin 1981,15)ý 
'excludes any possibility of activity and change'; in contrast to the dialogised 'internally 
persuasive discourse', the 'authoritative word' is 'distanced', 'prior', 'sharply 
demarcated'. 'fully complete', with 'single meaning' (342-343); in contrast to the 11vifig 
word', - the 
'direct word' 'acknowledges only itself (that is only its own context), its own 
object, its own direct expression and its own unitary and singular language' (276). 'A 
tendency towards monologism can thus be characterised as an orientation against the 
forces of dialogue towards closure and singularity. It may be that dialogue cannot be 
eliminated altogether from the communicative context but its effects can be limited. 
Writing as an exile in Stalin's Russia, Bakhtin knew about the forces that worked -to 
suppress expression of the underlying principle of dialogue and recognised the 
inflexibility and inertia of an authoritative word fused with 'political power, an 
institution,, a person' (343). In the children's responses to diversity, factors of resistance 
can also be discerned (similar to those described as 'stage resistors'- in reference to 
movement between Faith Stages in Chapter 2.2.5); they include defensiveness, lack of 
confidence, loyalty or hostility. 
The children of the project express and report varying degrees of dialogue or monologpe 
in response to the dialogism of their context. The children's dialogical responses in the 
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extracts above have already been acknowledged. They may have been encouraged by 
social considerations of friendship as in JN"s efforts to bring together his Hindu frienos' 
and his own understanding of God's plurality and unity (HI 16), or by intellectual concern 
for understanding as in JS's questioning of CS's ideas in order to relate them rationally to 
his own conception of the relationships between, religion, humanity and God (G122, 
G128ý. G142-3). Elements of monologism can also be found in their talk. In particular 
accusations of monologism are implicit in their criticisms of their Muslim peers. They 
complain of the lack of openness of some of the Muslims to learning about other beliqfs, 
'because Muslims only believe in their own gods' (F55), have suspicions that Muslim 
children are trying to impose their own beliefs on them, 'they just want more - they jpst 
want people to turn into Muslims - definitely' (G246), and claim that Muslim parents are 
restricting children's choices by limiting their contact with children of different f4ith 
backgrounds and so protecting them from other religions because 'They might change 
them' (F148). There are also signs of resistance to dialogue in the context of their oývn 
community. JK's openness to the religion of her peers contrasts with the attitude of a 
family friend: 
JK- I told one of my friend's mum that I believe in every god. She said that if 
Muslims don't believe in your god, why should we believe in their god? (F244-6) 
The reasons for resistance to other religions here relate to intercommunal power relations 
producing arrogance in the majority, mistrust of other's intentions, fear of the influence 
of other religions on one's own belief and a stubborn holding to a principle of reciprocity. 
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Dialogue may be 'just there' but response to dialogue can be dialogic to a greater or 
lesser degree, there is an element of human agency. Dialogue can be encouraged or 
denied. The degree to which participants in a verbal exchange orientate themselves 
towards or away from dialogue depends on a number of factors, social, emotionaL 
rational. The merits of openness to dialogical activity and change can be weighed and our 
response tailored accordingly. Underlying this element of choice in response to dialope 
is an understanding that dialogue is not neutral but has value. The value of dialogue will 
be considered in the following chapters,, Dialogue in Religion and Phito. 5qphiýal 
Dialogue. First, in acknowledgement of the dialogised nature of the term 'dialogue' 
itself, I propose create a definition of dialogue that draws together the diffýrent 
perspectives on the word with which we have engaged in this chapter. 
4.1.4 Threefold Dialogue 
In this chapter we have met diverse understandings of dialogue varying from 'dialo4ic 
imperative' (Bakhtin 1991,426) to dialogic choice, from the 'necessary multiplicity in 
human perception' (Holquist 1990,22) to the 'compositional form in the structuring of 
speech' of linguistic analysis (Bakhtin 1981,279), from dialogue as dependent on context 
(Edwards and Mercer 1987,65) to dialogue as context. The question we are faced with 
when seeking a definition is whether it is possible to hold the different understandings 
together. It would be easy to draw the conclusion that these accounts of dialogue are not 
referring to the same thing, nevertheless there are shared elements in the various uses of 
the term. Firstly there is encounter with difference, whether in the interchange between 
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separate individuals in conversation, the interanimation of other meanings with the 
Bakhtinian 'living word', or the interplay of ideas in a mind open to engagement with 
another's point of view. Secondly the element of commonality is introduced in 
considerations of dialogue as communication in particular (Vygotsky, Yakubinskii and 
Rommetveit). Dialogue proceeds from a common base which is understood to have 
existed before the communicative event or to have been negotiated as part of it. 
Examination of the linguistic forms has revealed an ambiguity in the relationship between 
sameness and difference in dialogue. The degrees of both present in dialogue Ire 
measureable as a ratio according to the principle of simultaneity, drawn out of Bakhtin's 
philosophy by Holquist. 
Simultaneity deals with ratios of same and different in time and space. (Holquist 
19907,19) 
Simultaneity always involves a question of proportion- when two things or 
consciousnesses are together in a simultaneous relation, how much of each is 
present. (135) 
A third characteristic of dialogue, then, is that it is quantifiable. It is possible to be 
dialogic to a lesser or greater degree- it can be measured according to the 'different 
degrees each possesses of the other's otherness' (51). A fourth characteristic shared by 
different understandings of dialogue is its creativity. Dialogical encounter and interaction 
produce change. As Bakhtin's word encounters ever new contexts that dialogise it, it is 
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able to reveal 'ever newer ways to mean' (Bakhtin 1981,346): orientation towards 
dialogue is orientation away from the 'prior', 'closed off 'single meaning' of monologue 
and the activity of dialogue is collaborative creation of text. 
These four elements (encounter, the relation of sameness and difference, quantifiability 
and creativity) underlie the concept of dialogue as understood in this project. They are 
dialogue's characteristics but do not on their own constitute a definition. To define Ihe 
term so that it encompasses and binds together the children's varied experiences of and 
responses to encounter, I propose that a threefold understanding of dialogue be usipd- 
primary dialogue which is the dialogical context, that necessary multiplicity of human 
existence; secondary dialogue which is a dialogical response to primary dialogue, an 
ofientation towards openness and away from closure, and tertiary dialogue as the forms 
and structures employed in the communicative events to give full scope to dialogical 
activity. All three involve relating to the other and are forces of change. They can also be 
measured in so far as the word is more or less dialOgised, the response more or less open 
and the activity more or less collaborative in its creativity. 
This threefold understanding means that dialogue can be the background of our activity 
as primary dialogue, something for which we should aim as secondary dialogue, and 
something which we do as tertiary dialogue. It means dialogue as an activity is not tied to 
particular structures of verbal exchange but is found in a variety of forms that enable the 
expression of dialogue in different times and settings as with different groups and 
numbers of people. For those who know each other well enough and have sufficient 
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strength of character for a more confrontational approach (CS and JS in Extract Y., for 
example), tertiary dialogue might be a Socratic dialectic of question and answer; in other 
cases considerations of politeness and the desire for a show of solidarity (as with A and 
friends in Extract W) might make 'duetting' a more appropriate dialogue form. It also has 
pedagogical implications. If dialogue, as I have argued elsewhere in a paper designed for 
teachers (Ipgrave 2001) dialogue between children is to be valued in schools, employing 
a threefold model of dialogue means that the plurality and diversity of the children's 
experience is acknowledged, the educational ethos is responsive to the challenges of that 
diversity, and class activities are structured to encourage pupils to meet those challenges 
and discover and create new meanings. 
We return to examples from the extracts with which the chapter began to observe the 
action of the three forms of dialogue within those exchanges. In Extract W, where 
children of Hindu and Christian backgrounds are discussing the plurality of God, the 
primary dialogue is the encounter between different traditions of belief and týe 
multiplicity of meanings and understandings that surround the word 'God'. The 
children's concern to create a framework that includes and reconciles their differipg 
viewpoints is the response of secondary dialogue, and tertiary dialogue is there in the way 
in which this is achieved through the participants' completion of each others' phrases apd 
the supplying of illustrations and examples to move the model forward. In Extract Y the 
primary dialogue is there in the meeting of the two boys' differing outlooks on religion. 
JS's concern to relate CS's understanding to his own is an example of secondary 
dialogue, and the probing questions he asks which shift CS's thought into new directions 
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are a form of tertiary dialogue. JH's speech on the colour of God (Extract Z) is a response 
to the primary dialogue between the languages of different religions, of race and colour, 
of God's unity and plurality. His efforts to orientate his way through this complex 
environment show a commitment to secondary dialogue and the structures he employs as 
tertiary dialogue include the juxtaposition of his reflections and the words of others, and 
the causal connectives linking different ideas in rational argumentation. 
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4.2 Dialogue in Religion 
The focus of the project is religious understanding and the subject matter of the 
children's discussions is religion, it is therefore appropriate to spend some time 
exploring dialogue within the context of religious thought and the particular issues 
that arise. In this chapter ideas of the keen advocate of dialogue between faiths, 
David Lochhead, will be considered to demonstrate how a religious (and 
specifically Christian) conviction of the value of dialogue gives new uroency to its 
pursuit. In contrast to this orientation towards dialogue we will uncover resistanýe 
to it as we explore his and others' concerns about the precarious balance between 
openness to other religious traditions and the integrity of one's own. Lochhead's 
model of dialogue with which he responds to these concerns will be evaluated 
using the characteristics of dialogue identified in the previous chapter and 
examples from the discussions of the children of this project. 
Imperatives to Religious Dialogue 
The title of Lochhead's book promoting dialogue in interfaith relations, Ike 
Dialogical Impertaive: A Chri. wian Rýfleclion on haqIiiiih E'licounier (Lochhead 
1988) is reminiscent of the 'dialogic imperative' drawn out of Bakhtin's work 
(Bakhtin 198 1,426) and used in the last chapter. Lochhead makes no reference to 
Bakhtin, however, and the force of the imperative is very different. For Bakhtin it 
IS ep . weniologictil. Dialogue is an inevitable condition of existence and the site of 
knowledge posited by Bakhtin's thought is never unitary but always involves 
relation to otherness. For Lochhead it is a nioiwl and, in Kantian terms, a 
ctilegoi-ictil imperative. He writes of Christian discipleship: 
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The call to dialogue, to open, trusting and loving relationships with the 
neighbour is clear and unambiguous. Dialogue needs no justification 
outside itself (Lochhead 1988,81). 
The direction of Bakhtin's argument has been towards proof of the existence of 
dialogue where it has not been recognised hitherto, Lochhead's has been to show 
that many encounters that have been loosely termed 'dialogue' do not in fact mept 
his criteria for 'genuine dialogue' (93). For Bakhtin dialogue is everywhere and 
needs recognising, for Lochhead it is all too infrequent and needs to increase- 
The fact that dialogue may be possible infrequently, ambiguously and 
fragmentarily does not mitigate the dialogical imperative (8 1) 
The difference between the two writer's employment of the term 'dialogue' is not 
a contradiction if they are understood to be describing primary and secondary 
dialogue respectively (Chapter 4.1.4). 
These two theories of dialogue are different from each other yet both are based on 
a central understanding that the individual is not alone. The Bakhtinian self is 
necessarily in a dialogic relation with the other, and the individual with society- 
Sharing existence as an event means that we are - we cannot choose not to 
be - in dialogue, not only with other human beings, but also with the 
natural and cultural configurations we lump together as "the world" 
(Holquist 1990,29). 
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While Lochhead sees our very humanity as bound up with community, he also 
holds that we are in a position (we have free will) to deny that humanity and 
choose not to be in dialogue- 
If to be human is to live in community with fellow human beings, then to 
alienate ourselves from community in monologue, is to cut ourselves off 
from our humanity. To choose monologue is to choose death (79). 
As neighbourliness has more to do with relationships of friendship than relations 
of proximity, so for Lochhead dialogue is about the way we choose to relate to our 
fellow human beings rather than a necessary sharing of existence with them. He 
writes of dialogue as a relationship alongside other relationships. Monologue too 
is a relationship, one in which 'the attitudes and beliefs of one party are in no way 
affected by a second party' (77). We are free to choose between a dialogicýl 
relationship of living in community or a monologic alienation from others. What 
undamental we are called to,, however is dialogue; it is 'first and foremost,, af 
relationship into which we are called with our neighbour" (85). It is this sense of 
dialogue as the vocation to which God summons us that makes dialOguf in 
Lochhead's theory both an imperative and a response. 
Records of the project's discussions show both imperatives at work in týe 
movement of the children's religious understanding. The children of the project 
share their existence with peers of different religious beliefs and traditions. Thýir 
neighbours come from a variety of faith backgrounds. When they define 
themselves as Christian or Hindu, their religious identities set them irý 
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necessary dialogical relation with the religious identities of others. They are in a 
state of primary religious dialogue. At the same time they are establishing 
relationships with their neighbour's religion. If they chose to ignore religious 
difference and not reflect on their own viewpoint in the light of that of their 
neighbours', they would be opting for a monological response. Their 
conversations,. on the other hand,, reveal an engagement with their neighbour's 
religion both during the activity of the research discussions and in earlier 
encounters. There are several indications in the children's speech of the opennqs 
to new ideas that characterises secondary dialogue. Openness to other's beliefs is 
several times correlated with belief in other gods (D135-140, F102, F245-0ý. 
H158-9). RA sees her school as a place where there is more 'toleration' and her 
contrast between her school and a more monocultural school shows the link in her 
mind between primary and secondary dialogue: 
RA: If you go to a school where there aren't other religions so you're 
more likely to believe in only one god and when you're older you might 
not believe in other gods because you don't know much about them fl58- 
261). 
The demands of life in community with others provide impetus towards such a 
relationship. This is demonstrated in microcosm in the overtures of friendship and 
expressions of solidarity implicit in the children's efforts to bring together thýir 
ideas with those of their friends in the context of the discussion group (HI06f, 
G165f). 
There are also indications of a moral imperative towards secondary dialogue 
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in children's accounts of exchanges with Muslim peers. Disapproval of the 
Muslims' lack of openness to other ideas appears to have a moral base, they 4re 
accused of unfairness (B310, F436-441) and 'racism' (H152-3). Their negative 
attitude to other religions is compared unfavourably by several children to thpir 
own positive approach (B419-422, F245-6, B384-7). In their own reactions to 
others' religious beliefs, dismissive attitudes or ridicule are seen to go against 
basic tenets of human decency: 
RA: I think if they believe it, then I don't think it's nice to laugh (D87) 
RA: It affects them because they believe it and people laughing at them - 
it's not nice (D122-4). 
Expressions of negativity and disbelief about another's religion are seen as 
'teasing' which for the children is not only morally wrong 'I've teased them about 
other things but not about their religion because that's not fair' (1137), bpt is 
punishable by God, 'I'd get punished by God' (1135, B415-6). 
Behind their concern for toleration and fairness,, and their criticism of those who 
fail to show these,. is an implicit awareness of opposing forces acting on their 
relationships with religious difference, and of the difficulties faced if there is not 
equal openness on both sides. In spite of RA's comparative models of the 
religiously mixed and the religiously homogeneous school, a context of religious 
plurality does not inevitably lead to secondary dialogue. The urgency discernible 
in Lochhead's writing is his recognition of this. His perception is that the 
220 
choices we make when faced with religious diversity, or our limited capacity as 
humans to do 'the good', often lead us to the dangers of monologism: 
A dialogical relationship does not happen easily. It is a precarious 
relationship, vulnerable to being converted to monologue without n9tice" 
(Lochhead 1988,81) 
The normal state of relationships is unstable; an oscillation between dialogue and 
monologue. However, it would be simplistic to see this movement purely in terms 
of orientation towards 'the good' or the bad,, or to see the inability to maintain a 
dialogical relationship as a sign of weakness. Similarly it would be a mistake to 
interpret, as the children often do, their Muslim classmates lack of openness to 
other's religious ideas as a sign of bad will. In their opposition to the ideas of 
others they may be expressing loyalty to their own. In our orientation towards ýor 
away from dialogue other factors than strength and weakness, - neighbourliness and 
its opposite come into play. 
Faithfulness in Religious Dialogue 
To explain the coexistence of monologic and dialogic elements in speeqh,, 
Mukarovsky wrote of a 'dynamic polarity' with monologue and dialogue at either 
end (cited in Wertsch 1985,235). However, to maintain the concept of dialogue as 
either relation or as relationship, it is helpful to understand it as in between two 
poles, self and other, individual and society, speaker and listener, utterance and 
response. The degrees of movement along the continuum between the two 
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poles are, to use Holquist's term, the 'different degrees each possesses o the 
other's otherness' (Holquist 1990,51). Rather than being at one end of the 
polarity, dialogue is somewhere in the middle of the continuum; there is an 
OPtimuM Point to pass which in either direction, towards self or other, is to Isk 
monologism, Holquist contrasts the examples of conditions where the individual 
is unable to 'mediate between inner speech and the social dimension of langua*e' 
(autism and schizophrenia), and totalitarian versions of official discourse in which 
there is 'no difference between individual and society. These two would be 
situated on either end of the spectrum as a monological inability to take on any of 
the other's otherness,, or a monological taking up and losing of the individual in 
society. The relationship of self to other, of individual to society, becomes a 
particular issue in religion and a source of contention. Religion is seen as both 
personal and individual, and historical and communal. As the faith of the 
individual relates to the faith of religious tradition concerns have been expressTd 
about the effect of encounter on the purity or integrity of both. Likewise the 
relationship between different religious traditions, as they encounter one another 
in the context of inter faith dialogue, raises controversy. There are fears that 
engagement with another religious tradition might make us less faithful to our 
own. 
Individual Faith meets Communal Faith 
The debate between Hay and Wright referred to in Chapter 2.1 is one between 
Hay's monological emphasis on an 'experience-based and personal' spirit#ity 
isolated from 'cultural overlay, on "interiority' and I inner talk', and Wright's 
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dialogical understanding of religious experience that 'does not constitute an 
autonomous realm., but is always informed by and dependent on public d, scour5e' 
(Wright 1996,167). To what degree the other's othemess should be possessed is a 
contested issue. Expressed in terms of ratio and proportion, Hay fears that the 
proportion demanded by the 'otherness' of society is too great, that the scope 
given to the individuality of the child is limited and her natural spiriti4ality 
suppressed: 
The natural relational consciousness clearly richly present in young 
children as our research has shown is currently being obscured, overlaid or 
even repressed by socially constructed process (Hay with Nye 1998,15 1) 
In Chapter 2.1.5 it was argued that Hay's concern to protect children's spirituality 
from outside social and cultural influence was misguided not only because'it 
underplays the natural sociality of the human person (Thatcher 1991,25) but also 
because any communication of this spirituality to others necessarily involves 
engagement with a shared language. Without this mediation the child would be in 
the monological state of autism. 
By contrast Wright sees intelligent conversation between different religious 
viewpoints as the site of religious learning. He opposes views such as Hay's by 
advocating 'a critical dialogue between the horizon of the child and the horizon of 
religion' (Wright 2000,179). Wright's pedagogy encompasses the four 
characteristics of dialogue identified in the previous chapter; encounter, the 
relation of sameness and difference, quantifiability and creativity. At the 
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heart of his model is encounter and interaction which will result in convergeqce 
and dissonance as some aspects of the alternative horizon appear familiar, others 
strange. In this dialogue a sense of proportion must be preserved- 
As these two horizons interact two dangers must be avoided. The first is 
the colonisation of the child's horizon by any one particular religious 
horizon. The second is the colonisation of the horizon(s) of religion by the 
unchecked horizon of the child, driven by the child's untutored prejuOice. 
(179) 
Here Wright is recognizing both monologic poles of the continuum of whiýh 
dialogue is the optimum middle point. He sees that when individual meets 
communal faith,. dialogue between them is a delicate balancing act which, if 
maintained,. has as its creative outcome 'the further clarifying, enriching and 
developing' (179) of the individual'-s religious beliefs. 
There are many instances in the research interviews of dissonance between the 
child's horizon and an alternative religious horizon they encounter, often 
prompting new, creative ways of thinking. JE and JO find a clash between their 
Muslim peers' depiction of their god as a god of punishment and retribution and 
their own understanding of god as someone who will be forgiving and good to 
them (B332f). This difference in personalities is a reason for thinking Allah must 
be a different god from theirs (B329). TR cannot accept her Christian friends 
understanding that there is only one god because 'we've got so many',. and so the 
discussion group work explore the idea of there being one god with many 
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features (HI09f). JH finds a contradiction between his belief that God is 
everybody's god, and the religious view of 'most people my colour' who say that 
God is black, and his belief that God is 'everyone's god' (F64). In the positions 
taken by the children in these examples, they are influenced but not 'colonised' by 
encounter with a different religious horizon; they remain faithful to central tenets 
of their own faith (God's kindness, God's universality, God's plurality). It is not 
just an individual"s faithfulness to himself that is represented here, for the 'own 
faith' that the children are bringing to encounter is already rooted in the 
communal; in Christian and Hindu understandings of deity. The children's 
religious understanding is enriched by encounters with other religious horizons 
while keeping faith with the traditions by which it is historically formed. When 
the horizon of the child meets the horizon of a religion, it is not just a question of 
individual meets communat- but also of tradition meets tradition. 
Faith tradition meetsfaith tradition 
The debate about the effects of dialogue on religious traditions when they engage 
with each other can be found within Lochhead's work. Although he is a kepn 
advocate of the meeting of religions in inter-faith dialogue, Lochhead displays a 
nervousness about the possible outcomes of encounter between different religioqs. 
His book presents a lucid analysis of different forms of historical encounter 
between faith traditions and sets out the problems of these in his search for ýn 
authentic dialogue. He recognises the fears of those who are concerned about 'the 
question of faithfulness' in dialogue (Lochhead 1988,66), who worry that the 
integrity of one tradition might be compromised by meeting with another. He 
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rejects the syncretism and idiosyncratic faith stances that some have attempted in 
dialogue with other religions. If to engage in dialogue were to risk the integrity of 
one's faith in this way, then better to hold to monologue, 
If there is a threat of syncretism in the search for understanding then to 
avoid syncretism I would have to close myself to reality, to confirm the 
integrity of my faith in splendid isolation from all of life. (64) 
Clearly what Lochhead is describing here is not his perception of reality. As has 
been seen,. he abhors the idea of isolation as 'death' (79). His confidence that 
dialogue is still the good to be sought lies in the distinction he makes between 
'dialogue as negotiation' the purpose of which is agreement, and the 'dialogue of 
understanding'. It is when agreement between the dialogue partners is being 
sought that syncretism is a danger to dialogue- 
The danger of syncretism ... arises when two parties reduce their claims to 
the lowest common denominator, precisely for the purpose of reaching 
agreement (64). 
Some of the constructions of the children's dialogue in their attempts to reach 
agreement might appear syncretic or idiosyncratic to Lochhead; the image of a big 
god from whom many smaller gods derive, for example (D221). To understapd 
another tradition, however,, does not require agreement with its precepts. Though 
ccommon ground' may be found as a result of the search for understanding it is 
not, Lochhead believes,. a prerequisite without which dialogue cannot 
226 
proceed, nor should it be dialogue's goal. If partners do come to agree it will be an 
"added bonus,, 'a gift of grace' (64). The primary goal is understanding: 'In a 
dialogue I will seek to understand and to allow myself to be understood' (64). 
This understanding is more than an act of cognition: genuine understandiqg, 
which Lochhead terms 'integration', has implications for our lives and practice, it 
is something that happens not just in our heads but 'in our guts'- 'In dialogue 
more than just our theory is transformed' (67). 
To clarify the meaning of 'understanding' and 'integration' and to distinguish týis 
model of dialogue from that of 'agreement', Lochhead uses the Wittgensteinian 
concept of 'language games' and the concept of 'bilingualism' (69). The liqks 
between his theory and this terminology he sets out as 'analogous' yet the strength 
of his argument depends on the view of language on whiCh he builds. This viýw is 
now explored as I consider religious dialogue as a meeting of languages. 
Dialogue of Religious Languages 
'Language games'lo Bilingualism 
Central to Lochhead's theory of dialogue as integration rather than negotiation is 
his concern for the integrity of the different religions in a relationship of dialogue 
with each other. This integrity can be maintained if the religions are conceiveo of 
as different languages rather than different dialects of a common language- 
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If different religious traditions are but different dialects of a common 
language, then dialogue is the process by which we agree on the 
grammatical standards for the religious language. If, however, different 
religions are like different languages, then dialogue is more like the 
process by which one becomes bilingual (69) 
To support this theory that moves against the idea of a basic common language of 
religion, Lochhead draws on Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations and the 
linking of word meaning to word use: 
Wittgenstein argues that languages arise out of and derive meaning from 
their role in lik. from activity. The meaning of words cannot be deduced a 
priori. The meaning of words needs to be understood from their role in 
life,. from the "language games" in which they are used. (68) 
According to Lochhead the differing functions of words within distinct religious 
traditions means that they are part of separate language games which should not 
be confused with each other- 
Each language is considered to have its own integrity. A category of one is 
not applied to the other, or, if it is, it is soon recognized as a mistake. (69) 
The incompatibility of the 'language games' of different religious traditions has 
caused some theologians to question the very possibility of a dialogue between 
religions (Milbank 1990,174-190), but Lochhead is led by his 'dialogical 
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imperative' to find a place where religious traditions can engage in mutually 
beneficial interchange. For Lochhead dialogue is the process by which we become 
bilingual and able to function in both languages. We cannot expect to acquire 
equal facility in both languages (one of the languages remains our 'mother 
tongue'), but we can come to see the world 'through other eyes': 
One comes to understand what their categories are, how they relate to pach 
other,, how they relate to the world. (69) 
Examples Lochhead gives of words gaining their meaning from differqnt 
'language games' include the Christian concept of 'salvation' and the Buddhist 
concept of 'enlightenment' which may both denote the ultimate human experieqce 
of liberation but have very different connotations deriving their meaning from 
very different language games (69). Other examples of category errors ýre 
Christian attempts to find a quasi-deity in the Buddhist tradition, and Buddhist 
misconceptions of the role of 'meditation' in Christian traditions (78-9). 
There are several instances of the children in my project making what Lochhead 
would judge to be category errors of this nature; ascribing to Krishna the status pf 
prophet for example (D197), describing a Christian priest as 'a little god' (D299), 
employing western liberal ideas of individual choice as a critique of Islam (G355- 
7), attempting, as JN does, to fit Hindu friends views of God as plurality into 
monotheistic structures (HI 13-6), and, above all, imposing a theocentric view pf 
religion on the course of the discussions (A25 1, A261-2, E226, E234, E 112). As 
Lochhead writes- 
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The assumption of Western monotheism that religion is centered in the 
worship of God cannot be imposed a priori as the starting point of dialogue 
(63). 
In Lochhead's terms, the children's use of religious language in these examples is 
mistaken. This is not dialogue as integration- their ability to see the world through 
other eyes is limited, or, differently expressed, they are making insuffiqient 
allowance for the otherness of the other. 
Lochhead's warnings against syncretism and the misuse of religious languages 
calls into question the value much of the creative outcome of the children's 
discussions and the advisability of the particular form of dialogue in which they 
are engaged. However, examination of his theory of bilingualism exposes an 
element of paradox and suggests an alternative model of religious dialogue. 
In his reference to Wittgenstein, Lochhead denies explicitly that word meaning 
can be fixed 'a priori' and stresses the dependence of word meaning on word use 
(68). The implication of this is that word meanings are not fixed but are open to 
change. It is reminiscent of the Bakhtinian 'living word'. Yet as he proceeds to 
outline his concept of bilingualism he begins to impose restrictions on those word 
meanings. Words and phrases such a 'salvation', 'enlightenment', have derived 
their meanings from the religious traditions, the 'very different thought worlds' in 
which they originated, but this word meaning-word use link has become 
historical. In present religious discussion there are restrictions on word use and 
meaning,, there are different categories cappropriate to each particular 
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language', the words are not transferable but 'a category of one is not applied to 
another' (69). Questions such as 'Do these people worship the true GodT and 
'Does this religion lead people to salvationT, for example, are part of a 
specifically Christian language game. In fact Lochhead's religious language has 
something in common with Bakhtin's authoritative word- 
It is, so to speak, the word of the fathers. Its authority was afready 
acknowledged in the past. It is aprior discourse. (Bakhtin 1981,342) 
Lochhead does recognise that there may be some changes in one's own views as 
a result of looking at them afresh 'through the eyes of the other' (Lochhead 1989,, 
70), but his concern for 'faithfulness' and the 'integrity" of religious traditions and 
for the established historical meanings of words within those traditions imposes 
restrictions on change and introduces the monologic element of closure. 
Openness to Growth 
The problems (as understood by Lochhead) of blurring the language boundaries pf 
different religious traditions are twofold; the introduction of 'alien' categories 
from one tradition into another (as with the application of theistic language to 
Buddhism and an overemphasis on 'meditation' in Christianity (78-9), and the 
confusion about the real meanings of concepts (such as 'salvation' and 
4 enlightenment'(69)) when they are employed across religious borders. In answer 
to the former problem, the importance of religious tradition, of 'the fathers",, could 
be maintained alongside an openness to further growth if Lochhead had used 
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Wittgenstein's city analogy for language (PI 18) whereby a language can be 
complete (have integrity) and yet be open to continual development in the 
suburbs of our language 
(And how many houses or streets does it take before a town begins to be a 
town? ) Our language can be seen as an ancient city- a maze of little streets 
and squares, of old and new houses, and of houses with additions from 
various periods; and this surrounded by a multitude of new boroughs with 
straight and regular streets and uniform houses. (Wittgenstein 1978,8e) 
The analogy could be extended to add that the addition of new houses and streets 
rarely involves a break in the continuity of life in that town, a change in týe 
town's name (its identity) or in the local loyalty of Its inhabitants. A language 
does not disintegrate when new elements are introduced. There are other factqrs 
that hold it together. In the case of religion there are issues of faith and 
psychology, the ties of history, identity and loyalty (observed in the responses of 
CSI, JS,. JK for example (G236-241, G232-4, F80-2)) that bind members to a 
particular tradition and set of beliefs. According to this understanding dialogue 
between adherents of Buddhism and Christianity can develop new suburbs of 
theistic interest in the former and of contemplative meditation in the latter while 
preserving each religion's central core. JN is able to expand his faith city to 
include a suburb where he engages with God's plurality (many features') and 
retain his city centre belief in 'one god' (H 113-6). This is not the buying into 
selected truths of other traditions and adding them to one's own that Loch4ead 
dismisses as a 'trading of truths' and monological in character: 
232 
If there is an economy of truth in which each tradition "possesses" a piece 
of it, conversation between two traditions would not be dialogue but 
alternating monologues. (Lochhead 1988,75) 
As concepts and words originally rooted in other traditions are drawn into one's 
own they undergo change. Meanings are not exchanged but new meanings are 
created. Though we may remain as Lochhead hoped, 'committed and faithful 
members of our own tradition' (70) there may be a concern about the effect of 
such activity on the integrity of the religious words and concepts being assimilatpd 
into our own understanding in this way. It is Lochhead's wariness of this very 
alteration of meaning that leads him to promote dialogue as understanding (or 
'integration') as opposed to dialogue of negotiation. We thus come to Lochhead's 
second problem with the crossing of religious language boundaries. 
Negotiated Meaning 
Lochhead's bilingual model uses the word-meaning/word-use link to argue for a 
separation of religious languages, terms have emerged and concepts have derived 
meaning from their 'distinct language games'. However,, if the meaning of a 
language depends on its use, the question that needs to be asked in relation to 
Lochhead's model of religious languages is, what is the function of the religious 
words that derive from the distinct religious languages when they are brought into 
dialogical relationship with each other? For Lochhead the words' meanings ýave 
been set by their internal function within the particular religious tradition,, or 
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more specifically within the formulation of doctrine of that particular tradition,, 
thus 'enlightenment' becomes 'a state of freedom from the attachments of ego', 
'liberation from karma, from the wheel of rebirth',, 'salvation' becomes 'liberation 
from alienation% 'restoration of the broken relationships between God, humanity 
and the world' (69). These words are the same that interlocutors will bring to inter 
faith dialogue. Lochhead does not see dialogue as formulation of doctrine, its 
primary goal is understanding (65), to understand and be understood by people 
whose religious conceptual horizons are not the same. The function of the words 
in a context of understanding is different, it involves communication across a 
conceptual gap. In the previous chapter examples of the children's speech wqre 
used to support Bakhtin's claim that on transit from one position to another a word 
is doubly changed by the speaker's attempts to make the word understood, and Py 
the listener's reception of that word into an existing conceptual horizon (Chapter 
3.2.1). This contrasts with Lochhead's bilingualism which seems to imply that it is 
possible to jump from one side of the gap to the other and avoid the 'dangerous 
middle ground' altogether, rather like Bakhtin's mythical direct word that 
encounters no opposition on its path to its object (Bakhtin 1981,276). In fact it is 
in this very 'middle ground' that Lochhead's stated primary goal of dialogue, 
understanding, is achieved. 
Lochhead notes the assumptions made in much literature on dialogue that 'the 
dialogical method involves the search for "common ground". Without common 
ground ... 
dialogue cannot proceed' (60), yet distances himself from this 
(negotiation' model of dialogue with its attendant dangers of syncretism by 
replacing 'agreement' as the end of dialogue with 'understanding. 
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Whereas it is difficult, with traditions that speak in "differing languages", 
to speak of "common ground", it is not difficult in the contemporary world 
to speak of a mutual need to understand (64) 
Yet, he gives little indication of what would actually take place within a dialogVe 
between faiths as he conceives it,, and so does not address the question of how 
understanding is achieved when 'differing languages' are used. This issue of h9w 
the interlocutors can carry on effective communication when they approach the 
discussion with different conceptual horizons is at the centre of Vygotsky's 
studies of adult-child interaction,, is the basis of the notion of intersubjectivity 
referred to earlier (Chapter 3.2.4) and of Rommetveit's theory of human 
communication whereby communication transcends the 'private' worlds of the 
participants by setting up 'states of intersubjectivity. "(Wertsch 1985,159) For 
ID - 
-Rommetveit acts of communication are acts of negotiation and agreement. 
In 
order to convey and gain understanding through the medium of words some 
agreement needs to be reached about the meanings of those words- 4: 5 
The linguistic basis for this enterprise ... 
is not a fixed repertory of sharqd 
"literal" meanings, but very general and partially negotiated drafts of 
contracts concerning categorization and attribution inherent in ordinary 
language (Rommetveit cited in Wertsch 1985,160). 
There needs to be a meeting point between languages if intercommunication is to 
be possible and mutual understanding achieved. CS's use of the image of a 
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fairy is one instance among several given earlier (Chapter 3.2.4) of this 
negotiation. As a metaphor for God's action responding to humankind's activity it 
may have shifted the meaning of CS's original anthropocentric view of religion 
but helps establish a meeting point for his and JS's differing understandings of 
religion when communication was becoming difficult. The importance of 
achieving agreement on definitions of word meanings for the purposes of muttlal 
intelligibility has also been set out previously (Chapter 3.2.6). The kind of 
negotiation in which the children of the project are engaged is not a hindrance to a 
genuine dialogue of understanding, but is necessary for the process of 
communication between the religious horizons of the participants of that dialogue. 
Through this semiotically mediated "negotiation" participants in conversation set 
up, in Rommetveit's words, a 'temporarily shared social reality' (160). The 
temporary nature of that agreement is important. The function of the negotiation is 
not to fix religious doctrine but to be open to difference and otherness. References 
of subsequent encounters are not to be determined a priori by outcomes of present 
exchanges. 
'Double-voiced Discourse' 
Another weakness of the bilingualism model of dialogue is the assumption that it 
is possible to 'see the world through other eyes' (Lochhead 1988,69) and, 
operating within 'the concepts and categories of the other tradition' (70) to speak 
another's language without its vision being refracted through one's own. Again he 
ignores the fact that when spoken by someone from a different tradition, however 
conscious they are of its origins, the religious word has a different function. 
236 
The word might be used as a demonstration of general knowledge to impress the 
audience, to show solidarity with a person to whom that word is significant, to 
explain another concept through analogy. Personal involvement with the word 
cannot be the same. With this change of function comes a change of meaning. The 
word 'Allah' for example, may be 'my God' for the Muslim children, the 
addressee of their prayers, their personal creator, guide, punisher etc. When used 
by others, however extensive their understanding of Islam, or deep their empathy 
with their Muslim peers, the meaning is different. It may take on the sense of 
'your god', 'their god", or be used self consciously of God to make the point that 
the god we members of different faiths worship is one and the same. Similarly, 
though some of the children recognised and were able to use appropriately the 
word Jah'.. only for JH did it have the deep, personal significance that led to the 
autobiographical account of his naming ceremony (E199f). 
In the children's conversation there are many examples of their use of words, 
categories and concepts from traditions other than their own; some of these words 
are presented to them as part of the activities used to stimulate discussion, others 
they bring up themselves from past encounters, sometimes acknowledged 
explicitly as others' through the use of reported speech. In the reporting pf 
another's speech the reporter is often making an implicit judgement of the 
speaker's views and behaviour. Several examples have been given in an earlier 
chapter (Chapter 3.1.2) of reported cases of teasing where the indignation, outrage 
or hurt of the teller was evident. There is also incredulity in the account of the 
money fall ftom heaven (B296-7), and ridicule in the tale of the picture of a 
badger a Muslim girl feared would come to life in the middle of the night 
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(D91-3). An example of an extended use of words from another religious tradition 
outside reported speech is SN's account of the significance of the topi (C52-61) 
Here there is a degree of ambiguity about SN's use of words and concepts from 
the Islamic tradition of his peers. He may be showing respect for their religiosýty 
or, as JN interprets his speech, be making fun of them. In all the instances above,. 
to speak in the language of another religious tradition brings additional meanings 
to those words,. for the intentions of the speaker underlie their sense. The action of 
the speaker on the other's word is, to adopt Bakhtin's phrase, 'to introduce intq it 
oneýls own voice,, to refract within it one's own fresh intention'(328) Rather than 
speaking of bilingualism, it might be more appropriate to think in terms of 
Bakhtin's theory of 'double-voicedness'. Writing of the novel he sets out this 
theory whereby heteroglossia is incorPorated into the novel as 'anothers speech 
in another's language'. - 
Such speech constitutes a special type of double-voiced discourse. It 
serves two speakers at the same time and expresses simultaneously two 
different intentions- the direct intention of the character who is speakiag, 
and the refracted intention of the author. In such discourse there are two 
voices, two meanings and two expressions. And all the while these qyo 
voices are dialogically interrelated, they - as it were - know about each 
other Oust as two exchanges in a dialogue know of each other and are 
structured in this mutual knowledge of each other),. it is as if they actually 
hold a conversation with each other. (324) 
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When the words and categories of one tradition or viewpoint are employed by 
someone of another tradition they do not remain distinct fTom that second tradition 
but are brought into dialogical relation with it, 
The organic growth of languages, the requirements of'communication and the 
internal dialogism of discourse that uses the words of the other,, all militate against 
a model of bilingualism for inter faith dialogue. The rejection of a bilingual model 
in favour of a dialogical model of language use has something in common with 
Bakhtin's mythical peasant who operated within several language systems, each 
with a particular purpose (prayer, song, communication with family or with 
officialdom). These languages were not dialogically coordinated but he passqd 
from one to the other automatically: 'each was indisputedly in its own place, and 
the place of each was indisputable' (296)- 
As soon as a critical interanimation of languages began to occur in the 
consciousness of our peasant, as it became clear that these were not only 
various different languages but even internally variegated languages, that 
the ideological systems and approaches to the world that were indissolubly 
connected with these languages contradicted each other and in no way 
could live in peace and quiet with one another - then the inviolability and 
predetermined quality of these languages came to an end, and the necessity 
of actively choosing one's orientation among them began. (296) 
Just as the peasant's initial simplicity is exaggerated for the sake of argument, so 
the starting point of Lochhead's bilingual model contains more recognition of 
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inter-language relations than a straight comparison with the peasant would allow 
('one comes to understand one's own language in a more profound way by 
experiencing it in contrast to a second language' (69)), nevertheless the 
'inviolability' and 'predetennined quality' of religious languages is what the 
bilingual model sought to maintain, and the movement of the peasant's 
consciousness is away from this monologic preservation of distinct concepts apd 
categories towards a dialogue of religious languages. It also parallels the 
movement of understanding with the children of the project. They too come frpm 
a number of different worlds, home, school, peer group, family religion, encounter 
with religions of their peers. Each has its own speech patterns, concepts and 
categories, its own language, and the children learn to handle the different cultures 
and move between them. Occasionally there is an encounter or clash betwoen 
them, examples of which are reported by the children in the course of their 
conversation (D6-15, D 210-3, B305-8, F66, F80-2ý, F236-7ý, G355-7). The 
situated activity of the research discussions in particular provides the stimulus and 
context for a meeting of these languages. At that meeting, the children in the 
discussion are not learning to move between distinct language games but are 
drawing those languages into dialogue with each other and choosing thýir 
orientation among them. As the children bring together concepts of God's unity 
and plurality (HI13-6), of afterlife and reincarnation (B356f), - of gods, prophqts 
and angels (D190f), the maintenance of separate languages and very different 
thought worlds gives way to an interplay and interanimation between them. Spme 
of the outcomes of that interplay form the subject of the following two chapters. 
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MEANING 
5.1 Religious ldenýity 
The exploration of children's religious understanding in previous chapters hýs 
focused on the process by which children's understandings are formed. By contrast 
the following two chapters deal more with the content than the formation of tbýir 
understanding; with the meanings they expressed during the research discussions,, 
the 'outcomes' of their dialogue. From the transcriptions of the children's speecb I 
have drawn out what I understand to be key ideas and concepts that provide 
frameworks for their thinking on issues of religion and will set them out belqw 
under the headings 'Identity', 'Religion' and 'Theology. Before recording any 
conclusions drawn from the childrens words,, however, some consideration ngý, eds 
to be given to the status of their meanings. 
Earlier I have identified a Bakhtinian chain of utterance and response in the 
children's thought, and traced contextual influences on their understanding 
(Chapters 3.1 and 3.2). This understanding has been seen as subject to continpal 
change and movement, and dependent on the choices and selections of meaning the 
children made for Particular situated activities. The transcribed material on which 
these chapters are based does not then represent the children's thinking in general,, 
but their thought at a particular moment in time under particular circumstances. 
Recognition of this does not reduce the value of their words which are of interest 
not just for their position in a continuous movement of children's understanding,, 
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but in their own right as conclusions drawn (however provisionally) from an 
experience of encounter with religious plurality. As such they can be viewed as part 
of a wider dialogue with religious difference. 
What the children have said has already been processed by me as reader and editor 
of their discussions. I have selected particular utterances and identified links and 
dissonances between words spoken by different speakers at different times. In 
making this selection I was not only influenced by the occurrence or prominence pf 
certain ideas in the children's talk, but also by themes in the wider discourse of 
which they are a part. In this chapter the theme to be explored is that of religioýs 
identity in particular in terms of identification with established faith traditions. The 
focus of the chapter is the children's understanding of religious identity, on what it 
means to be a Hindu., Muslim,, Christian,, Sikh, and not on the children's self- 
presentation. Nevertheless this understanding is informed by their reflections on the 
origins and consequences of their own religious identity, as well as by their views 
on the identity of others. Before undertaking a survey of the understandiýgs 
expressed and produced during the course of the research activities, I set out some 
of the areas of debate within recent discourse on religious identity as a new context 
for the meanings which emerged ftom the children's discussions. 
LI Questions of Identity 
Prominent in the terminology employed by the children in their discussions were 
words denoting religious identity (Hinclu, Christian, Rastafarian-Christian, 
Muslim), used for themselves or for others. Their frequent occurrence was partly 
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due to the demands of the research activities in which the children were engaged 
(some of these terms were displayed on the word cards used to stimulate 
discussion, for example) but they were also employed by the children in other 
contexts as explanations of the behaviour of their peers towards them (1177-8, 
1190, H320f, G200f) or as grounds for their own attitudes and viewpoints on 
particular issues (H7-9, Al 10, G261-3). W-ith these terms the children positionFd 
themselves in relation to others and to the big issues of religion and belief that they 
explore in their dialogue. 
The impression given by the children was of a society (school or local communiýy) 
organized into different groups along faith lines. They displayed a strong personal 
identification with particular faiths. This sense of belonging and self-designation as 
member of a faith tradition has been the starting point of many ethnographic 
studies of children's religion, prominent among these being studies from Ihe 
Warwick Religious and Education Research Unit (e. g. Jackson and Nesbitt 1993,, 
Nesbitt 1995,, Ostberg 1998). The relationship of the individual child to ,a 
community faith tradition is also central to the presentation of religion in many 
texts for school religious education, including those produced by the Warwick RE 
Project (e. g. Barratt 1994, Everington 1996). 
.A -proaches such as the children's which position the individual 
firmly within a 
communal faith tradition, have not been without their critics, who promote 
'individual agency' above 'cultural authority' (Donald and Rattansi cited in 
Jackson 1997,84) and prefer to stress the individuality of each person's religion 
above membership of faith traditions. The Errickers, for example, express concern 
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that , in religious education, the 'small narrative' of 
individual children might be 
silenced by the power of the 'grand narratives' of the major recognised bplief 
systems (Erricker 1997,194). They write. 
It is the voices of individuals that have to be heard, rather than individulls 
speaking as representatiVes of membership groups belonging to faith 
traditions ( 195) 
This preference for the individual over the communal is present in both 
developmental and experiential models of religious understanding and has thus had 
a significant influence on a "child-centred" religious education where the teachet's 
prime task is 'to lead their pupils to find their own religious interpretation of life' 
(Erricker 1997,4) Fowler's Faith Stage descriptors display a keen interest in isstAes 
of identity, particularly in the movement from Stage 3 to Stage 4. Faith provides a 
basis for identity and outlook (Fowler 1981,172). The lower Stage 3 is depicted as 
a cconformist' stage which 'does not have a sure enough grasp on its own identity 
and autonomous judgment to construct and maintain an independent perspectivp' 
(172-3). By contrast, the more advanced Stage 4 where 'self (identity) and outlook 
(worldview) are differentiated from those of others" (182). Coming ftom a differept 
position yet also emphasizing autonomy in religion, experientialist Hammond 
writes in a 1988 essay on religion and identity of an 'individual-expressive' identily 
(Hammond 1988) which is chosen or achieved; 'finding oneself comes before 
commitment to significant groups (Murray 1991). In contrast to both of these, 
Wright refutes the 'liberal' idea where 'our identity is seen to be dependent on our 
self-understanding' (171). He argues for 'an anthropology in which identity is 
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formed via communal relationship rather than introspection' (172) and so fuels the 
debate around the comparative influence and value of communal authority and 
individual agency in the religion of the child (Chapter 2.1). 
In his study of the religious identity of young Sikhs, Murray sees this association of 
religious identity with individualism and autonomy, as a western construct that 
does not match the understanding of the young people with whom he is workipg 
(Murray 1991). In the debate religious educationalists are participating in an 
established discourse on identity which follows the lead of psychologist EOk 
Erikson, the 'father' of identity theory in the West (Murray 1991,2). Erikson 
recognized in identity relationship with self and with others. He suggests identity is 
social and psychological, conscious and unconscious- 
It connotes both a persistent sameness within oneself and a persistent 
sharing of some kind of essential character with others. At one time it will 
appear to refer to a conscious sense of individual identity; at another to P 
unconscious striving for a continuity Of Personal character; at a third as a 
criterion for the silent doings of ego-synthesis and, finally, as a maintenanpe 
of an inner solidarity with a group's ideals and identity. (1980, pl09 in 
Murray 1991,2) 
From Erikson's social/psychological dialectic, Murray draws out a reciprocity, 
bringing together the needs of individual and group within the process of identity 
formation- 
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The group confers identity on the individual often after a period of trial and 
by means of ritualisation. The individual must be willing to accept this 
conferred identity and in doing so reinforces the group's sense of its own 
identity. (Murray 1991,2-3) 
The discussion above has viewed identity in terms of relation between group and 
individual, self and others. Some of the statements recorded relate as much to 
cultural or ethnic identity as to religious. In efforts to understand the particular 
force of identification along faith lines, we need to recognize (as the children 4o) 
the influence of the individual's and the group's relationship with God. The 
significance of this relationship is acknowledged by Wright in his understanding of 
children's religion. Writing for Trinitarian Christians in criticism of the 
introspective spirituality of 'liberal religious education-, he states: 
Genuine spirituality has little to do with introspective experience, and all to 
do with our developing relationship with an objective deity (175) 
The emphasis on relationship with God and recognition of room for development 
in that relationship,, links Wright's thought to the Churches' position on religiws 
identity as set out in a 2001 discussion document from the Churches' Commission 
for Inter Faith Relations (CCIFR)- 'Religious Discrimination: A Chris(ian 
Response': 
As individuals travel on their journey with and to this God,, their inward 
convictions will almost certainly change and develop. Religious identity,. 
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therefore,, must be understood in ways that take account of this 
development and change. (CCfFR 2001,15) 
The change can go so far as to involve 'transfer ftom identification with one faith 
community to membership of another' (15). The right to make this change is seýn 
as an essential component of religious freedom and is enshrined in Human Rights 
legislation (European Convention on Human Rights, Article 9). The language pf 
rights and freedom is thus brought into discourse on identity. In political debate on 
public policy, so, too, is the language of choice. 
Parliamentary debate on the advisability of legislation outlawing religious 
discrimination,. or making incitement to religious hatred a crime, has revealFd 
different understandings of religious identity among those taking part. Supporters 
of such legislation have often drawn parallels between religious and racial or ethýc 
identities as in John Austin's contribution to a House of Commons discussion in 
March 1998: 
The argument for legislation outlawing religious discrimination is broaOly 
the same as that for legislation outlawing racial discrimination. First a 
religious discrimination law wouldbe a powerful symbol of public policy 
and would convey the important message that religious identities are valued 
and respected throughout society. (Hansard -3d Mar 1998, Col. 860. ) 
In contrast, speaking in the 2001 debate around proposals to criminalize incitement 
to religious hatred, Christopher Chope uses the concept of 'choice' to reject the 
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parallel positioning of race and religion and distinguish religious positions from the 
fixed attributes of race and colour- 
D 11 in-ace and colour are attributes with which we are bom,, and over which we 
have no choice,, whereas religious belief, or lack Of it, is a matter of choice 
and opinion. In that sense, religious belief is similar to political belief pr 
even,, dare one say, support for a football team. (Hansard - 19"h Nov 2QO I, 
Col. 69) 
The argument is that while race and colour are essential aspects of our personal 
identity over which we have no control, our religious stand is something we have 
chosen for ourselves and has no more inevitability about it than many of our qther 
life choices. 
At the time of writing it is not clear whether such legislation will be passed, 4ut 
underlying the whole debate is recognition that, as it stands,, the existence of 
separate religious identities can be a source of tension between different strata in 
our society. Our survey of the ideas expressed by the children begins with their 
consideration of inter faith group relations. In what follows it will be seen how the 
understandings of religious identity that developed during the course of the 
children's discussions dealt with the other issues detailed above, contributing 
different perspectives on the relationship of individual religion to communal; on the 
respective roles of self, other and God in deciding one"s religious allegiance; on 
links between racial and religious identity on religious freedom and choice. The 
requirements of the research project meant that the participants had to engage ýn a 
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conscious reflection and public expression of their sense of religious identity and 
their understanding of the identity of others. 
S. 1.2 Religious Identity and Communal Relations 
In the research activities the children were led to position themselves in relation to 
others. Some of the questions they formulated for use in discussions demanded this 
kind of reflexivity: "Do you think you are different from most children at schoql? 
How are you different? Do you like being in a smaller group? ". The introduction of 
religious terminology with the initial word card exercises, and the absence of 
Muslims from the interview groups, might also have contributed to the prominence 
they give to religious identity in their definition of self and of peers. Certainly they 
identified themselves readily with the Christian and Hindu faith traditions and their 
peers with Islam: 
A: Is anyone here a Christian? 
AN: Four - these two are fEndus. 
CA: Most people in this school are Muslims. (A120-2) 
DK: I'm the only one in my class who's ffindu - the rest are Muslim (16) 
A sense of being different from other children in the school could be explained by 
difference of religious identity, with all it entails. 
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CS: I think a small group of us do feel different because it's - they've got 
sort of different ways of life and different times when they do things ald do 
different things - do different things from us. 
JI: So which people are you talking about when you say 't4ey'? 
CS: Mostly the Muslims. (G6-1 0) 
The sense of separation along religious lines came out quite sharply in the 
children's retelling of their experiences. Religious identity was understood to be a 
powerful tool for social organisation within the school. The children felt they wýre 
included in or excluded from different peer groups because of their religious 
identity. The role of religion in social tensions between the children was frequently 
remarked upon. Religious identity was seen as a common ground for teasing and 
for discrimination (H248-250). For the white and black children, the clýse 
association of their colour with their Christian religion meant that it was sometimes 
difficult to distinguish between racial and religious disciimination in incidents tlýey 
reported (H257-8, H160-4), but the case of the Ifindu population of the school,. 
who shared the Gujarati language and ethnicity of most of their Muslim classmates, 
indicated that religious identity was a major determining factor in inter group 
relations. There is recognition of this in the sympathetic comment made by Al 
(himself of African Caribbean origin) on the experiences of his Hindu friends- 
Al: Because like you're one colour but most people are a different kino to 
you and you're the odd one out. (I 10- 11) 
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The Hindu children spoke of being 'the odd one out' or 'left out' because of thpir 
religious identity (H273,112-3). SH recalls not being allowed to join in a football 
game by some Muslim children because he was Hindu (HI 82-3), and AK 
remembers being teased in class as the only Hindu among Muslims- 
AK: In Year 3- in Year 2 and Year 31 was the only ffindu in our class 
and the Muslims they used to say 'Our god is better than yours' and used to 
tease me. (G200-202) 
The children reported the role of religious identity in power relations betwqen 
groups at school and in the wider community. SC outlined how they work in 
practice in the playground through the employment of 'back up' defineo by 
religion- 
SC: Like if it's a Christian against someone like a Muslim, the Christiqns 
will help the Christians and the Muslims will go and help the Muslims. 
(1177-8) 
The wider community served by the schoof is described by JH, JK and RA in terms 
of religious groupings with the large Muslim group exercising dominant influence 
over the area. They described what they understand to be a Muslim takeover of tpe 
district, and proceeded to criticize the Hindus and Christians for their laziness in 
allowing this to happen. Here and in the discussion of relations between children at 
the school, they bound the language of religious identity to that of segregation, and 
inter-communal tension. They gave it a significant role in social relations and Made 
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it a public as well as a private concern. They themselves explored the idea of 
political regulation as a possible solution to the problems they were discussinF. 
Another way out of the 'fights' and 'fuss' put forward by CS, is the dissolution of 
existing distinctions of religion and the establishment of a new universal religion. 
People should 'just settle your differences and all be the same' (GIOO-101). This 
very general model,, however, ignores the strength of the ties that bind peoplý to 
their existing religious traditions. 
In more individual terms, I put it to the chitdren that they might consider improving 
their own situation by changing their religious identity, themselves becoming 
Muslims and joining the majority so they would no longer be subject to the sort pf 
discriminatory behaviour they had been describing (H282-3, G227-8). None of 
those asked would consider this option for themselves. Social inclusion could npt 
be effected through an easy realignment of religious affiliation. For them religious 
identity did not just determine where they stood in reldtion to those of differqnt 
iaith traditions but seemed to have a stronger hold. The responses given to my 
question were affirmations of their own religious identity as an integral part of who 
they were: 
TR: I'm happy the way I am (H2§5) 
ST: I'm proud of what I am (11286) 
JS: I'm happy what God made me (G232) 
252 
5.1.3 Distinguishing between Religious Identities 
While there was general agreement among the children about the social 
significance of religious identity and its determining role in community relations, 
there was a greater diversity of views on the criteria by which it was possible to 
distinguish different faith groups from each other. They were very ready to ascribe 
particular religious identities to different children at school but found it harder jo 
explain how members of different traditions could be so easily identified. A variety 
of criteria were put forward occasionally to be rejected as inadequate by other 
members of the discussion group. An example is the following exchange where the 
children suggested racial, cultural, linguistic, physiognotnic , ideological criteria to 
use when distinguishing Christians ftom Muslims, and also found problems with 
some of these- 
A: Could you tell if someone was a Christian or not just by fookiqg at 
them? 
CA: I couldn't 
CS: I could -I could - 
BT: By their face, if they're white. 
DY: By their clothes - their clothes. 
BT: if they're black. 
AY: It depends -I think it depends on your ears. 
CA: You can't - some people might be Muslims but they look like 
Christians. 
DY: It depends on your clothes. 
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BT: You've got small ears - yoWve got small ears - yo. u've got small ears 
AY: No sir -I can tell his ears because they're quite small 
CA: The way they speak. 
CS: It depends on their personality - how they walk, what clothes they 
wear,, how they talk and their ideas they've got - they develop how they 
look. 
CA: The way they speak 
CS: No, some Christians have different languages (A95-114). 
Race 
As has been seen, parallels and distinctions have been made between religious and 
racial identity in the debates around possible legislation against religious 
discrimination and incitement to religious hatred. The relationship between theýe 
identities is something considered by the children themselves. The correlation of 
religion, culture and race evident in the Words of some members of the criscussiQn 
group above, was also evident in other exchanges. The language of religion often 
merged with that of racial, ethnic and cultural diversity: 
JS: I'm happy what God made me and if he made me Muslim, whatever - 
whatever he makes me - you know, whatever culture he makes me like 
Indian or Red Indian or African,. I'd be proud of what he made me. (G232- 
4) 
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The children frequently expressed an understanding of religious identity as 
something with which they were indeed born. The sense of religious identity fis 
being predetermined in the way that race IS,, came across strongly M several 
contributions. In a conversation overheard in one classroom,, AYs younger sistýr, 
SP,, was clear that it was dependent on parentage rather as though religious identity 
was passed on in the genes- 
SP: Being a Christian is like when your Mum's white or your Mum's býack 
or your Dad's white or your Dad's black 
Some of the concepts associated with racial difference were attached to religion in 
the children's thought. The term 'racist' was readily applied to those who teased, 
criticised or discriminated against another's religion (F270-1, H152'-3, F461-ý), 
Instances of discrimination on grounds of religion, and on grounds of colour, were 
associated together in the discussions: 
SH: Some people don't let other people play because they're different 
religions. 
AY: I know, that's honible. 
TR: They don't let me play. I think that's racist. 
AY: And they wouldn't let me play, and I say, 'Just because I'm white' 
(H160-4). 
The concept of 'mixed race' or 'dual heritage' had its religious counterpart. Frqm 
the idea of religion as something inherited it followed logically that complexities in 
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family life and mixed partnerships could lead to complex religious identities. 
Conscious of dual heritage in race, CS and AY applied the same rules to religion: 
CS: I'm half Muslim because my aunty's boyfriend is Muslim (classroom 
conversation). 
AY: I'm only half Christian. My Dad says I'm Christian but my Mum says 
I'm Church of England (C90-9 1). 
The easy paralleling of religious and racial identity had its critics among the 
children,, however. Whether or not religious identity could be halved or quartered 
along the same lines as race, became an issue for debate between AY and ýer 
classmates JN and ST, who both felt that religion was more than this. For the boys 
either you are or you are not a Christian, there are no half measures. The gebetic 
model does not work- 
SN: How can you be half a Christian? 
JN: You have to be Christian or not Christian. 
SN: You can't be half a Christian. 
JN: If you're half a Christian you cut your body in half and say, 'I'm half a 
Christian'. (H3 13 -7) 
The association of race and religion had been further weakened by children's 
school experience involving encounter with Muslims of different racial origin and 
11(y. 
recognition that many of the Muslims and Hindus shared the same Indian ethnici . 
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Al: If you come to school and see all different Indians you don't know if 
they're Muslim or Hindu. 
S-. Miss, 'cos some people can be white and they're Muslim like lfýt [a 
Bosnian classmate]. 
Al: Some people can be black and they're Muslim (123-7) 
Practice 
In attempts to define terms of religious identification, some of the discussion 
groups referred to different religious and cultural practices. Dress was one of these 
(A99). The children quoted above stated that 'it depends on your clothes'. and J$s 
account of the conversion of a woman he knew to Islam expressed clearly the link 
between a change of religious identity and change of dress (G259-9). For othýrs 
the important differences of practice concerned attendance at places of worship 
and celebration of festivals- 
SH: Muslim goes to mosque, flindu goes to a temple, Christian goes to a 
church. (C5) 
B: A Christian? 
DY: Someone who doesn't celebrate 'Id,, Diwali aýd - 
AN: Ramadan. 
DY: Ramadan. We celebrate Christmas and believe in God aild - 
CS: And celebrate Carnival and Easter (A83-7). 
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Even with rebwous practice the &stinctions i& ere not ctear cut as the children 
recognized diversity, %ithin tradifions: 
DY: Christians haN e diffierem religions -I nx-An. they do differmt things at 
differeW fmim like somefimes they don't k-neel dawn, [o pray (ASSO-04-1 
They also relate instances of the shariniz of practices and celebrations acro-ý,, s faith 
gmps JK recaUs Nfuiýý,, Joining Diwah Mebrations: and JH relates hi-s 
at the dance skW of a goup of StVhs parficipating in the citv-s, -Affican 
Canlkean 
Camival- 
JK: Some of m-% frien(6- who. are Nfuslim the\ ssaN they go to ouir occasion 
and celebrate as w elL vou knou - with stick 
dances - the% even ýzo u ell 
(. F-% 4-25)- 
JH: 1-, %e seen quite a lot of Sikks joining in the carniual --- 
Becau-se la-q 
year Sim& religion, they joined the cannival la-st Near and they carne 
But most people think that many people can-t danm but -%-h4m you 
- ve 
-SeM 
them dance thev dance vt-a - thev weire -: 3cwallv mo-%inQ at the beat and 
that (F 
f. 
During the course of the the A,. -w-w was vqxvssed that reLýZic--, us- idtntitv 
I 
, %-a. s more than membership of a par&-War group or an aczidenm. of' t=n 
entailed commitment to certain beliefs and values. JE and JO defined 'Christian' in 
terms very different from those used by AY. For them you could not tqll a 
Christian from appearance- 
JI: Do you know what it means to be a Christian? 
JO: Believe in Jesus. 
A: So who is Jesus, - then?.. 
JO: He's our God. 
JE: He's our God's son (B28-33). 
Speaking of the Hindu religion with which he identifies, YN defined 'Hindu' in 
terms of 'a religion that believes in a lot of gods' (E 112). That identification witlý a 
religious tradition involves conformity of individual belief to communal, is 
acknowledged several times in the children's words (eg. E36-37). The impressign 
given by some of the children's statements is of religious identity as something that 
determines belief rather than being detern-fined by it. Religious identity is seen as a 
reason for believing in the unity or plurality of God, for example. 
JN: Because I feel like that what they teach us at my church - that therq's 
only one god, because I'm a Christian so I feel I should always go to 
church, I don't really want to go to a mosque (H7-9). 
From the perspective of another faith community, TR stated that she and her fellow 
Hindus cannot subscribe to a view of God as one, her use of the first person plural 
emphasising the communal nature of her belief 
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TR: Mss,. we can't actually say that because we've got so many gods 
(HI09). 
PR uses the plural to the same effect: 
PR: We've got hundreds of gods, man! (B4Z4) 
Religious identification was also associated with a particular stand on practical 
ethics in a discussion of the harsh corporal punishment meted out in some moýque 
schools- 
JH: That's wrong. That's wrong. 
YN: Miss, that's wrong. 
JH: That's wrong to hit. 
NA: In I-Endus we never do that. They treat us fairly. I think in Christian 
people they don't do that. 
JH: In Christians they don't do that (E246-25 1). 
In these statements the children were speaking from communal experience and 
with communal knowledge. The children's understandings of religious identity 
recorded above have more in common with Wright's notion of identity as socially 
constructed (Wright 2000,172) than the Errickers' emphasis on the 'individual 
voice' (Erricker 2000,204). Though the children's religious thought showed a 
marked degree of autonomy and a preparedness to move outside the faith 
traditions with which they identified (F58-9, F240-1, F245-6, H230-1), their use of 
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the terms Christian and Hindu in conjunction with issues of belief indicated that 
identification with a religious tradition meant acceptance of an authoritative 
religious canon, for the Christians belief in one God and in Jesus, for the Hinous 
belief in a plurality of Gods (see the discussion of the 4: authoritative word', Chapter 
3.1.3). Perhaps because of their limited knowledge of the teachings of the 
traditions to which they belonged, the children rarely tackle issues raised by 
diversity of beliefs within those traditions. 
5.1.4 Reasonsfor different Religious Identities 
SWing the same 
So far the understandings of religious identity that have been considered qre 
descriptive, the question being how a Christian, Muslim or Hindu could be 
identified or defined. Other understandings that emerged from the discussions wqre 
more in the character of explanations, reasons why in the plural community in 
which they live, the children acknowledge a particular religious identity and qot 
another. The degree to which people are free to choose their religious identity is a 
major issue here linking the children's meanings with wider discourses of religious 
freedom and choice. 
Explanations for holding to a particular religious identity were often offered by the 
children in the context of dialogical encounter with the different identity of their 
Muslim peers, sometimes to defend themselves against criticism of their fa#, 
sometimes in the face of moves to convert them to Islam. JE identifies two such 
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attempts to embrace Christians within Islam, both of which provoke indignation on 
his part- 
JE: One time my fiiend was telling me. He was trying to tell me the prayer 
of a Muslim,. to tum me into a Muslim. He tned to tell me some prayer to 
turn me into some Muslim ... 
He's not turning me into a Muslim! I stay 
Christian! (B316-320) 
JIE: Yeah, they're saying Christians ... they say we're 
Allah's children 
they're trying to say I'm Allah's children! ... they say 
Allah made 
everything! 
PR: He made us. 
PT: He made even the Christians and children and all them (B421-9). 
None of the children who discussed the possible transfer from identification with 
one faith community to membership of another (CCIFR 2001,15), saw this aý a 
likelihood for themselves. In the face of criticism of their faith,. or of evangelising 
overtures from Muslim peers, some bound their own religious identity to thoir 
relationship with God. The Churches' discussion document quoted earlier 
employed a teleological 'journey towards God' formula to explain the fluidity pf 
religious identity in developmental terms (15). In the research discussions children 
expressed an understanding of relationship with the divine in terms of coming from 
God and used causation theories to explain the unchanging nature of their identity. 
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One view of religious identity as being God-given retains an idea of God as one, 
while he is prepared to assign diverse religious identities to his creatures. This is 
the view expressed by JS above where he was quoted as attributing his Christian 
identity to God's decision when he was made (G232). God could have made him 
as a Christian or a Muslim; he chose to make him as a Christian. In their 
discussion, JE and his friends, on the other hand, countered their Muslim 
classmates' suggestion that they were Allah's children, with a plural understanding 
of God, different gods making different faith groups. It is an understanding sharýd 
by other children in separate dialogues. The impression given is that people are 
'locked' into particular religious identities and the idea of changing these after the 
initial creative act was portrayed as absurd. 
JE: Their god made us? - No! Our god made us, their god made them - 
Muslims' god made them (B43 0- 1). 
JO: How could [Allah] make the Ffindus and Christians? What did 
someone go off and say J don't want to be Muslim% and then someone 
went J don't want to be Musfim, I want to be Christian -I don't want to 
be Muslim,. I want to be HinduT (B43 2-3 5) 
In these contributions, it was God who determined what religion his creatures 
would belong to,, God's purposes for humans rather than human responses to God 
decided religious identity. Other understandings expressed by the children did 
allow for more human agency in their religious identity, for example in the 
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following instances when they were reporting criticism made by Muslim children of 
their religious choices- 
JS: [They say] all the Christians are going to Hell because they haven't pt 
the real - because they've chose god what they want and that ain't the right 
god (G215-6). 
The jealousy of the Christian God imputed to the Muslims by JS,, implieq an 
element of choice but still favoured constancy over change- 
JS: I think they're jealous because they think, 'Oh, that - yeah their god's 
true but I should appreciate what god I've got and I can't step back. ' 
(G244-5) 
In the latter quote JS combined the givenness of one's religion ('what god I'ye 
got') with a response of acceptance (I should appreciate'); a combination he 
included in his account of his own religious identity, T' m happy what God ma0e 
me ... 
I'd be proud what he made me' (G232-4). With choice, appreciation, happy 
and proud acceptance, he introduced the concept of religious allegiance inýo 
religious identity. In similar vein several of the children, Christian and Flindu 
describe their reactions to negative comments from Muslim children in terms of 
their loyalty to their own God (B412-9,, F 115-7). 
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The children's religious identity was not only decided by allegiance to their God 
but also by allegiance to family. When asked why he wants to stay Christian, in 
spite of pressure from Muslim fiiends to change his religion, JE replies- 
JE: Because my family's Christian (B-322). 
While other children spoke of their commitment to their 'family' religion (1150f, 
G33 If), CS's expression of such commitment was the most detailed- 
CS: I'm proud of who I am because really it's my ancestors that started 
this and I'm going to carry it on for them because ... 
I just feef sorry for 
them because they were slaves and I don't want that to happen again - 
people to be slaves and not this time by colour but by religion and colour - 
both (G236-241) 
There is a strong sense of inherited identity in CS"S words, but not the kind pf 
fixed, genetic inheritance, the association of religion and race, reported earlier. He 
was speaking in the context of an exchange that recognised the possibility pf 
changing the religious identity received at birth, and immediately before he 
reported instances of people who had converted. The option to change religiops 
identity was there in his understanding; the forces that resisted such change were 
those of loyalty. I-Es relationship lArith his family tradition demonstrates the groqp 
solidarity of Erikson's identity model and the reciprocal relationship noted by 
Murray (1991,2-3). CS's ancestors started the tradition of which he is proud, and 
he takes it upon himself to safeguard that tradition for them. 
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When the children were asked whether they would consider a change of religious 
allegiance, all who recognised that change was an option showed a sirnijar 
conservatism as regards their own religious identity, a loyalty and pride in the 
tradition into which they had been bom (H282-6, G227f). Religious identity was 
inherited but not foreclosed. It was passed down through the family but it was up 
to the children as individuals whether or not they would accept and continue that 
tradition. 
Change 
While all who discussed the issue of conversion were sure of the fixity of their own 
religious identity, several of these same children allowed a flexibility in the identity 
of others. The children were aware of instances where people had taken the step of 
changing their religious allegiance, had made 'a socially visible transfer from 
identification with one faith community to membership of another' (CCfFR 20Q I, 
15). Some of these were people close to them, CS's aunt (or sister), for example. 
In their discussion of instances of conversion from one refigion to another, CS and 
JS were aware of the significance of the step these people had taken. Changes of 
lifestyle, clothes and diet were part of the process of- adopting a new reFi&ious 
identity 
JS: The lady [who converted] had a sister, and she gave all her good 
clothes to her sister, and she took all the Hindu clothes,, and now she's a 
Hindu (G258-9). 
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CS: And before my sister [aunt] actually got married she had to have a 
special bath and everything, and being blessed - but I think actual being a 
Christian is sort of better because you - you know, you can eat any food 
you want, any drink, can really do anything (G260-3). 
In spite of their insistence that they themselves would not change religious identity, 
the boys did not disapprove of those who have made this step, as long as it was 
done for the 'right reasons. One acquaintance 'turned Muslim' as part of her 
involvement in the drugs scene (G264) and so her conversion is not approved of 
CS was very insistent that his aunt did not 'turn into Muslim by force' nor just 
because her boyfriend was a Muslim, but it was her own independent decision 
based on reason and as such was a positive move- 
CS: Some people do tum into Muslims by fQrce. 
JS: Like your aunty did. 
CS: My aunty didn't turn into Muslim by florce. 
JS: Because her boyfriend - 
CS: She actually done it by herseff 'cos she could've told him, 'Oh, why 
don't you become a ChristianT, but instead she just went and be a Muslim 
- she was reasonable (G247-253). 
Though he showed some confusion between Islam and FEnduism, JS gave a clear 
description of a 'reasonable' change of religious identity: 
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JS: Once there was this woman. She went out with a Hindu and sort of like 
- the lady, she went in the library and she was a Christian and her boyfriend 
was a Hindu. In the library she looked [for] this Quran book and she took it 
up - she wanted to know how he differed from her and she read the woole 
book and ... now she's a 
fEndu (G254-9). 
In both examples the fact that the convert is acting on her own initiative was 
stressed. Their position in the text means they serve as counter examples to the 
idea of forced conversions; examples of individuals acting on the universal right to 
change their religion and belief, that essential component of full religious freedom 
(Article 9 ECHR). 
Freedom of religious choice for others was acknowledged elsewhere in exchangps 
where the children considered what their reactions would be if, at some time in the 
future, they should find their own children wished to change religious allegiance- 
Al: I'd be very upset but it's up to them. 
SC: Nfiss,. because they're the ones that have got to live with it. I'd try to 
persuade them not to but if they didn't want to I'd just leave them to go. 
Al: Yeah,, 'cos it's really their choice, innit7 
DK: You would try to stop them but if they want to it's their choice. 
SC: It's their life. 
DK: They might not like it if we forced them to believe in what we say and 
things (115 6-162). 
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In this mixed group, Christian and Hindu children weighed the respective claims of 
family religious tradition and children"s right to decide for their own lives, and 
concluded in favour of religious freedom. In their discussion on the same question, 
CS and JS came up with the same sense of the need to respect the choice of the 
individual as against family tradition. 
CS: I think if my kids sort of disagreed I'd try to reason with them, but if I 
couldn't it would be difficult. 
JS: I'd sort of like - if they didn't understand it what our family religion - 
our religion, yeah, and they never wanted to - what I'd do really, either 
discuss it with them,, if they never - or I'd just take them churc4 or 
something. 
CS: Yeah, but that would probably be offensive to them if they wantqd to 
be a different religion (G340-6). 
Loyalty and Liberty 
In all of these instances, the real examples and hypothetical situations, the choices 
made entailed movement outside the inherited traditions and so contrasted strongly 
with the children's own allegiance to their religious origins. Though they expresýed 
unhappiness about the choices, they approved of the way the choices were (or 
would have been) made. In the children's words both the principles of loyalty and 
of liberty were upheld. This combination of a fixed religious identity for themselves 
and tolerance of free choice and movement in the religious identity of others (even 
others from within one's own community or family) echoes the 'private certitude 
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and public uncertainty' duality that Ninian Smart saw as a characteristic of the 
modem open society (Smart 1991,93f) where the individual can have inner 
conviction of the correctness of her worldview and yet accept that, because there is 
fteedom to differ, this view cannot have certainty in the public arena. 
Smart also goes some way to resolving the tensions between communal and 
individual, agency and authority with which this section began with a modql of 
individual acceptance of communal authority: 
It is of course hard in fact to insulate a community, and for this reason the 
solvents of modernity are likely to enter in, and the authority within the 
community becomes individualized - it is a matter of a group of indiviquals 
agreeing to recognize a given authority (Smart 1991,93). 
This compares with the pnnciple of assent to the 'authoritative worcr set out in 
Chapter 3.1 and relates closely to the understandings that emerged from the 
children's discussions of examples of transfer of religious allegiance. What the 
children have to add from their own experience and understanding is 
acknowledgement of the difficulty of such moves both for those who make them 
and for those who are left behind. Though religious identity has an element of 
choice, it does not bear glib comparison with allegiance to a football team, nor is it 
simply a matter of religious conviction of the rightness or otherwise of the religion 
one adopts. JS and CS commended moves made on the basis of reason and study, 
but also recognised the strong forces that ran counter to change and that held them 
to the religion into which they had been bom; the forces of continuity, the inherited 
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nature of religious tradition and the sense of responsibility for the safeguarding of 
that tradition. The power of these forces over the children's own thinking might 
explain the concern they expressed over the possibility of their children not 
following in the family religion. The concepts 'persistence', 'continuity' and 
(maintenance',, used in Erikson's definition,, have a place, then, in the children's 
understanding of religious identity as part of their historicaf selves. 
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5.2 Religion and Theology 
The previous chapter's examination of religious identity drew attention to the children's 
awareness of religion as a distinguishing feature of their own and others' experience and 
identity. This chapter considers further the understandings of religion that emerged in the 
research. It sets out some of the phenomena seen by the children as integral to refigioqs. 
It also explores the relationship between the children's understandings of religion and 
their understanding of God, thus bringing their dialogue into the context of discussions 
on how theological activity interacts with that study of different religious traditions that 
came to be termed 'comparative religion' or "religious studies' in the educational apd 
academic world (Lott 1987,1). The terms of the discussions are set out briefly below 
before the children's contributions are explored. 
5.2 1 Contrasting Approaches 
Religious Studies and Theology 
The historical relationship between the theological and'religious studies approaches hRs 
commonly been seen as one of divergence (Lott 1987, Whaling 1985). Eric Lott, for 
example, traced a 'deep-seated tension in the relationship of theology to religious studQsl, 
back to the emergence in the late 19th century of 'scientific' investigation of religion- 'a 
deliberate attempt to disengage from the restraints of theological commitment and to 
develop a discipline that would be quite distinct from theology' (7). Increasing contact 
with religious plurality provided impetus for the development of new methodologies in 
the study of religion. Prime movers in the study of religions were initially European 
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Christian missionaries encountering, comparing and explaining the existence of, different 
traditions in other parts of the world. Further impetus for the movement came fis 
opportunities for inter religious encounter multiplied through the growth of non Christian 
faith communities within the United Kingdom itself In a rapidly shrinking planet, 
religious studies are, according to Smart and Konstantine, a 'major mirror' of the 'global 
world' in which we now live (1991,20). 
The methodological implications of the religious studies movement were wide ranging. It 
resulted in a broadening of the scope of the study of religion to include history, 
phenomenology, sociology, anthropology, art history and various other methods or 
approaches (19). A moral grounding for religious studies was found in the promotion pf 
empathy, 'gathering the data and mustering the imagination so that we may know what it 
is like to be the other' (Smart and Konstantine 1991-,. 3-0). It was strongfy infTuenced- by a 
pluralist ethic that demanded the principles of respect for diversity, tolerance of differing 
views and equity in their representation, be upheld. The study of different religiops 
traditions was to be carried out 'without fear or favour' (19). In particular, in a 
postcolonial world, favour was not to be shown to Western perspectives. Smart and 
Konstantine wrote of 'a world language about religions and worldviews which can be 
used to rid the study of religions of its too Western clothing(50). 
Basic distinctions have been made between the object and methodologies of the two 
fields of study. While theology concentrates on God or Ultimate Reality, Religýous 
Studies has an anthropocentric concern, in Frank Whaling's words it is concerned with 
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The religious phenomena of man, and man in his religious dimension ... not 
directly with transcendence, but with man"s response to transcendence. (Whaling 
1995ýý 207) 
The meaning-concern of theology is the pursuit of truths (5). In this pursuit it is usually 
bound to the faith of the theologian, grounded in his faith tradition whether as 
affirmation, criticism or revision. As such,, then, theology is usually normative, particutgr 
and partial (2). By contrast the aim of the religious studies approach is not to evaluate the 
truth claims of the traditions with which it works. Smart and Konstantine wrote of-the 
distinction between the theological and religious studies methodologies when they set out 
the principles of what they term 'the modern study of religion' 
We are often more interested in the truth of ideas rather than their power, 
especially in the case of religions and ideologies. But the primary emphasis of the 
modern study of religion is on the descriptive and historical mode of approaching 
the phenomena, without importing into the study normative assumptions (we 
hope) from any one tradition. (29) 
Thus religious studies, as opposed to theology, tends towards a descriptive approaqh 
(Lott 87,6), and strives to be pluralist and impartial. (Whaling 1995, cited in Lott 1987,. 
3) 
While many, Lott asserts, 'seem content merely to assert the crucial difference betweýn 
these two approaches, and leave the gap as wide as possible'(Lott 1987,1), over the last 
two decades attempts have been made to bring them together (Whaling 1985, Lott 1987, 
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Smart and Konstantine 1991). In his 1987 book, 'Vision, Tradition, Interpretation'. Lott 
argued for recognition of the interdependence of the two approaches while maintaining 
methodological distinction between them (253). He sees an overlap between the 
theological and the sociological / scientific understanding both because of the orientation 
towards God (or the transcendent) of the religious phenomena being studied: 
In particular, scientific investigation must incorporate, as evocatively as posslbfe, 
the integrating sacred Focus which participants in religious traditions see as of 
crucial significance. (Lott 1987,254)' 
The scholar's accounts of the significance of the sacred object in the tradition being 
studied will depend to some degree on his own (theological) understandings of its r9ality 
and power. Because of this,, 
In the ultimate analysis scientific accounts of religious life, being necessarily 
interpretive of meaning, function in some ways analogous to theological 
interpretations 
... there 
is in common the attempt to provide an account of the 
meaning of what may be seen as some 'hidden' reality of the concerned 
tradition(s). (255) 
Studies of religions are affected by the prior theology of those being studied or doing týe 
studying, and also set the scene for new and creative theologies. Responses to religious 
plurality have included movements towards universal theologies which incorporate týe 
diversity of faith traditions into their understanding of God's being and activity. Among 
these theologies a distinction has been made (Ipgrave 2002) between constructioný of 
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theologians such as John Hick (An Interpretation of Religion, 1989), who aim to work 
from a perspective that is above faith traditions, and those theologians who, like S. Mqrk 
Heim (The Depth of the Riches, 2001), consciously work from within a faith tradition. 
The work of Ninian Smart and Steven Konstantine is also relevant here. Their boQk, 
Christian Systematic Theology in a World Context (199 1), set out an ambitious model for 
a new Christian doctrinal scheme which draws on themes and ideas from a plurality of 
traditions. The authors understand religious studies to take place on two levels; the 
descriptive level of worldview analysis with its emphasis on the influence, rather than the 
truth,, of religious ideas, and the philosophical level of worldview construction where 
critical reflection and normative judgement play a part (33). Worldview analysis is tPe 
C prelude' (50), it provides the background, the content, the categories for the theological 
activity of world view construction. 
Phenomenological and fheological Religious Education 
The tension between a normative, particular, partial approach to religion and a 
descriptive, pluralist, impartial approach has percolated through to the level of religious 
education. In the position of religious studies stands the '*phenomenological' model and a 
curriculum based on the study of 'world faiths'. It is grounded in a rather truncated 
version of the 'Schools Council Lancaster Secondary RE Project' associated with Smart. 
Of the different types of interaction advocated by the Lancaster school the type that came 
to characterise the project was the first: 
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To study the tradition" s self understanding in an empathetic and non-evaluatýve 
manner bracketing their own presuppositions and opinions (cited in Grimmit 
20001ý 27). 
Though the Lancaster Project contained within it a dialogue between an 'implicit' RE 
concerned with the search for meaning, and 'explicit' RE concerned with the detailed 
phenomena of religion, the phenomenological approach was commonly viewed as 
cnarrowly descriptive and content-centred' (Grimmit 2000,28), concentrating on 
information about the world"s religions, often going no deeper than exterior 
manifestations of religious behaviour (Erricker 2000,192). In opposition to this world 
view analysis, world view constructivist models of religious education have boen 
developed whereby pupils work from within their personal experience (or narrative) to 
construct their own religious meaning (Errickers et al 1997) and to evaluate alternative 
interpretations of experience in the light of their own (Grimmit 2000). 
Other models reject both the superficiality of a descriptive approach and the 
individualism and relativism of constructivist approaches, to advocate an explicitly 
theological quest for truth. Like Lott, proponents of theological models see theology 
the heart of the traditions being studied and in the assumptions that scholars bring to the 
study. The Stapleford Project, for example, (Cooling 1994a) starts from a recognition of 
Christianity's 'Integrating sacred Focus' (Lott 1987,254) by giving greater attention to 
'the theological concepts which are the source and meaningfulness and significance for 
Christians' (Cooling 2000,153). In defence of his 'critical religious education', Andrew 
Wright tackles the assumptions behind studies which treat religions as embodying 
equally valid expressions of a common religious experience. To take this liberal stand, he 
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argues, is to adopt a particular theological position (Wright 2000,172). Wright's 'critical 
religious education' is based on the 'emergent theology" of the pupils (Wright 20QO,, 
as assimilated from significant others in their lives, and on their ability to make 
informed and critical responses to the various truth claims they encounter: 
It is pupils' ability to take part in an informed, critical, sensitive and ideologically 
aware conversation about the nature of ultimate reality, of their relationships 'to 
this reality, that marks the heart of religious literacy, and the fundamental aim of 
the pedagogy of critical religious education (Wright 2000,180). 
In contrast to the quantitative pluralism by which a plurality of religious traditions are 
presented as related and compatible within a common phenomenological framework, 
Wright poses a qualitative pluralism which accepts the ambiguous, controversial and 
conflicting nature of theological truth claims (177). The contrast between the two will 
inform our analysis as we turn to the children's understandings of religion and theology. 
These understandings are formed against a background of plurality which at the same 
time widens the scope of the children's religious knowledge and challenges the certitudes 
of their inherited world-views. 
5.2.2 Religion: a descripfive approach 
Religious response 
Alongside the meaning the children give to the word 'religion' I shall also consider thýpir 
use of the adjective, 'religious *) , which was given as one of the prompts for their group 
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discussions. In their employment of both terms the children often conformed to a 
Religious Studies approach, with an emphasis on the description of religious phenomena, 
on human rather than divine activity. In some cases religiousness was portrayed as a 
human response of belief and obedience to God (A25 1, A261-2)- 
JH: [a religious person] is like a holy person. They believe in God. 
YN: All the time. 
JH: And don't disobey his rules (E226-8) 
In others,, religiousness meant response to religions, believing in religions (A253), doing 
'what's in their religion' (E240), 'following' their religion (E237). In one exchange the 
idea was put forward that religiousness entailed no more than 'having' a religion. JA saw 
herself as religious because she was a Hindu and defined 'religious person' in these 
terms. 
JA: It's a person that has a religion, like it might be a Muslim, a ffindu, a 
Christian 
... or a 
Sikh. (B540-2) 
Elsewhere in the discussions,, however, religious identity alone did not confer 
I 
4 religiousness'-, membership required an active response. Within a religion members 
could be more or less religious according to the degree of their commitment (i. e., the 
extent of their practice, their knowledge, or their belief); religiousness was measurable. 
NI defines 'religious' as someone who 'believes a lot in own their religion' (D44-5); RA 
thought she was only 'a little bit' religious because she rarely attended church (DI02-3) 
and JE saw religiousness as dependent on having a sufficient knowledge of religion, He 
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was not convinced by the understanding implied in JA's words, that all Muslims or all 
Hindus were religious: 
JE: I don't know, because some people don't know about anything - they just 
know a little. (237) 
Religious Phenomena 
This idea of a sound knowledge of religion being a basis for religiousness,, was supportýd 
by another child, who viewed teachers as religious people 'because they know about 
everyone 71 s religion' (A299). This time religiousness was measured by knowledge pf 
other people's religions and not just of one's own. In another exchange, knowing about 
other people's religions was given priority. It was put forward as a recipe for toleranFe 
and as the benefit to be gained from education at a school with a religious and cultural 
mix 
JH: I can learn about all of them so I know that when I grow up I know about 
everyone and know that their gods - who they are, and I won't be racist (F281-2). 
The understanding of religion favoured by the children here is content-centred; therq are 
things about religions that people need to know and to know just a little is not enough. 
This kind of content knowledge of their own and others' religions was revealed in the 
children's conversations. They were aware of the external, public signs of different 
traditions, 'what they do' about their religion and god (E235). Their definitions of the 
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term 'religious' brought together experience and knowledge of a varied collection of rites 
and practices, 'the phenomena' of the religions in question. It was a descriptive approach. 
When JN described himself, and CS described his Nana, as religious, they supported their 
claims with examples of practice they viewed as Christian. 
J-N: I am religious because I go to church every Sunday and I pray and I read the 
Bible and I'm good in church (C72-3). 
CS: My Nana's religious. She goes to church and she sings prayers and she goes, 
'Thank the Lord' and all that. She watches programmes about God. She watches 
programmes about Jesus (A256-8). 
When a group of children talked about the religiousness of a Muslim girl in their school 
they again gave details of practices that were 'part of her religion". 
JI: Why do you think Ayesha is [religious]? 
RA: Well, she's not allowed to watch TV. 
JK: Yes,. because it's part of her religion. She doesn't watch it. 
RJ: They're not allowed to watch TV 
RA: And she's always wearing a headscarf (D54-65). 
Their experience of religious plurality had given the children a wide knowledge of the 
different traditions they encountered, they were able to talk about fasting (A25f, B81f, 
C29f, E22f), pilgrimage (D232f), worship (A289f, B174f, D333f, 138f), celebrations 
(G47f H767f F22f), dress and dietary regulations (F3f E65f E308f, D349f D146f),. and 
281 
other customs (D161f, B242, A166) from a variety of religions. In this respect they 
showed themselves to be students of religion in the Religious Studies mode, familiar with 
religious 'phenomena' and confident in their descriptions. In these cases evaluative 
judgements were not made between religions but between degrees of religiops 
observance-, the 'strictness' (D49, D58, D101-8) with which you practice the religion that 
is yours. 
Religious Pluralism 
In their context of religious diversity, the children's words recorded above imply ? Ln 
understanding of a relationship between traditions akin to the quantitative religious 
pluralism that Wright detects in liberal teaching (Wright 2000,177). Religions were 
related and compatible. There were examples of the children positioning religions within 
a common interpretative framework; each religion has its place of worship (C5), its 
festivals (A83-88), its scriptures (D278f); religion is about believing in God, about 
prayer, about religious leaders and teachers; it is the details of content, the personalities 
or the terminology that change from tradition to tradition* 
CA: [religious means] like believe in lots of different things, like Allah for 
Muslims,. and God for Christians and all that and all different gods for Ffindus 
(A261-2). 
AN: I know loads of religious people like the pope, mosque teacher, God, priest - 
because they tell you - they help you to pray and say what you're supposed to say 
and they're religious people (A253-5). 
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SC: I think there's just one god, but people from different religions call him by 
different names (172-3) 
Much of the children's talk was about distinct religions, but the term 'religion" itself Was 
given the meaning of a universal category including within its scope the diversity of 
religious belief and practice familiar to the children. One of the questions produced ýy 
three of them for their peers was, 'Do you believe in religionT RA wished to probe 
further with the supplementary question, 'or if you do believe in religion what religion qo 
you believe inT (F240-1), setting out a relationship of the general and the particular 
between the category C religion" and the individual religious tradition. A religious person 
was defined in relation to the general category as someone who 'believes in religion' 
(A252), or who 'doesn't tease religion' (A25 1); similarly one of the teachers was 
reported as being someone who hated 'religion' (F236). 
These meanings reflected a 'global city" (Smart and Konstantine 1991,36) where the 
children were regularly brought into direct contact with other cultures, and a global,. 
pluralist ethic where to learn about their fellow human beings and be in a relationship -of 
'informed empathy' with them was a duty (Smart and Konstantine 1991,30). In the spirit 
of a pluralist ethic, the children often associated religiousness with a sympathetic interest 
in the religions of others (B535, B547-9). AK, a Hindu, described himself as religious on 
the basis of his positive attitude to the religions of others- 
AK: Yeah, like I went on a trip in the church ... - cathedral - and I 
don't tease 
Hassan even though he's a Muslim, and he's my best friend (A267-270). 
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The imperative was not just one of dialogue with our neighbour, as advocated by 
Lochhead (1988,81), but it was imperative to accept our neighbour's ideas, or even to 
'believe' in his religion and gods (F246, F258-261,1165,1168-9). This inclusive 
acceptance of the beliefs of others as equally valid is far from being universally acceptFd 
by faith traditions, however. Though its intentions may be more ethical than theologicaL 
it is grounded within a particular theological frame of reference where doctn-gal 
differences are underplayed, and so it cannot be considered entirely impartial. The 
children gave indications of the origins of such thinking in a particular, school-basFd 
understanding associated with teachers (A299), religious education, (A300), assemblies 
(A301), the educational input received at their after-school club (B'547-9), and the ýnter 
religious learning viewed as a happy outcome of multi-cultural schooling (F25 8-26 1). 
Muslim peers, by contrast, received criticism for not fitting into this liberal pluralism. 
Their problem was seen to be that 'they don't listen to other religions' (A69) or even 
believe in others" gods (F55, F245). Here we find the dilemma of liberal univer§al 
theology remarked upon by its critics (Wright 2000,172) and a conflict of world views. 
In this and other expressions of disapproval of Muslims for not accepting the truth claitps 
of other faiths (H158, F80, A133, D135-8, F225-9), the children were, in the context'of 
demands for religious tolerance, making evaluative judgements on the religious stanIs of 
others. 
5.2 4 Religion: an evaluative approach 
Above we have followed a descriptive, 'religious studies' thread through the children's 
religious understanding. As has already been hinted at, other approaches to religion were 
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also evident in their dialogue; approaches which recognised controversy in the encounter 
between different traditions and the occasional incompatibility of world views, and are 
prepared to reject elements of different traditions as wrong. These are the approaches of 
the qualitative pluralism advocated by Wright (177). Elements of ambiguity in thpir 
attitudes towards different faiths arose out of two major emphases in the children's 
representations of religion and religiousness. belief and morality. 
Questions of belief 
Belief in God was put forward as a requirement for religiousness. A religious person is 'a 
person that believes in God. (A25 1)', 'they believe in God (E226)', friends are deemed to 
be religious because 'they all believe in God (E234). It was also presented as the 
primary purpose of religions, what Lott describes as the 'integrating sacred Focus' (Lott 
1987) 
JH: Everyone has a religion so they can believe in God (E60). 
The children's knowledge of a diversity of beliefs about this ultimate reality, God, raised 
questions about the validity of tiruth claims and an element of doubt about some of the 
views that they encountered. In the discussions there were instances of the children 
weighing the religious truth claims of others against the criteria of reason (G353, F50f, 
F1 54ý. F 115-7). Occasionally religious beliefs and experiences were dismissed as 'stupid' 
or laughable (D75-8, B396). CS had difficulty with the idea of the elephant-headed 
Ganesh as a god (G309-310),. JN rejects the animism implied in AY's acceptance of the 
295 
gods of others while SN views the idea that AY, a Christian, could believe in one God 
and many at the same time as a logical contradiction* 
AY: I believe in their gods because people, like - they have like pictures of them,, 
like - they have like necklaces and things and books 
JI: So do you believe those things that they have are real - really qod? 
AY: Yeah 
JN: No! How can you believe in that? Who? - who? - Rave you ever seen a god 
that's gold - that's rock solid gold? 
SN: If you've got one god, how can you believe in other gods? (H230-4) 
Rather than 'bracketing their own presuppositions' in a non-evaluative manner 
(Grimmitt 2000,27) on questions of belief, there were several examples of the childrqn 
judging other people's religious viewpoints by their own developing theology (Wright 
20007 178). JH's discourse on God"s colour is one such. He opposed the claim by 'most 
people my colour' that God is black, with the two presuppositions that God is one and 
God is for everyone, and presented instead his theory of an inclusive God of many 
colours (F58-66). There are other examples which will be discussed later where children 
felt unable to accept unchanged ideas of God's oneness or his plurality because t4eY 
appeared to contradict the religious teaching of their home tradition. The children were 
moving from a descriptive approach to other people"s beliefs,. to a theological apprQach 
where normative judgement and creativity have a part. 
286 
Questions of morality 
Ethical norms were also employed by the children to assess religious practice. A close 
association of morality and religion was understood, in a number of the children"s 
contributions,, being good was part of the definition of being religious (C73, C79, D44)- 
JI: What does it mean to 'follow their religion'? 
JH: Do what's in their religion and don't do bad ... and 
be good (E240-2). 
Members of faith communities were criticised when they failed to live up to the teachings 
of their religion, for smoking for example (E228-9, E160-4), telling lies during Ramad; tn 
(F237), being generally naughty (D60). However, the relationship between morality and 
religion was recognised as more complex than a neat correlation between 'doing what's 
in their religion' and being 'good. The children were aware of instances where people 
did things in the name of their religion that they themselves considered morally wrong, 
notably cases of 'teasing' (HI87f), quarrelling (G99-100), corporal punishment of 
children,, as practised in some mosque schools (H32-9), and violence in some of the 
world's trouble spots (E 13 6-14 1) - 
- what they do. NA: They [Muslim friends] taught me some things about religion,, 
Sometimes they say that if we do something wrong in the mosque the headmaster 
will hit you. 
JH: And I don't think they should do that because that's wrong. That's wrong 
that's wrong to hit (E243-8). 
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J-11: He gave us life and that and there's bad people in the world killing and 
shooting each other and they're saying that - they're using God as an excuse to 
say that He said that he wants everyone to kill. He never put us on this earth to 
kill people, He put us on this earth to be friends and love each other like brothers 
and sisters (E I 1- 15). 
Much of the children's discussion of questions of morality was founded on the 
presupposition that God, by whatever name he is known, is necessarily good, and on 
fixed ideas of what that goodness amounted to: 
A: What do you imagine Allah's like? Have you any idea what he's like? 
R: Peaceful. 
JK: He must be good. 
JI: Why do you think he must be peaceful? 
CH: He's a god (D 125 -9). 
Several expressed a sure knowledge of God's Moral expectations of his people, and usýd 
this knowledge to pass judgement on the practice of others. SN, for example, knew that 
when Muslims teased him about his religion they were not acting in accordance with 
God's wishes because J know their god teached them to be good' (11194). In his 
criticism of interreligious violence above, JH spoke of God's purposes for us in terms pf 
love and friendship towards each other, of the brotherhood and sisterhood of all 
humankind (E I 1- 15); elsewhere CS spoke of the need'for 'peace on Earth" and of God's 
annoyance at our fighting and 'fuss' (G146, G99-100). 
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Divergence from ethical norms by those who claimed religious justification for their 
actions was interpreted variously by the children according to their own understanding of 
religion and religions. One theory put forward was that religion was good and so those 
who acted against the moral certainties on which the children's judgements were basqd, 
must be misinterpreting or disobeying their religion. In particular, those who used 
religion to justify violence were portrayed in this way- 
JH: Like people that were shooting in Ireland and Algeria - slitting people's heads 
if they prayed to God they're praying to him for no reason (EI29-13-1). 
NA: You know those people in Algeria, those Muslims who are cutting their throats,, 
I think that they"re not being proper Muslims, they're not following their religion, I 
don"t think (E138-141). 
Another view was held by CS. Where he found a contradiction between the teaching of a 
religion (Islam) and what he saw as a fundamental right of humans, he was prepared to 
question the very foundation of that religion; to separate its teaching from what God 
really wants. He was not just judging practice, but passing judgement on a religious 
worldview. 
CS: I think that Muslim religion is wrong to - that they can't eat certain things 
and can't do certain things because everyone has a right to do what they feel is 
right. 
J11: So when they say Allah tells us we must do this and we mustn't do thiý, do 
you think that is wrong9 
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CS: Yeah, because he's not telling you that - it's just some person who's wrote a 
book and they don't even know if all the stories are true or not. They're just 
saying that they are (G3 55 -3 63) 
Religion: a human or divine creation 
CS's picture of 'Muslim religion' as being 'some person who's wrote this book' movps 
the discussion on from the external phenomena of religions, the practices and beliefs, to 
questions of their foundation. In this exchange he raised again the issue of the 
relationship between religions and God, and gave support to the idea of religions as 
human creations that was implicit in his model of a new religion (GI 15f). His solution to 
present inter-religious conflict was that people should get together and 'make one big 
religion that no one disagrees with" (G127). Like other children in the study (GI64r. 6, 
H134,172-3), CS saw a significant link between religious and linguistic diversity. In his 
account, a religion was something that could be created by people getting together aqd 
working out their terminology. It could be formulated by humans using 'appropriate' 
words, presumably words that would be recognised by all. Underlying the argument wýs 
the idea that harmony depended on people speaking 'the same religious language'. 
However, this emphasis on human activity did not exclude a divine perspective on he 
world. Indeed,. CS's model of a new religion was predicated on an understanding of God 
as I just there'(G125),, above and beyond religions, looking down on humankind biblical 
fashion,. distressed by our transgressions- 
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CS: But what I think is,, God's getting quite annoyed now 'cos everyone's just 
making a fuss. He thinks that you should just settle your differences and all be the 
same (G99-101). 
In answer to his friend, JSs hesitations about his model,, CS was very clear that while 
you can create a new religion, 'no one can make a new God' (G123). 
JS proposed a different view of the relationship between God and religions. He gave GQd 
greater involvement in their foundation and questioned the ability of humankind to create 
a religion themselves. 
JS: You can't make a new religion really, can you? (G 128) 
In JS's scheme it was for God to make a new religion- 
JS: Like say God came down to Earth today, sort of like to settle it down (GI 3 ý). 
If someone took God's soul into their body and became 'something like God' (G143), 
then (perhaps) he could say he had "made a new religion' (G145). 
From these two views of religion a new model emerged that combined human and divine 
activity. CS was prepared to incorporate JSs ideas into his scheme, but would not let go 
of his idea of the importance of human activity. The result, illustrated with a fairytale 
analogy, was an understanding of religion as a reciprocal relationship, not just njan's 
response to God but God responding to man- 
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CS: But I think it's going to need someone that gives a lot of dedication to his 
name before he can come down to Earth,, then he can actually take on that 
person s body ... 
People have to do something first before God gives them 
something back. Like it"s if a fairy -a fairy"s not going to start doing it for yoLl - 
like say they're going to put a new suit on - you're not going to just stand there 
and get a new suit on - like you're going to have to twirl around or somethitig - 
just do a little thing until the fairy actually does something (G 13 8- 15 2). 
In their representation of religion and religious traditions the children were got 
disengaged from theological commitment, but their understanding of God, his nature and 
his purposes formed part of their interpretive framework. In their thoughts they showed 
themselves to be 'ideologically aware' (Wright 2000,180), dealing directly with 
transcendence (Whaling 1885,207), with an ultimate reality, to whom their evaluation of 
other religions was one response, 
5.2.4 Theology 
While Lott stressed that our response to a plurality of religions is informed by opr 
particular theological perspective (Lott 1987,255), Smart and Konstantine argued that 
the theology of their particular, Christian, tradition, must acquire a 'plural outreac4% 
blending ideas from different worldviews, in response to the modern, religiously diverse 
world in which we live (Smart and Konstantine 199 1 ý. 
5-0-5 1). This combination of pripr 
belief and creative, 'constructivist' thinking, the dialogue between continuity and 
discontinuity, is discernable in the children's own thinking. This chapter has alrea0y 
demonstrated how the children's interpretation of a plurality of religions was influenced 
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by their prior knowledge of God. We now explore their understanding of God as it 
developed in this context of religious diversity. The subject of what follows is the 
children's theology. 
Questions of epistemology 
In the discussions the children's arguments were markedly God-centred. For the most 
part they argued ftom and not fOr the existence of God. All taking part accepted the 
reality of God and made little attempt to give grounds for belief in his existence. Only 
when they were seeking arguments to defend a position against Islam, did proof of God's 
(or a particular god's) existence become an issue. JK put proof as a requirement for bellpf 
when she questioned the grounds for the mosque leaders' teaching about a god they had 
not seen (F154-5). She was not consistent in her views, however. When she wanted-to 
prove the existence of her (Hindu) god in the face of the scepticism of her Muslim peers 
she used belief itself as evidence of her gocr's existence; because she believed in him, he 
must be real. JK related her responses to her critics on two separate occasions* 
JK: I believe in my god - if your god- made me then how come I believe in my 
god? (F81-2) 
JK: I say, 'If the devil made me then how come - how come I've got my own 
god; how come I believe in my gods? ' (F 116-7) 
In these words JK brought together two episternologies- God being known by her as hýr 
own god, and that god's existence being inferred by others (in this case by the Muslims) 
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fTom her belief in him. This combination of the given and the inferred is present in the 
following exchange, where children were asked for their ideas of what Allah is like. 
RA: Peaceful. 
JK: He must be good. 
JI: Why do you think he must be peaceful'? 
CH: He's God. 
RA: Because lots of people respect him and if he was bad I don't think they 
would (D 126-13 1). 
For CH, that Allah is good is given by the fact of his being God; for RA that Allah is 
good is inferred from other people's respect for him. This dual understanding 
incorporates both the certainties of one's own faith and inherited belief system and a 
pluralist ethic that requires openness to the beliefs,, or 'gods' of others. With these two 
sources of knowledge of the divine, come two levels of theological knowledge. Though 
many of the children both demanded and displayed acceptance of the beliefs of others, 
the greater certainty with which they held to their own religion often left them with p 
uncertainty, expressed in hesitant or non committal responses, about the truth claims of 
different traditions. 
JE [Christian]: I believe in loads of gods but I don't know more about them than 
my God (B422). 
JA[Hindul: We believe in Krishna but we don't believe in Jesus because we 
don't know if it's true or not. 
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JE [Christian]: I know for a fact. (B276-8) 
RA [Christian]: Not only Muslims think Allah's their god, some other people 
think that he is. 
JI: Do you think he is? 
RA: Probably (D 13 r- 13 4). 
It was often the commitment to the beliefs oftheir own tradition that made the acceptance 
of differing views a problem (A223, H109, HI I I)- 
SN [Christian]: If you've got one god how can you befieve in other gpds? 
(H23 7) 
JI: So if a Muslim talks about Allah,. do you think he's talking about the 4ame 
god? 
AK [Hindu]: I don't know because we have lots of gods (G75-9). 
Loyalty to the faith with which they identified worked against the children's adoption of 
a relativist approach by which any belief position is equally vali&, yet the force of the 
pluralist ethic required that this loyalty did not exclude other worldviews. The dialogue 




The main focus of the children's religious thinking was God and their theology was 
stimulated by efforts to reconcile the different and multiple forms in which he is known 
and names by which he is described. One offshoot of this emphasis was týe 
understanding of Jesus expressed by the Christian children. Where Jesus was mentioned 
he was not talked of as a moral exemplar or personal ffiend, but as God (A223, BZ9f, 
B3107 H137-8). His divinity was stressed; he corresponded in Christlan thinking to Allah 
in Muslim thought-. 
Al: There's one Allah, one Jesus and things like that (177). 
Reasons for this high Christology might in part be due to a general atmosphere of thought 
in which God is so important, and to the need of Christian children to have a distinpt 
religious identity. 'God' was a very general term used for the Muslim god and Hindu 
gods. The name 'Jesus' was specific to Christianity, so for children to call God 'Jesus' 
marked them out as Christians. This was the name they brought to the inter faith 
dialogue- 
A [talking to a IFEndu boy] We call ours Jesus and theirs - the Muslims call 
theirs Allah,, and what do you call yours? (186-7) 
Where Jesus was simply understood as another name for God rather than as a person of 
the Trinity, it was not difficult for Christians to reconcile their belief with Muslim 
monotheism, provided the desire for reconciliation was there. Ambiguity in approaches to 
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the truth claims of Islam could be traced not so much to contradictions between the 
central beliefs of the two traditions, as to fluctuations in the relationships between týe 
Christians and Muslims in the school. The same children at one time rejected as false 
basic Muslim beliefs and at others were happy to incorporate them Into their general viqw 
of God. The relationship of context and audience to the children's choice of meanings has 
been examined in earlier chapters (Chapters 3.1,3.2). Under pressure from peers JS- and 
AY reacted defensively with an attack on or denial of Allah- 
JS: I love Jesus and I hate Allah (overheard in a classroom conversation). 
AY: And they come round saying - we started arguing, this boy and me - and 
they say, C Allah created the world' and I say "No, he didn't' (HI 54-5). 
Yet both children in discussion detailed their belief that Allah and God, Allah and Jesus 
were the same: 
JS: I think there's Allah, God, whatever, they're just the same thing. It's a waste 
of time making them different (G162-3). 
AY: I think there's one [god] and he's called different things (HI06). 
Unity and Plurality 
A greater theological challenge was posed when the children were confronted with a 
choice between the unity and the plurality of God. There were two main directions in 
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which their meaning moved when they sought to reconcile these positions- either 
different religions, by relating to God in different ways, have obscured God's unity apd 
created the impression of a plurality of gods, or God, who is himself both one and many, 
uses the diversity within his own being to relate to people in different ways; that is, either 
plurality is a phenomenon of religions that has been applied to God, or plurality is 
inherent in God. Both answer the puzzle posed by SN of how, if you have one god, you 
can believe in many. (14237) 
The role of language, particularly of names, was very important to the idea of plurality 
created by religions. As different religions use different terms it might appear that each 
has a different god, but, many insisted, there is in fact only one god known by njany 
names (H238, B447, G71-2, H106, H134-5,172-3)- 
JN: It's one god with different names so we believe in all the gods (H238). 
CS: It's just the same thing. Allah's just the same as God in a different language. 
JS: Yeah, just like they speak in Gujarati, they're saying like the same thiný but 
in a different language. Like - er - so you can say "Allah" in Gujarati? 
AK: No. 
JS: That means ... what's 
God in Gujarati? 
AK: Bhagavan. 
JS: That means you call Allah, Bhagavan (G164-170). 
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Reconciling Allah and the Christian god in this way presented few problems, but the case 
of Hinduism was more difficult because the children saw within this tradition belief in a 
multiplicity of gods- 
JN: What I think - what I've been brought up to believe is, there's one god and 
there's all kinds of names. 
AY: Yeah, like there's ninety-nine names. 
JN: So I don't like say all the things you're calling Shiva. I know, like, Allah as 
Jesus because I believe Jesus is just one god or you call Allah just one *od. 
(11134-8) 
JN was not only puzzled by the challenge of incorporating Hindu understanding into his 
own scheme of belief, but he also found it hard to imagine how the Hindus themselves 
could cope with the practicalities involved in worshipping so many deities. 
JN: Do you praise every one of them ... 
Like we pray to Jesus - do you have to 
pray to all of them? (H12Q-4) 
JS was fascinated by the concept of many gods and insistent in his cross-examination of 
his Hindu friend,, but he found it hard to imagine, suggesting Hindus would eventually 
put aside their belief in plural gods to focus their worship on one- 
JS: How many [gods] are there? Do you know? Have you got over - at least 
fifteen gods? Over - 
AK: I only know some of them because I think there's a lot more than I know. 
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JS: Do you think there's about over fifteen? 
AK: Yeah. I've got some pictures in my house but I don't think I've got all. 
JS: But one day will more ... Do you go to a temple? Will your temple stick to 
one god one day, any day? (G175-182) 
For the Hindu children themselves plurality became a problem when they were led (often 
by Christian or Muslim peers) to think about the difference between having one god and 
having many. Some of their responses reflected this difficulty with replies of 'I don't 
know', 'we don't know'. 'I'm not sure' (G183, G195, G79, B447-8,176) to questions 
asking whether they believe in other people's gods and how many gods they believe in. 
New theologies 
The difficulty of fitting the Hindu children's ideas of the plurality of God into a 
monotheistic framework,, where the same one God was known by many names, was the 
starting point for some creative theological thinking in mixed Hindu and Christian 
discussion groups. A dialogue between three Christians and three Hindus began with this 
problem- 
AY: I think there's one [god] and he's called different things. 
NA: I was going to say that! 
TH: Miss, we can't actually say that because we've got so many gods. 
AY: Yeah,. but they could be called - em - 
SH: You have to believe in all of them because all of them have got something 
different, like special (H 106-112). 
3 
As recorded in an earlier chapter (chapter 4.1), the children proceeded to negotiate a new 
understanding of God that included elements of both a monotheistic and polytheisýic 
tradition and so could be acceptable to all of them. In this understanding, there was one 
God with 'many features' who could 'come into anybody' and 'change into anything". At 
the end of the exchange, TR linked this idea to the incarnate god (Sai Baba) to whom her 
family offer devotion. The plurality here was a plurality of God's own making; a plur4lity 
in the way he chose to reveal himself in the world. 
Another theory of a plurality inherent in God, was present in JH's description of a goý of 
many colours; his diversity of colours meant that he could relate to all people: 
JH: I think there's only one god and he's everyone's god so he's got tp be 
everyone's different colour (F64-5). 
Another way in which unity and diversity were combined was in a theological mooel 
which assigned different status to the various divinities of different religious traditions. 
JK and RA, a Hindu and a Christian, started ftom a discussion of the status of Krishna to 
develop this system of diminishing divinity emanating from a supreme being and 
embrajing a multiplicity of divine beings. They began by bringing to their definition of 
Krishna concepts from a variety of faith traditions: prophets from Islam; angels from 
Christianity; messengers from both; gods from Hinduism. They then drew their i0eas 
together in the following image- 
RA: Like you've got one big god and then you've got lots of little gpds. 
JK: Little, little gods 
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RA: Little gods which come from him. 
JK: Like you have a mum and all the little children and all that. 
RA: Yes,. like you've got God and he's got a little child and then another little 
one. 
JK: No,, and then the children's got toys. 
RA: And then they get - and then they fly away and have their babies and you 
carry on. 
JK: And then the children have toys and that's us (D221-8). 
Later in the discussion RA returned to the model the two of them had created to include 
priests, at the lower levels of the diyine-. 
RA: [A priest] is like a little god'who takes over - not takes over, he looks after a 
church or somewhere like that. He helps people (D299). 
The children were not only working from existing theological frameworks, but wqre 
constructing new frameworks within which the God of a plural world could be 
understood. In this model,. as in those of a God of many colours or of many features (let 
out above), the children were developing theologies of universal application. Their 
universality was grounded in the underlying realism of the children's thought. Faced with 
a variety of belief systems and languages about God, the children did not move into a 
relativist understanding, but held to the belief that what is true is true for everyone; the 
challenge was to find what that truth might be. 
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In this analysis of the children's meaning, we have observed their developing theology 
and have also indicated how that theology has evolved through their engagement with týe 
context of religious plurality in which they live. Their knowledge of a variety of religious 
beliefs and practices was not the end of their study of religion, but rather supplied a bapk 
of meaning and association to challenge and resource their search for religious 
understanding. Their own personal belief, whether in one god or many, provided a threýd 
of continuity and an organising principle for their meaning-making. The move we have 
traced is the progression from worldview analysis to world view construction (Smart and 
Konstantine 1991,50). In their book, Smart and Konstantine wrote of the task of the 
theologian who uses the analytical tools of religious studies, yet works on (and within) an 
evolving framework of faith and religiousness- 
The Christian theologian may use tools and techniques which are the same ýs 
those of the analyst and historian. But she is still building up a system and a 
vision, and doing that is manifesting faith and manifesting religiousness. 13ýt 
because she is making religion, she is part of the data, in the long run, of the 
modern study of religion as worldview analysis. (33) 
It is from such activity, at the same time grounded and creative, that the children's 
meanings emerged. Those meanings in turn, like the religion of the Christian theologiap,, 
have been the subject of my scrutiny and analysis, and so have become the material for a 
religious study (this chapter) that has aimed to be descriptive, yet will not have Peen 
entirely uninfluenced by the theological preconceptions of the author. 
3U.. ) 
End Note 
Since the discussions that constitute the subject of this project took place,, there have bef n 
many changes in the lives of the young people involved. Some of these changes I can 
only guess at, others I know. All the children whose words are recorded here have n9w 
left the school and moved on to secondary education and into adolescence. In the school 
and neighbourhood the arrival of large numbers of Somali families from Holland apd 
Scandinavia,, has added a new dynamic and introduced another model of Islam. Several 
key events on the international scene have also had repercussions in the young peoplý's 
lives. At the time of writing, local encounters between different faith traditions have as 
their global backdrop, the events and consequences of the September I 1"" 2001; the 
escalation of conflict in the Middle East; communal violence between Hindu and Musl Im 
groups in the Gujarati homeland of many Leicester families. New meanings have been 
added to the bank of resources from which the children draw their religious 
understanding. 
The speed with which the children's environment has changed highlights the histori $ al 
status of any dialogue once it has been written down, and the provisional nature of any 
conclusions that are made; each is 'but one link in a continuous chain' (Hol ist 19ý0, 71 qu 
59). In keeping with this project's emphasis on process and movement in understanding, 
these changes underline the fact that what we are working with is a 'living word', ppen 
not closed,. constantly in dialogue and never completed. 
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